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Abstract 
 The present thesis examines the idea of aesthetic education of three eminent 
Victorians: John Stuart Mill, Matthew Arnold and John Ruskin. By focusing on the 
essence of what they meant with „the cultivation of the beautiful‟ and, more 
importantly, the way their ideas of beauty informed their criticism of society, my 
study aims to contribute to our understanding of the idea of aesthetic education in the 
Victorian context and, further, to participate in a recent debate about the nature of 
beauty and aesthetic education. 
 Chapter One focuses on John Stuart Mill‟s concept of „feeling‟ in a series of 
essays. I will demonstrate how Mill‟s idea of „aesthetic education‟ was an „education 
of feelings,‟ and moreover, how this idea was integrated into his literary criticism, his 
later critique of democratisation, his description of an ideal liberal society and even 
his own style of writing. Chapter Two contains a comparative study of Matthew 
Arnold and Friedrich Schiller. Through a rereading of Arnold, I will argue that his 
idea of aesthetic education is essentially Schillerian and that their resemblance 
consists primarily in their stress on the importance of aesthetic unity for modern life, 
which was becoming increasingly fragmentary and multitudinous. Chapter Three 
examines John Ruskin‟s idea of aesthetic education and concentrates particularly on 
the cultivation of perception. Perception, as I shall show, was pivotal in Ruskin‟s idea 
of aesthetic education. Just as what happened in Mill and Arnold, the emphasis on the 
education of seeing continued from his early writings well into his art and social 
criticisms. It not only differentiated him from his fellow art critics; the conviction that 
people should perceive with a pure heart also enabled him to link observation of 
artistic details with moral criticism of contemporary society and, thereby, to turn the 
cultivation of the beautiful into a moral-aesthetic experience.  
 
 
 
 
 2 
Copyright Statement 
 The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without the written consent of the author and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
Beauty for the Present: Mill, Arnold, Ruskin and Aesthetic 
Education 
 
 
 
Chun Huang 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Department of English Studies 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in Durham University 
 
 
2012 
 
 
 4 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7 
INTRODUCTION 8 
CHAPTER 1 ‘THE EDUCATION OF THE FEELINGS’: JOHN STUART 
MILL AND AESTHETIC EDUCATION 20 
Mill and Aesthetic Education 20 
The Evolution of Feelings: Aesthetic Education in Mill’s Essays on Poetry 28 
„Loneliness and Intensity‟: Feeling in „What is Poetry‟ 28 
Cultivated Feeling: „The Two Kinds of Poetry‟ 39 
Feelings and Democracy: Aesthetic Education in ‘Civilisation’ 47 
„Pleasures in Cooperation‟: Civilisation Redefined 47 
„The Rising of the Masses‟: Critique of Democracy 55 
The Question of Authority: Mill as an Aesthetic Educator 62 
Elitist or Liberal: Aesthetic Education and the „Cultivated Few‟ 62 
A Logician Poet: Mill in „Bentham‟ and „Coleridge‟ 70 
Conclusion 83 
CHAPTER 2 ‘A MAJESTIC UNITY’: MATTHEW ARNOLD’S 
SCHILLERIAN AESTHETIC EDUCATION 87 
‘Cromwell’ and ‘Cassandra’: Arnold and Schiller 87 
‘One Aim, One Business, One Desire’: Aesthetic Education in ‘The 
Scholar-Gipsy’ 95 
„The Unity of the Ideal‟: Schiller‟s Aesthetic Education 95 
The Binding Effect of Imagination: the Aesthetic of „The Scholar-Gipsy‟ 102 
 5 
Against Multitudinousness: the Scholar-Gipsy as a Schillerian Aesthetic Ideal 107 
The Unified and Animating Action: Aesthetic Education in Arnold’s Literary 
Criticism 116 
What is „Action‟? Arnold‟s Debate with his Critics 116 
„Unified‟ and „Animating‟: „Action‟ as a Schillerian Concept 122 
Hellenism for the Present Time: Arnold and Schiller‟s Classicism 126 
‘Grand Style’ and ‘Aesthetic State’: Aesthetic Education in Arnold’s Social 
Criticism 131 
„Grand Style‟: Aesthetic Education for the Middle Classes 131 
„Aesthetic State‟: the Social End of Aesthetic Education 136 
Conclusion 144 
CHAPTER 3 BEHOLD AND BE GOOD: JOHN RUSKIN’S AESTHETIC 
EDUCATION AS AN EDUCATION OF THE EYES 149 
The King of the Golden River: Ruskin’s Aesthetics of Seeing 149 
‘The Authority of the Beautiful and the True’: Modern Painters and the Idea of 
Perception 155 
A Professional Campaign: Rippingille‟s Aesthetic Education 156 
A Devotion to Classics: Hazlitt as an Aesthetic Educator 161 
„Authoritative and Inviolable‟: Perception, Nature and Ruskin‟s Aesthetic 
Education 166 
Perceiving ‘with a Pure Heart’: Imagination and Morality in Ruskin’s Aesthetic 
Education 174 
Modern Painters II: From „Perception‟ to „Imagination‟ 174 
„The Pure in Heart‟: Morality and Aesthetic Experience 178 
The Stones of Venice: Allegorical Readings and Morality 182 
 6 
Beauty and Industry: Woman and Aesthetics in ‘Of Queens’ Gardens’ 190 
„The Stars Only May Be Over Her Head‟: Woman as an Aesthetic Ideal 190 
The Identity of the Queen: a Paradoxical Female Ideal 194 
Beauty in the Age of Industrialisation: The Dilemma of Aesthetic Education 199 
Conclusion 207 
CONCLUSION 211 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 226 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
Acknowledgements 
 
My deepest gratitude goes first and foremost to my supervisor Dr Simon Grimble. 
His great knowledge of the subject and professional instructions provide me the most 
valuable help that I could ever imagine; and I would also like to thank him for his 
warm encouragement and patience, which have sustained me through frustration and 
depression. 
My sincere thanks also go to my advisor Professor Timothy Clark at Durham and 
professors back in the English Department of Peking University. They have all given 
me many insightful comments concerning my doctoral research as well as the present 
dissertation. I am delighted to acknowledge generous help from China Scholarship 
Council (Chinese Government Scholarship) and Durham University (Durham 
Doctoral Fellowship), which provided full financial support for my study.  
I also thank my friends both in and outside Durham. I owe a great deal to a great 
many people: among them Camila the „boss,‟ whose housekeeping skills and jigsaw 
talents have been totally inspirational; Yvonne Wong, who spoiled me with her 
wonderful cooking; Feng Liang, who has been my closest friend for the past fifteen 
years; and people from St. Chad‟s College, who have brightened my life with their 
kindness, cheerfulness and efficiency, and my special thanks should go to Stephanie 
Eichberg for her great help with proofreading. 
Last but not least, I would like say thank-you to my parents. To make a long story 
short: they are the best parents ever. 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Introduction 
The present thesis contains thematic portraits of three Victorian figures: John 
Stuart Mill, Matthew Arnold and John Ruskin; the theme is „aesthetic education.‟ The 
association between „Victorian‟ and „aesthetic‟ as such is not innovative. After all, 
aestheticism is a nineteenth-century phenomenon which had a large impact upon 
Victorian Britain. One can easily think of, for example, Walter Pater‟s The 
Renaissance, or William Morris‟ immensely popular floral designs, or even that green 
carnation in Oscar Wilde‟s buttonhole. Compared with these distinct images from 
Victorian aesthetes, however, the earlier part of the nineteenth century appears 
surprisingly blurred when it comes to the word „aesthetic.‟  
In some cases, the picture is blurred either because there are too few touches on 
the subject or because the focus of study has been too narrow. When Colin Heydt 
completed his Rethinking Mill's Ethics: Character and Aesthetic Education in 2006, 
he mentioned in the preface that Mill‟s aesthetic ideas were „surprisingly 
understudied.‟1 This remark was very true then, and, regrettably, it still is. Critics 
have got so much used to Mill the Benthamite rational thinker that they have almost 
forgotten the fact that the man had developed his interest in the cultivation of beauty 
at a very early stage of his career, and that he eventually became a determined 
promoter of aesthetic education. When Mill announced in his St. Andrews speech that 
a well-devised education should involve not only the cultivation of the intellectual and 
the moral but must also include that of the aesthetic, he was actually making a 
succinct summary of one of his own life-long pursuits. However, many critics of Mill 
have overlooked this point. After Heydt‟s book came out, studies in this field still 
remain scarce. In fact, even Heydt‟s book does not offer a complete picture. Restricted 
to the discipline of moral philosophy, the book does not pay much attention to other 
aspects such as Mill‟s literary achievements, which, I believe, is never to be ignored 
in any study of Mill‟s aesthetic ideas.  
                                                        
1 Colin Heydt, Rethinking Mill’s Ethics: Character and Aesthetic Education (London: Continuum, 2006) 2. 
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A similar problem exists in the study of Arnold and Ruskin‟s aesthetic ideas, even 
though these two thinkers are not exactly understudied. There are quite a few works in 
this area, but very often the subject is approached through a narrow focus. Thus it is 
common to see Arnold being portrayed as a devotee to the artistic and the literary, as 
if „aesthetic‟ means nothing more than poetry and art. In this respect, one could refer 
to Matthew Potolsky‟s article „Hardy, Shaftesbury, and Aesthetic Education‟ and 
Ralph A. Smith‟s section on Arnold in Culture and the Arts in Education: Critical 
Essays on Shaping Human Experience. The former describes Arnold‟s „theory of 
aesthetic education‟ as cultivation through „beauty of art and literature,‟2 and the 
latter alleges that he has found in Arnold‟s writings much concern for aesthetic 
education, that is, „a conviction of the importance of excellence in art education.‟3 In 
George Landow‟s The Aesthetic and Critical Theories of John Ruskin, which is 
indisputably a landmark study of Ruskin‟s aesthetic ideas, the author, too, focuses 
mainly on the artistic. Beginning with ut pictura poesis and concluding with Ruskin‟s 
opinions of Turner, the book is in fact a study of Ruskin‟s art theory. All of the critics 
mentioned here can probably be excused on the ground that they are talking about 
„aesthetic‟ as it is most likely to be understood in our present context, where art and 
literature are usually perceived to be the most crucial vessels of beauty. But in my 
view, this approach does not do full justice to the original ideas. Beauty for Arnold 
and Ruskin, as I shall demonstrate, refers not only to artistic merit; rather, it is a 
powerful antidote against industrialisation, a principle to be observed in daily life and, 
ultimately, an ideal for human society. Considering the complexity of the concept of 
„beauty,‟ therefore, another rethinking of their ideas of aesthetic education is still 
necessary. 
Such rethinking is also necessary for another reason. Heydt‟s chief goal, as he 
himself acknowledged, was to examine Mill‟s „aesthetic education‟ as a „notion,‟ and, 
therefore, his study very often centred on what this notion was.
4
 So it was the same 
                                                        
2 Matthew Potolsky, „Hardy, Shaftesbury, and Aesthetic Education,‟ Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 46.4 
(2006) 863-78, at 864. 
3 Ralph A. Smith, Culture and the Arts in Education: Critical Essays on Shaping Human Experience (New York: 
Teachers College P, 2006) xvii. 
4 Heydt 8. 
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with studies by Potolsky and Smith. The questions they have brought forward include, 
for instance, what is the „primary desideratum‟ of their aesthetic education, what are 
the „important mechanisms‟ for that education and what is the „intellectual milieu‟ that 
motivated this idea. My study, however, is informed by a slightly different concern. 
Apart from examining what these ideas are, I am also interested, first, in the way that 
these ideas have been communicated and, secondly, the way they have been 
developed. When I look at Mill, Arnold and Ruskin as aesthetic educators, I see them 
not as specialists in the theory of aesthetic education (which is how they are portrayed 
by Heydt and others) but as people who constantly provided the public with 
instructions on the value of beauty and the means to obtain beauty. For sure, their 
relationship with their readers cannot be simplified as one between teacher and pupils. 
Nevertheless, the media they adopted – newspapers, lectures and pamphlets – remind 
us of how much effort they had made to influence and shape the mind of their 
audience. Moreover, I shall also pay particular attention to the way that these ideas 
had been developed. This is based on the observation that these thinkers addressed the 
issue of beauty at different stages of their life and, in each stage, presented different 
ideas to their audiences. Sometimes they changed their mind completely and had to 
revise what was formerly said, while in other cases, they came up with new topics and 
found it necessary to adapt their principles to new concerns. As a result, within 
decades, their understanding of beauty was constantly modified and enriched. Thus, 
while trying to answer what these notions are, I think it is equally important to reflect 
on the formation of those notions by giving special consideration to their diversity and 
„progressiveness.‟ 
But the present thesis is not just about methodology. While demonstrating a 
different approach to the idea of aesthetic education in the Victorian age, my study 
also responds to a popular critical opinion concerning the nature of „aesthetic 
education.‟ Some critics now insist that the cultivation of beauty is nothing but a 
disguise of the desire to dominate, and very often they would draw on theories 
developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and his work Distinction: A 
Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, which was first published in 1979. This 
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work features a fieldwork study of the correlation between aesthetic preferences and 
class. Examining the taste of people from various social backgrounds in 1960s France, 
Bourdieu draws the conclusion that aesthetics is in fact a product of a whole range of 
social assets. He terms these assets „capital,‟ and the three most important forms of 
capital, according to him, are the cultural, the social and the economic. In other words, 
it is factors such as upbringing, education and financial status that decide an 
individual‟s idea of what beauty is. Since difference in taste is largely an index to 
class „distinction,‟ the very notion of „aesthetics‟ – which, as Bourdieu argues, 
designates a taste pure and superior – expresses merely „the ethos of the dominated 
fraction of the dominant class.‟5 The attempt to disseminate the idea of beauty, 
consequently, signifies the attempt of the bourgeois to dominate over the labouring 
classes: 
 
The denial of the lower, coarse, vulgar, venal, servile – in a word, natural – 
enjoyment, which constitutes the sacred sphere of culture, implies an 
affirmation of the superiority of those who can be satisfied with the 
sublimated, refined, disinterested, gratuitous, distinguished pleasure forever 
closed to the profane.
 6 
 
Bourdieu thereby concludes, „that is why art and cultural consumption are 
predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfill a social function of 
legitimating social difference.‟7 
 Distinction is a monumental work in the theory of aesthetics, and its influence 
goes far beyond the field of sociology. Many students in Victorian studies have 
adopted the theoretical framework provided by Bourdieu. In the essay „The Education 
of the Innocent Eye,‟ Kazys Varnelis analyses John Ruskin‟s aesthetic ideals in „the 
innocent eye‟ and concludes, citing Bourdieu‟s theory, that 
 
the belief in pure aesthetic perception – of which the innocent eye is a 
manifestation – is founded on class distinction. To perceive a work of art, 
                                                        
5 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1984) 7. 
6 Bourdieu, Distinction 7. 
7 Bourdieu, Distinction 7. 
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Bourdieu explains, is „an act of deciphering, decoding, which presupposes 
practical or explicit mastery of a cipher or code.‟ […] The cultural 
competency needed to perform this act of deciphering is the result of our 
upbringing and functions as an indirect marker of class.
8
 
 
Pam Morris, in a similar vein, applies Bourdieu‟s theory to a reading of Charles 
Dickens‟ Our Mutual Friend. Morris‟ study focuses particularly on the „split‟ in 
British society in the 1860s: the dramatic increase of commercial wealth on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, the middle classes‟ discomfort at the working classes‟ 
growing demands for equality. Highlighting such social phenomena, Morris rereads 
Dickens‟ depiction of the aesthetic choices of different characters as a representation 
of the grim power relationships in Victorian culture.
9
 Yet, Dickens is not the sole 
target. The thesis of Morris‟ essay extends further as she moves from the criticism of 
the novel to the criticism of „the ideology of cultural capitalism,‟ which, according to 
her, is embodied in the Victorian discourse of aesthetics: 
 
Clearly, for any writer who believes that literature should contribute to 
cultural elevation, there is seductive power in the ideology of cultural 
capitalism, stylized as disinterestedness, inborn taste, „sweetness and light,‟ as 
Arnold terms it. However, recognizing that this opposition of styles and tastes 
is the symbolic ground of struggle for dominance within the dominant class 
itself suggests that there are strict limits to the transformative potential of […] 
social disaffection.
10
 
 
 So, discussions of beauty are not just useless; the transformative power of 
aesthetic perception, as these critics have tried to point out, is a sham, while people 
who led the discussions – Arnold, Ruskin and Dickens, among others – were all 
hopelessly naive or even malicious. By preaching „sweetness and light‟ and the 
principle of the „innocent eye,‟ the Victorians, in the view of these critics, acted as 
perpetuators of an ideology of capitalism and became, in this way, exercisers of 
„seductive powers.‟ Consequently, all the social disaffections avowed in the 
                                                        
8 Kazys Varnelis, „The Education of the Innocent Eye,‟ Journal of Architectural Education 51.4 (1998) 212-23, at 
219. 
9 Pam Morris, „A Taste for Change in Our Mutual Friend: Cultivation or Education?‟ Rethinking Victorian Culture 
ed. Juliet John and Alice Jenkins (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000) 179-93, at 189. 
10 Morris 190. 
 13 
discussions of beauty also amount to nothing but an egoistic middle-class wish for 
control. With this, we have once again, arrived at the conclusion of Bourdieu‟s social 
studies: the whole issue of aesthetic education is but a myth, a disguise for the 
appetite for dominance.  
 Such an argument does not go unchallenged. Linda Dowling, for instance, is 
among those who have raised disagreements with Bourdieu. In her work The 
Vulgarization of Art: the Victorian and Aesthetic Democracy, Dowling notes a recent 
change in the way that people look at Victorian „talks about beauty.‟ The critics 
nowadays, Dowling observes, are not willing to take seriously the „grand objects‟ of 
Victorian discussions of beauty; moreover, „there is a certain tendency in 
contemporary criticism to regard the very idea of the aesthetic as a mystification.‟11 
According to Dowling, Bourdieu‟s Distinction plays a significant role in this 
mystification, and it is therefore time to call on a different judgment. „[T]aking history 
seriously,‟ she says, „means taking with equal seriousness the power of social 
redemption that writers like Ruskin and Morris were ready to attribute to the 
aesthetic.‟12 In the present thesis, I stand with Dowling, and my study shall challenge 
Bourdieu‟s idea of aesthetics by highlighting Victorian aesthetic education as a means 
towards social redemption. But since the main body of my work will be focusing on 
the ideas of three Victorian individuals rather than present-day criticism, I think it is 
necessary to identify here some fallacies in contemporary criticisms or, to be more 
specific, to discuss, however briefly, why Bourdieu‟s theory is not entirely applicable 
to the Victorian context. 
 The weakness, I think, lies first of all in Bourdieu‟s own theory. It 
overemphasises the importance of power relationships and, as a result, negates the 
possibility of change and self-reflection. According to Bourdieu, there is a 
practice-generating formula for people in any given social and cultural context: 
[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice. By habitus, he means  
 
                                                        
11 Linda Dowling, The Vulgarization of Art: the Victorian and Aesthetic Democracy (Charlottesville: U of Virginia 
P, 1996) x. 
12 Dowling x. 
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a system of durable, transposable, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structure, that is, as principles which generate and 
organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their 
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends of an express 
mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.
13
 
 
Speaking of capital, Bourdieu includes a whole range of resources supplied to social 
actors in specific contexts, such as economic capital, education capital, social capital 
and cultural capital. Unlike habitus, which is the term of the general setting, „capitals‟ 
refer to qualities which, attached to each individual, affect their „outcomes‟ at a micro 
level. The concept of „field,‟ however, indicates a factor different from both. As 
Jonathan Eastwood explains, the word is not used by Bourdieu to denote realms such 
as medicine and law; neither does it refer to any „ground‟ that groups and classifies 
individuals; rather, it is specifically a ground of battle or, to borrow a metaphor from 
physics, a field of power. A given field, in this sense, represents „the forces of polarity 
that exert pressures on the agents that move within it.‟14 Thus to examine the ideas 
and behaviour of any individual within a given society, it is imperative to take note of 
three factors: first, the general social settings; second, the resources of the individual – 
economic status, position within the class stratification, education background and 
cultural origin, etc.; third, the tension between agents with different types of capital – 
in other words, between the dominant and the dominated. 
 To understand the relationship between social agents exclusively as a power 
relationship is excessive reductionism by itself. Comparing Bourdieu‟s theory of 
culture with that of the Frankfurt School, David Gartman maintains that a 
„fundamental flaw‟ of Bourdieu is „a structuralist conception of culture that reduces 
cultural choices to passive reproductions of structural necessities.‟15 Here, I will not 
go further into a comparative study of Bourdieu, the Frankfurt School and 
Structuralism in order to testify Gartman‟s assertion, but I insist that it grasps at least 
                                                        
13 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990) 53. 
14 Jonathan Eastwood, „Bourdieu, Flaubert and the Sociology of Literature,‟ Sociological Theory 25.2 (2007) 
149-69, at 152. 
15 David Gartman, „Culture as Class Symbolization or Mass Reification? A Critique of Bourdieu‟s Distinction,‟ 
American Journal of Sociology 97. 2 (1991) 421-47, at 422. 
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one fallacy of Bourdieu‟s theory, that is, the „passiveness‟ of the social actors. 
Defining cultural practices as generated by the field of power, Bourdieu has in effect 
deprived all social actors of their capability to have any impact on their own „field of 
power.‟ According to his theory, once the actors are born into a certain social or 
cultural status, they become instant products of that status to such a degree that their 
actions, regardless of their intention, are simply attempts to sustain the values and 
structures that they have already acquired. The flaw becomes even more serious when 
we think about the implications for education. If the practice of each and every social 
actor is but a practice to preserve and reproduce the structures he or she is born into, 
education becomes nothing but an accomplice that helps to fortify existing power 
relationships. The value of culture, in this sense, is inescapably connected to the 
material reality. As Rob Moore has recently summarised, „once the social base has 
been revealed and the interest it serves and the standpoint it reflects exposed, there is 
no more to say – nothing in terms of truth or beauty in its own right.‟16 
 This is clearly the mentality that is reflected in the above-quoted comments on the 
Victorians. The „truth‟ that Varnelis and Morris try to convey is that aesthetic 
education is too concerned with practical self-interest to be of any value, that „there is 
seductive power in the ideology of cultural capitalism‟ and „strict limits to the 
transformative potential.‟17 Describing the idea of „education of the innocent eye‟ as 
well as „cultural elevation‟ as seductive, as something not worthy for „any writer‟ to 
invest faith in, those critics repeat precisely Bourdieu‟s negation of the value of 
education and, for that matter, negate the possibility that social actors could conduct 
self-reflection on their own culture. Thus, when they argue that aesthetic education is 
questionable, they are no longer questioning aesthetic education as such, but 
education at large; and, worse still, they find education questionable because they 
examine it only according to their own theory that people are the production of capital 
and power. In this way, to disparage Victorian aesthetic choices which, like „sweetness 
                                                        
16 Rob Moore, „Hierarchical Knowledge Structures and the Canon: a Preference for Judgments,‟ Language, 
Knowledge and Pedagogy: Functional Linguistic and Sociological Perspectives eds., Frances Christie and J. R. 
Martin (London: Continuum, 2009) 197. 
17 Morris 190. 
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and light,‟ had a distinctive intention to contribute to the edification of society, 
becomes in the end a trick in logic. It is based on some preordained conviction, which 
threatens from the beginning to nullify the value of the very subject it proposes to 
analyse. 
 Another flaw in the interpretations of Morris and Varnelis is that they confuse 
aesthetics with the issue of taste, by equating aesthetics with artistic preferences. 
Bourdieu‟s theory of aesthetics is derived from his sociological analyses of French 
society in the 1960s. He conducted his study by doing questionnaires among people 
with different social backgrounds, and most of his questions regarding aesthetics fall 
into the category of artistic preference. The first illustration in the book, for instance, 
is a table detailing „class preferences for singers and music.‟ Elsewhere, he also uses 
predilections for „Impressionists‟ or Renoir or Goya to demonstrate class differences 
in aesthetic judgment.
18
 With examples of this kind, Bourdieu establishes the premise 
that the question „what is beauty‟ is the same as „what is my favourite artwork‟ or 
„who is my favourite artist.‟ Aesthetic education, as he states, is merely a „formal 
refinement‟ that „always announces the sacred character, separate and separating, of 
high culture,‟ which is professed in „the icy solemnity of the great museums, the 
grandiose luxury of the opera-houses and major theatres, the decor and decorum of 
concert-halls.‟19 Similar to the idea of power relationships, the equation of the 
aesthetic with the artistic also provides one of the premises of Morris‟ and Varnelis‟ 
critique of Victorian talk of beauty. Hence, Matthew Arnold‟s „sweetness and light‟ 
signifies an „inborn taste‟ representing „the ideology of cultural capitalism,‟ and John 
Ruskin‟s emphasis on the competency of eyes is all about „how to perceive a work of 
art.‟ 
 Both critics, however, ignore the fact that „aesthetic‟ was used by those Victorians 
in a very different sense. While it is true that most of the Victorian discussions of 
„beauty‟ involved art and literature, aesthetic education was by no means synonymous 
with art or literary education. In John Stuart Mill‟s definition, for instance, it was in 
                                                        
18 Bourdieu, Distinction 20. 
19 Bourdieu, Distinction 34. 
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every sense an education of the beautiful.
 20
 For him, beauty consisted in feeling. The 
aesthetic cultivation that he envisioned was, therefore, a cultivation of feelings and, 
furthermore, an attempt to achieve a delicate equipoise between feelings and the 
intellect. Only with a refined inner world of this kind could a person be regarded as 
having received a proper aesthetic culture. For Arnold, beauty was to be found in the 
„completest and most harmonious development‟ of human nature. Aesthetic education 
enabled an individual to transcend from his „local and casual‟ self in order to become 
an „aesthetic man,‟ and helped society to progress from anarchy to an „aesthetic 
state.‟21 Among all Victorian aesthetic educators, Ruskin was perhaps one most 
closely associated with art, since he wrote books on fine art, gave lectures on 
architecture and was well known for his loyalty to Turner. But even for him, the 
cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity was not just an instruction on how to perceive 
artworks. It was, first and foremost, an education of sense and imagination. Aesthetic 
cultivation, as he explained in Modern Painters, began with the polishing of human 
powers, „powers, namely, of observation and intelligence, which by cultivation may 
be brought to a high degree of perfection and acuteness.‟ And from there, Ruskin 
proceeded to give further stress on the importance of observational skills: 
 
[U]ntil this cultivation has been bestowed, and until the instrument thereby 
perfected has been employed in a consistent series of careful observations, it 
is as absurd as it is audacious to pretend to form any judgment whatsoever 
respecting the truth of art.
 22 
 
Yet it was not only the power of the eyes that received emphasis. Ruskin also 
devoted much of his work to an explication of the nature of „imagination,‟ which was 
first categorised into three orders – penetrative, associative and contemplative – and 
then approached, one after the other, with substantial analysis.
23
 Art, on the other 
hand, was downplayed in Ruskin‟s argument. In fact, as he continued to highlight the 
                                                        
20 John Stuart Mill, Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews, The Collective Works of John 
Stuart Mill, vol. 21 eds. J. M. Robson and Jack Stillinger (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1984) 254. 
21 Matthew Arnold, „On the Modern Element in Literature,‟ On the Classical Tradition ed. R. H. Super (Ann 
Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1960) 18-37, at 28. 
22 John Ruskin, Modern Painters, The Works of John Ruskin, vol. 3 ed. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn 
(London: George Allen) 140. Hereafter referred to as Works. 
23 Ruskin, Modern Painters, Works, 3 62. 
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value of perception and imagination, his reading of artworks eventually turned into a 
reading of signs. For him, art was valuable only because it embodied some deeper 
significance concerning religion and morality, and as far as the role of signifier was 
concerned, artworks were no different from any common object that people 
encountered in their daily life. This, I believe, is why Ruskin‟s aesthetic education 
was still carried on even when he turned from art criticism to the field of social 
criticism, where beauty remained a central topic but artworks were no longer the 
primary concern. 
 In Chapter One, by investigating John Stuart Mill‟s concept of „feeling‟ in a series 
of essays including „What is Poetry,‟ „The Two Kinds of Poetry,‟ „Civilisation,‟ 
„Bentham,‟ „Coleridge‟ and the address at St. Andrews, I will demonstrate how the 
idea of „aesthetic education‟ holds indeed a central position in Mill‟s thinking. The 
„education of feelings‟ was the very object of his early literary criticism, and it was 
also the conviction that underlined his later critique of democratisation and his 
description of an ideal liberal society. The concept of „feeling‟ underwent several 
significant changes in a span of thirty years of Mill‟s career, but his faith in „feelings‟ 
never wavered; he remained a devoted aesthetic educator, who, as we can see from his 
essays on Bentham and Coleridge, not only preached the importance of feelings but 
even attempted to address the feelings of his audience directly through his skilful 
handling of literary images. 
 Chapter Two contains a comparative study of Matthew Arnold and Friedrich 
Schiller. Through a rereading of Arnold‟s „The Scholar-Gipsy,‟ his literary criticism in 
1853 Preface and his social criticism in „Democracy,‟ I will argue that Arnold‟s idea 
of aesthetic education is essentially Schillerian. Their resemblance consists primarily 
in their stress on aesthetic unity. While Schiller regarded „unity‟ as an antidote against 
the social turmoil that he experienced in the eighteenth-century Germany, Arnold 
discovered in the same ideal a remedy for his society in the nineteenth-century Britain, 
where, according to his observations, various new trends – industrial, economic and 
conceptual – rendered life increasingly fragmentary and multitudinous. 
 Chapter Three examines John Ruskin‟s idea of aesthetic education and 
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concentrates particularly on the cultivation of perception. Perception, as I shall 
demonstrate, was pivotal in Ruskin‟s idea of aesthetic education. The emphasis on the 
education of seeing continued from his early writings well into his art and social 
criticisms in major works including Modern Painters, The Stones of Venice and 
Sesame and Lilies. It not only differentiated him from his fellow art critics such as 
Edward Villiers Rippingille and William Hazlitt; the conviction that people should 
perceive with a pure heart also enabled him to link observation of artistic details with 
moral criticism of contemporary society and, thereby, to turn the cultivation of the 
beautiful into a moral-aesthetic experience.                     
As the following three chapters contain more details about Mill, Arnold and 
Ruskin‟s ideas of aesthetic education, there is no need to go much further here. The 
name of Bourdieu and the opinions of the critics that are previously mentioned will 
not make frequent appearances in the part that follows; nevertheless, it is my intention 
to point out, however briefly, that they are the counterforce that helps to shape my 
argument and the central questions that I bear in mind when reading those Victorian 
works. By examining the idea of aesthetic education in those three individuals, the 
present thesis shall reflect on the nature of aesthetic education, illustrate the 
complexity of the term „aesthetic‟ and investigate the social role of aesthetic education 
in the Victorian context. Hopefully, I shall come up with a very different answer than 
the one Bourdieu has provided.  
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Chapter 1 ‘The Education of the Feelings’: John Stuart Mill and 
Aesthetic Education 
 
Mill and Aesthetic Education 
In 1867, John Stuart Mill gave a Rectoral Address at the University of St. 
Andrews, offering to his audience „a few thoughts on the subjects which most nearly 
concern a seat of liberal education.‟24 A well-devised educational project, according 
to him, should highlight at least three ingredients of human culture. Besides 
intellectual and moral aspects, which meant „knowledge and the training of the 
knowing faculty, conscience and that of the moral faculty,‟ there was also 
 
a third division, which, if subordinate, and owing allegiance to the two others, 
is barely inferior to them, and not less needful to the completeness of the 
human being; I mean the aesthetic branch; the culture which comes through 
poetry and art, and may be described as the education of the feelings, and the 
cultivation of the beautiful.
25
 
 
In 2006, Colin Heydt published Rethinking Mill’s Ethics: Character and Aesthetic 
Education, which attempted to secure a central position for aesthetic education in 
Mill‟s theory of ethics.26 It is important to do so, according to Heydt, because this 
topic has been so „surprisingly understudied‟ that „[r]eferences to, let alone treatment 
of, aesthetic education are rare.‟27 This observation is very true. Even if the concept 
was clearly defined by Mill himself – as we can see from the quotation above – the 
„aesthetic‟ has always been a missing part in the scholarship on Mill. Also in 2006, for 
example, John Skorupski published Why Read Mill Today, a book that catered to 
academic as well as general readers‟ needs. As a widely acknowledged expert on Mill, 
Skorupski reflected on the thinker‟s „steadfastly generous and liberal vision of human 
                                                        
24 John Stuart Mill, „Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews,‟ Essays on Equality, Law and 
Education, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 21, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1984) 217. 
25 Mill, „Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews‟ 51. 
26 Colin Heydt 2. 
27 Colin Heydt 2. 
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beings‟ but barely mentioned the word aesthetic. Mill‟s argument for the aesthetic 
aspect of human nature and the importance of aesthetic cultivation was, as a result, 
left almost completely unexplored.
28
 In other cases, where critics have noted Mill‟s 
interest in the aesthetic, they nevertheless decided that this was purely accidental for 
such a Utilitarian as Mill. Hence, John Robson, another influential expert, insists that 
since the element of the aesthetic only exists in the „three-fold distinction‟ of aesthetic, 
morality, and intellect, which Mill employed to „broaden the utilitarian account of 
values,‟ the notion does not deserve to be treated independently.29 
 My thesis seeks to invalidate these conclusions. Through a rereading of Mill, this 
chapter will demonstrate aesthetic education as one of his fundamental concerns by 
showing its relevance to his thinking on literature, politics and philosophy. But before 
moving on to the main argument, it is helpful, I think, to have a brief survey on Mill‟s 
own references to this idea. Though by no means comprehensive, the following 
examples will give us some ideas on the „essentiality‟ as well as the complexity of 
aesthetic education in Mill‟s thinking. To begin with, there is the keyword „aesthetic.‟ 
Although the St. Andrews address was the first occasion for Mill to use the phrase 
„aesthetic education,‟ the „aesthetic‟ was never a strange notion in his writings. For 
instance, we could find the following statement from his essay on Bentham: 
 
Every human action has three aspects: its moral aspect, or that of its right and 
wrong; its aesthetic aspect, or that of its beauty; its sympathetic aspect, or 
that of its loveableness. The first addresses itself to our reason and 
conscience; the second to our imagination; the third to our human 
fellow-feeling.
30
 
 
The chief error of Bentham, as Mill proceeded, was the overestimation of the value of 
morality and the underestimation of the significance of the aesthetic and the 
sympathetic. This mistake rendered Bentham‟s knowledge of human nature 
inadequate, and it also seriously compromised the soundness of his utilitarian 
                                                        
28 John Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today (London: Routledge, 2006) iii. 
29 John Robson, „Civilisation and Culture as Moral Concepts,‟ The Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed. John 
Skorupski (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) 338-71, at 348 and 349. 
30 Mill, „Bentham,‟ Dissertations and Discussions vol.1 (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1875) 387. 
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philosophy. This judgment would be repeated in Mill‟s book Utilitarianism. But 
different from the essay, the book challenged an entire school of thought instead of an 
individual. One of the most insightful objections against Utilitarianism, Mill admitted, 
was that „many Utilitarians look on the morality of action, as measured by the 
utilitarian standard, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon 
the other beauties of character which go towards making a human being loveable or 
admirable.‟31 And he went on to specify the qualities essential for beauty of character, 
which consisted mainly in „sympathies‟ and „artistic perceptions.‟32 A cultivation that 
only stressed moral feeling but ignored the aesthetic component, Mill insisted, could 
only be a „mistake.‟33  
The aesthetic also featured in Mill‟s idea of the improvement of humanity. 
Talking about liberty, he observed that 
 
Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, 
their susceptibility of pain, and the operation on them of different physical 
and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their 
modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to 
the mental, moral and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable.
34
 
 
The argument here is quite straightforward: education should allow different modes of 
life and thinking among different individuals. Meanwhile, it is interesting to observe 
the way in which Mill analysed human nature. The ultimate end of a liberal education, 
as he said, was to make human nature achieve its fullest growth in various aspects – 
the mental, the moral and the aesthetic. The aesthetic, as with the moral and the 
mental, formed an indispensable part of humanity, and human beings could not be 
regarded as well cultivated if that part was neglected. This point becomes clearer if we 
realise that several pages earlier, in the same book, Mill quoted Wilhelm von 
Humboldt in saying that the end of man was „the highest and most harmonious 
                                                        
31 Mill, Utilitarianism, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 10, ed. 
John M. Robson (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1969) 221. 
32 Mill, Utilitarianism 221. 
33 Mill, Utilitarianism 221. 
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development of his powers to a completest and consistent whole.‟35 So liberty 
according to Mill‟s definition, meant more than the right to be individualistic; it 
denoted a condition which was achieved only when a human being managed to 
preserve his individuality by cultivating his mental, moral and aesthetic powers to a 
„completest and consistent whole.‟ In this sense, the cultivation of the aesthetic nature 
of human beings is a critical step towards the realisation of genuine freedom. To make 
a thorough exploration of Mill‟s liberal belief, it is therefore necessary to inquire into 
his idea of human development, which in turn requires some research into the idea of 
aesthetic cultivation as such.  
 Aesthetic education, as Mill defined it in the St. Andrews address, was a 
cultivation of the beautiful, an instruction in poetry and art yet, more importantly, an 
„education of the feelings.‟ Similar to „aesthetic,‟ „feeling‟ is also a high-frequency 
term in Mill‟s writings. But unlike „aesthetic,‟ which invariably won approval from 
Mill, „feeling‟ was more ambiguous for him. However, not every scholar on Mill 
would agree with my observation. F. A. Cavenagh, among others, argues that for Mill, 
feeling was always cherished, and that Mill‟s consistent triumph of feeling over 
intellect demonstrates his rebellion against his utilitarian heritage.
36
 Cavenagh‟s 
argument is probably based on Mill‟s autobiographical account, which is never short 
of enthusiastic defences of the „natural feelings of mankind‟ and even „passionate 
emotions of all sorts.‟37 Looking back on his old lessons, for example, Mill observed 
that the Benthamites were generally noted for their „neglect both in theory and 
practice of the cultivation of feelings.‟ 38  Moreover, in an early draft of the 
Autobiography, right after the discussion of the utilitarian disdain for feeling, Mill 
even went on to declare that his own progress came from the attempt to „[outgrow] 
the narrowness of [these] taught opinions.‟39 This bold declaration was removed in 
the final version, probably because Mill himself was disturbed by its irreverent tone; 
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nonetheless, the contrast between the narrowness of utilitarian teachings and his own 
recognition of the value of feelings was evident. „Feeling,‟ as Cavenagh interprets it, 
seemed to embrace anything that was exiled from the cold utilitarian heart. 
 So it is surprising to find, in the very same work, that Mill should disparage 
feeling in a tone not dissimilar to that of his fellow Utilitarians. Explaining his 
intention with his System of Logic in the autobiography, Mill alleged that he was 
targeting the intuitive school and, in particular, William Whewell, who defended a 
priori view of human experience that could be independent of rationality. If 
Whewell‟s doctrine was accepted, Mill warned his audience, it would lead to the 
result that „every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which the origin is not 
remembered, is enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason, 
and is erected into its all-sufficient voucher and justification.‟40 How, one cannot help 
but wonder, did Mill reconcile the call for „justification by reason‟ with his previous 
tribute to „passionate emotions of all sorts‟? Moreover, this potential conflict also 
poses a series of questions concerning the meaning of the „education of feelings‟ – 
what kind of feelings should be cultivated and to what degree should reason and 
rationality be upheld. When Mill called on his audience to educate their feelings, did 
he mean that cultivation should set free sentiments in general, or was he saying that a 
certain type of feelings should be cultivated to its fullest while the others must be 
censored and disciplined? 
 This issue becomes even more complex when we come to a diary entry from 
February 24, 1854. There, Mill gloomily complained that 
 
Three-fourths of all the so-called philosophy, as well as all the poetry, spoken 
or written about Men, Nature and Universe is merely the writer‟s or speaker‟s 
subjective feelings (and feelings very often extremely unsuitable and 
misplaced) thrown into objective language.
41
 
 
Again, the claim is strangely reminiscent of some remarks made by Bentham and 
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Mill‟s father. The former once made the famous comment that „the game of push-pin 
is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of 
push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either.‟42 Mill‟s father, being 
a close ally of Bentham, was never reported to be a fan of poetry. According to the 
recollection of Harriet Grote, a family friend of the Mills, the father was „a 
propagandist of a higher order,‟ who always sought to lead others „to regard the 
cultivation of individual affections and sympathies as destructive of lofty aims, and 
indubitably hurtful to the mental character.‟43 For sure, Mill had not become as 
hostile towards poetry and feelings. Nevertheless, „three-fourths‟ is not a tiny 
proportion, and the way he referred to the „so-called‟ philosophy and poetry is highly 
expressive of distrust, while the negative descriptions of the „unsuitable and 
misplaced‟ feelings clearly suggest reservations on this subject. Thus, similar to his 
criticism of the intuitive school, this piece of complaint also reveals Mill to be a critic 
rather than a eulogist of poetry and feelings. The fact that he disparaged „subjective 
feelings‟ cautions us against any sweeping generalisations concerning Mill‟s opinions 
in this respect; but, meanwhile, like all the quotes above, it also invites us to make 
further inquiries into his ideas of poetry, feelings and, ultimately, aesthetic education. 
 So much for the brief illustration of Mill‟s references to aesthetic education. For 
now, it is mainly my intention to offer a glimpse into the significance of this topic by 
raising some relevant questions, while a more in-depth study will be conducted in the 
remaining part of the chapter. Admittedly, it does not always seem natural to associate 
the feelings and the beautiful with such a thinker as Mill, whose popular image was 
and still is as a logician, who possessed superior intelligence with little 
accomplishment in the aesthetic. Nonetheless, as the above examples remind us, he 
did show a great interest in aesthetic culture; and precisely because of the seemingly 
impossible association between the logician and the aesthetic, between Utilitarianism 
and the beautiful, his exploration of beauty, with all the enthusiasm and discretions 
displayed, stands out as a particularly fascinating subject. In order to give a full 
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illustration of its fascination, this chapter will focus on Mill‟s early essays from the 
1830s: his literary study of poetry and the poet, his political examination in 
„Civilisation‟ and his two articles on Bentham and Coleridge.  
My choice of materials is not random. The essays that I shall discuss were all 
republished when Mill compiled his Dissertations and Discussions in 1859. They 
were selected, the preface informs us, because the author considered them „desirable 
to preserve.‟44 If that self assessment could be trusted, those essays certainly carry 
specific weight in the study of Mill. Meanwhile, it is also worth noting that in spite of 
their appearance in the same collection, these essays are rarely grouped together. This 
is quite understandable, since at the surface level, they all deal with different subjects: 
the concerns in the poetry essays are obviously literary; that of „Civilisation‟ is always 
regarded as political; and the articles of Bentham and Coleridge are meant to be 
assessments of two individual minds. But, as I shall argue later, despite the variety in 
topics, all of these essays are informed by a common interest in the „education of 
feelings.‟ In this sense, they not only offer insights into Mill‟s understanding of 
aesthetic education, but also serve as good examples of how aesthetic education 
functions as a crux, joining together Mill‟s thinking across a whole range of 
disciplines. Moreover, those essays, however crude they may be, have their own 
special values compared with Mill‟s later (and therefore more mature) works, such as 
Utilitarianism and On Liberty. Composed in a comparatively early stage of his career, 
they signify a critical period in the formation of Mill‟s mind. While the literary essays 
could be regarded as his first expedition into the realm of aesthetics, „Civilisation‟ 
registered, on the other hand, his first attempts to carry this interest into an 
examination of the political and the social. For these reasons, the essays offer us a 
convenient opportunity to trace the origin as well as the progress of Mill‟s idea of 
aesthetic education, and to see how various factors, both public and private, had 
contributed to the shaping of his argument, in both what he said and the way he said it. 
Thus, through a close reading of Mill‟s essays from the 1830s, this chapter will chart 
the formation of the idea of aesthetic education, with special attention to its progress, 
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modification and, in particular, Mill‟s intellectual interaction with his predecessors 
and contemporaries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
The Evolution of Feelings: Aesthetic Education in Mill’s Essays on 
Poetry 
 
‘Loneliness and Intensity’: Feeling in ‘What is Poetry’ 
 „[B]ut poetry was hardly looked upon in any serious light, or as having much 
value except as an amusement or excitement, the superiority of which over others 
principally consisted in being that of a more refined order of minds.‟ Mill thus spoke 
to his audience at the University of St. Andrews in 1867, lamenting the lack of poetic 
spirit of the „average Englishman.‟ To criticise the „average‟ is always a dangerous 
move, since the speaker himself, being an Englishman, might soon be revealed to be 
no better than his own people; thus shooting himself in the foot, so to speak. But Mill 
was quite safe. As far as the poetic spirit was concerned, he could certainly 
congratulate himself on being one of the more refined minds, for his study of poetry 
had begun more than thirty years ago. As both his contemporary and later critics have 
testified, the study was conducted with much ingenuity.  
 In January 1833, Mill‟s essay „What is Poetry‟ was published in The Monthly 
Repository, a Unitarian periodical edited by William Johnson Fox. The essay began 
with an attempt to define poetry by identifying its intrinsic qualities, the most crucial 
of which, according to Mill, was „feeling‟: 
 
The object of poetry is confessedly to act upon the emotions; and therein is 
poetry sufficiently distinguished from what Wordsworth affirms to be its 
logical opposite, namely, not prose, but matter of fact or science. The one 
addresses itself to the belief, the other to the feelings. The one does its work 
by convincing or persuading, the other by moving. The one acts by 
presenting a proposition to the understanding, the other by offering 
interesting objects of contemplation to the sensibilities.
45
 
 
Looking back on poetic theories of the nineteenth century, some recent studies group 
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this article by Mill with studies of poetry by people such as John Henry Newman and 
John Keble. They belong to the same category, as one critic insists, because they were 
all „Victorian equivalents to the great Romantic manifestos.‟46 However, I think this 
notion is too simple and generalised to be true. For one thing – which will be 
discussed in more detail later – Mill‟s idea of poetry would undergo enormous 
modification; and, furthermore, „Romantic‟ is not always a proper description of his 
views. Secondly, to define poetry against science rather than prose was by no means a 
standard practice at the time; in fact, it set Mill apart from many of his contemporary 
poetic theorists. Taking John Henry Newman, the author of Poetry, with Reference to 
Aristotle’s Poetics, as an example, Newman‟s theory was, as the title suggests, in 
many ways a response to Aristotle‟s definition of Greek tragedy, which gave priority 
to the issue of plot and form. Although Newman challenged Aristotle with his own 
emphasis on the power of imagination and creativity, he still attached much 
importance to the formal aspect of poetry. As a result, his explication of the 
„imaginative‟ and the „creative‟ eventually led to his conclusion that these qualities 
were best brought out only in a verse form. „A metrical garb,‟ Newman maintained, 
 
has, in all languages, been best appropriated to poetry – it is but the outward 
development of the music and harmony within. The verse, far from being a 
restraint on the true poet, is the suitable index of his sense, and is adopted by 
his free and deliberate choice.
47
 
 
This is an important premise in Newman‟s theory. Even though he tried hard to 
romanticise Aristotle‟s poetics by calling attention to feelings and imagination, 
Newman nevertheless made it clear that he was addressing a specific genre. For a 
writer to be qualified as a good „poet,‟ according to him, he must possess abundant 
sensitivity and creativity and also demonstrate great skills with the metrical form. 
 Mill, however, was more „avant-garde‟ than Newman. As the previous quotation 
from „What is Poetry‟ indicates, he emphasised feeling and emotions to such an extent 
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that he no longer considered „form‟ a paramount issue. Instead of being opposed to 
prose, his „poetry‟ was understood as the antonym of fact and science; hence, any 
brilliant work that offers „interesting objects of contemplation to the sensibilities,‟ 
according to Mill‟s criteria, should be appropriately classified as poetry. Ultimately, 
the term designated to him not a genre but a quality, which existed in both metrical 
works and non-metrical ones. And this definition of poetry did not only feature in this 
essay; as a matter of fact, it could be safely said that Mill never cared about literary 
forms, except when he found them irritating. On one occasion, for instance, he 
upbraided Tennyson for his surrender to the „tyranny of rhyme,‟ an error that he 
regretted in a poet who was otherwise „pre-eminent‟ for his capability „to summon up 
the state of feeling itself.‟48 
 Feeling, in this way, stood as a core ingredient of Mill‟s literary criticism. Once 
the premise was established, the essay proceeded towards a closer investigation of the 
subject. Through a series of comparisons and contrasts, in which poetry was put side 
by side with narrative and eloquence, Mill arrived at the conclusion that poetic 
feelings comprised of various kinds, ranging from joy, affection, admiration and 
reverence to pity, hatred, grief and terror; all of them were poetic if they were genuine 
products of the heart of the poet. The only condition to be added, in his view, was that 
the poet had to be somehow all alone by himself; hence Mill‟s often quoted 
description of poetry: 
 
Poetry is overheard [;] the peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the 
poet‟s utter unconsciousness of a listener […] Poetry is feeling, confessing 
itself to itself in moments of solitude, and embodying itself in symbols, 
which are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the exact 
shape in which it exists in the poet‟s mind.49 
 
This statement has convinced many critics that Mill was a great fan of lyric poems. 
Indeed, he is now often portrayed as a literary theorist infatuated with lyric poetry and 
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the personal lyric self by those who take interest in his literary criticism.
50
 But once 
again, I think what really distinguishes this passage is not Mill‟s preference for any 
poetic form but his focus on the content of poetry or, to be more specific, the kind of 
feeling that poetry should address. Poetry, in his view, should be overheard only in the 
sense that the poet, instead of offering an objective depiction of the world outside, 
must relate a private aesthetic experience by exploring his own inner world and, 
thereby, offer faithful representations of the emotions and sentiments deep within 
himself. So far as the feelings are genuinely individual, it does not matter what form 
or occasion the poetry is subjected to. Even when published, as Mill insisted, poetry is 
still a depiction of personal emotions, „a soliloquy in full dress, and on the stage.‟51 
This is also why he took care to stress, at one point, that the feeling relevant to poetry 
was the „feeling of their [the poets‟] own‟ rather than „feelings of others.‟52 
 With such a combined emphasis on feeling and individuality, the essay certainly 
suggests Mill‟s strong affiliation to Romantic thinking. The portrayal of the poet 
echoed John Keats‟ „Ode to Nightingale,‟ in which the narrator, also a poet, expressed 
the wish „That I might drink, and leave the world unseen, / And with thee fade away 
into the forest dim.‟53 And it also reminds readers of the famous statement in „A 
Defence of Poetry‟ by Shelley, in which he insisted that „A poet is a nightingale who 
sits in darkness and sings to cheer its own solitude with sweet sounds.‟54 There is 
little wonder, therefore, that M. H. Abrams should categorise Mill‟s poetic theory as 
„expressive‟ and place him firmly in the romantic tradition. „[W]hatever Mill‟s 
empirical pretensions,‟ Abrams adds, „his initial assumption of the essential nature of 
poetry [as expressions of the feelings of the poet] remains continuously though 
silently effective in selecting, interpreting, and ordering the facts to be explained.‟55 
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This is a very insightful comment. It not only points out Mill‟s secret attachment to 
Romanticism but also identifies an inherent conflict for Mill the Romanticist, that is, 
the discrepancy between his „empirical pretensions‟ as a devoted Utilitarian and the 
Romantic „assumptions‟ he presented in the essay. The conflict was recorded in Mill‟s 
Autobiography, which recorded in detail his conversion to the Romantic view of life. 
His professed interest in the issue of feelings, as Mill explained in the autobiography, 
was largely generated by his reflections on his own utilitarian upbringing. 
The utilitarian view of human nature, according to Mill, is based on the 
conviction that men adjust their behaviours as a response to changes in the external 
world. Because of this conviction, Utilitarians tended to deem a carefully constructed 
system of punishment and rewards as both essential and effective in shaping the 
character of individuals. They considered the exterior reality the most decisive factor 
in moral life, and intellect the most important faculty. Mill was brought up with such a 
conviction, and a considerable proportion of his youthful years was spent in studying 
and advocating these utilitarian principles. However, a mental crisis that started in 
1826 gave him a bitter lesson. „Suppose that all your objects in life were realised, that 
all the change in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be 
completely effected at this very instant; would this be a great joy and happiness to 
you?‟ Mill asked himself these questions when his battle against the „dull state of 
nerves‟ reached its climax. The only answer that he could come at was an irrepressible 
„No!‟ 56 It was only after a painful self-examination that Mill was finally brought 
home to the importance of the inner world. He came to realise that to think like a 
machine, following only the logic prescribed by human reason, could not offer him 
full satisfaction. „The habit of analysis,‟ he told his readers, „has a tendency to wear 
away the feelings;‟ and, as his own education „had failed to create these feelings in 
sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of analysis,‟ it therefore rendered 
him indifferent towards the pursuit of happiness.
57
 In view of this autobiographical 
account, „What is Poetry‟ could be appropriately read as a product of this self 
                                                        
56 Mill, Autobiography 139. 
57 Mill, Autobiography 141 and 143. 
 33 
reflection. The Romantic point of view testified to Mill‟s rebellion against his early 
education in utilitarianism. 
But there are also other factors that helped to shape his argument, factors which 
were often eclipsed by that famous story of mental crisis. His intellectual background, 
along with the intellectual activities that Mill participated in at that time, I argue, also 
directed his interest towards the inner world. It should be noted in the first place that, 
in identifying „feelings‟ and the cultivation of the inner world as a powerful weapon 
against the coldness of reason, Mill shared the mentality as well as the interest of 
many of his contemporaries. The binary opposition between head and heart, as 
Barbara Hardy observes, is a popular theme in Victorian literature. In her study of the 
„forms of feeling‟ in Victorian fiction, Hardy gives a broad survey of the 
representation of feeling by Victorian authors such as Dickens, Thackeray, the Brontës 
and George Eliot. All of them, she maintains, borrowing D. H. Lawrence‟s words, 
were highly concerned with the „unreasonable‟ interior life of individuals, „the cries in 
our own forests of dark veins.‟58 Mill was certainly one of them, as he also adopted 
the binary opposition, with a particular interest in personal sensibilities. As a matter of 
fact, his name appeared in the introduction of this book by Barbara Hardy, who 
considers him in some ways an ally of Lawrence, the only difference being that Mill 
proposed poetry as the means of the cultivation of feeling whereas Lawrence was 
more interested in fiction.  
Meanwhile, there is also strong evidence suggesting an influence from his 
acquaintances. The story of how Harriet Taylor, a Romantic herself, turned Mill‟s 
world upside down has been told so many times that it is not worth repeating. But 
there are also other individuals who had a similar impact on Mill. Mill‟s literary 
essays, as we should remember, were first published in The Monthly Repository, 
which was then under the editorship of William Johnson Fox. Fox was a Unitarian 
clergyman, but he was also known for his interest in literature as well as his capability 
as a literary critic. The „influence of literature,‟ as he asserted in one of his sermons, 
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was a great power that „bear[s] upon the formation of character in human beings.‟59 
And this was not mere lip service, for Fox was indeed a central figure in a quite 
eminent literary circle, which included, for instance, Robert Browning, who regarded 
Fox as his literary godfather.
60
 In April 1832, several months before „What is Poetry‟ 
came out, Mill wrote to Fox, saying that „I was even thinking at the very time when 
your note reached me, of writing something which might possibly suit the design of 
the Repository.‟61 It is reasonable to assume, then, that Mill‟s literary essay had much 
to do with Fox‟s encouragement, if not inspiration. 
However, there is yet a particular factor that I want to draw attention to. This is 
Mill‟s personal experience in the London Debating Society, which has received little 
attention from those who study his literary ideas, but which, in my view, offers 
immense help for us to explain his embrace of Romantic ideas. Since 1827, Mill had 
been an active member of the society, and the intellectual exercise soon became a 
major activity in his daily life. In this society, he socialised with a group of young 
intellectuals, with whom he debated on a varied range of topics. Literature was a 
popular choice; the titles and topics they debated included, for instance, „On the 
Present State of Literature‟ (1827), „Perfectibility‟ (1828) and the comparative merits 
of Wordsworth and Byron.
62
 Some of the literary topics that Mill engaged with there 
were to find their way into his later writings, of which „What is Poetry‟ was just one 
example. Moreover, the society itself was a rather interesting mixture in terms of 
intellectual schools. Among other members, Mill maintained a close friendship with 
John Arthur Roebuck, John Sterling and F. D. Maurice. The first belonged to the 
group of „Philosophical Radicals‟ who were avowed disciples of Bentham, whereas 
the latter two, both following the example of Coleridge, were anything but 
Benthamites. Mill was quick to notice the difference. He once commented that his 
friends Sterling and Maurice „made their appearance in the Society as a second 
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Liberal and even Radical party, on totally different grounds from Benthamism and 
vehemently opposed to it.‟63 Because of the contrasting intellectual tendencies of 
their members, the society itself vividly illustrated to Mill the conflict between 
Utilitarianism and Romanticism. As his friendship with the Coleridgians developed, 
the Romantic side grew stronger and, one could assume, was incorporated into Mill‟s 
own writings. In this sense, Mill‟s essay on poetry also bore the influence that he had 
gained through intellectual interactions in the debating society. 
Mill‟s experience in the debating society also helped to shape his views on poetry 
and poets in another way, which was perhaps less pleasant but equally profound. The 
poet as a lonely creature, I maintain, was more than a typical Romantic image. It was 
also a self-portrayal of Mill, who, for a period of time, was seriously troubled by a 
lack of adequate means of communication. Two years after he joined the debating 
society, Mill resigned. The event was but lightly touched in his Autobiography. „In 
1829,‟ he wrote, „I withdrew from attendance on the Debating Society. I had had 
enough of speech-making, and was glad to carry on my private studies and 
meditations without any immediate call for outward assertion of their results.‟64 The 
reason offered – „I had had enough of speech-making‟ – was a grand example of 
Mill‟s habitual use of understatement, if we compare it with his fellow member‟s 
comments on the same issue. Sterling, for example, once complained in a letter to 
another friend about the unwholesome fierceness in the debating activities, which, as 
he believed, could seriously distort the opinions of the participants. „I have been 
present in body at several of the debates of the London Debating Society,‟ said 
Sterling, despite his cordial friendship with the fellow members, „I have spoken once 
or twice, but it won‟t do […] I was going to be stoned with stones at Cambridge for 
being an enemy to religion, and now I am ground to powder by a Mill in London for 
excessive piety.‟65 Consequently, he quit in the same year as Mill. Regarding this 
anecdote, Tod E. Jones in his study of the Broad Church liberal movement in the 
nineteenth century, observes that „[d]ebates might sharpen the wits, but it also 
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divorced ideas from the feelings and observations with which those ideas are always 
associated in individual persons […] Thus, organized debates not only had an 
essentially unreal quality about it, but it was also inimical to sympathetic 
communication.‟66  
In all probability, Mill would consent to this judgment, and this is clearly 
indicated in one of his letters. On April 15, 1829, he wrote to his good friend Sterling 
a highly affectionate letter about his „loneliness‟ in the society, something that he 
insisted that Sterling should know before the latter left the society for good. „Among 
the very various states of mind,‟ confided Mill, „some of them extremely painful ones, 
through which I have passed during the last three years, something distantly 
approximating to misanthropy was one.‟67  Curiously, the confession contradicts 
Mill‟s later account. Those „three years‟ he mentioned in the letter had always been 
described in his Autobiography (and for that matter, being widely accepted by his 
critics) as a void of feelings. Here, however, the word „misanthropy‟ seems to suggest 
otherwise: it appears that the young man did have feelings, only they were too 
intensive and negative to be pronounced. Indeed, one has every reason to believe that 
the earlier account is closer to truth. If „misanthropy‟ was the true state of mind, it was 
only natural that Mill should feel that he „had had enough of speech-making‟ and 
therefore had to seek privacy and seclusion. In fact, no matter how hard he tried to 
suppress it, Mill never quite got over the uneasiness that he had picked up from the 
debating experience. Hence the previously quoted comment on his resignation from 
the society: that he was finally able to live as a young scholar, contently lost in 
„private studies and meditations‟ without feeling compelled to make „outward 
assertions‟; much in the same way, I would add, as the secluded poet in „What is 
Poetry.‟ Therefore, the image of a soliloquising poet, while serving as an antagonist to 
the utilitarian logician, was also highly confessional; it registered more immediately 
Mill‟s experience of failure in his early attempt to communicate and the difficulties he 
had encountered when exercising his intellectual power on people around him.  
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Nevertheless, although Mill made the declaration that he enjoyed „private studies 
and meditations,‟ he did not follow the way of life that he had prescribed for the poet. 
His misgivings were first of all reflected in a letter to Carlyle on December 27, 1832, 
when he had just finished „What is Poetry.‟ The essay, Mill described, attempted at 
something high and intrinsically valuable, but 
 
it is not nearly so good of its kind, because I am not so well versed in the 
subject. It embodies some loose thoughts, which had long been floating in 
my mind, about Poetry and Art, but the result is not satisfactory to me and 
will probably be far less so to you – but you will tell me to what extent you 
think me wrong, or shallow.
68
 
 
Mill was somewhat bewildered, but the self-evaluation here contained a kernel of 
truth. The judgment that the whole essay was an embodiment of loose „floating‟ 
thoughts was quite to the point. His principle of „feelings of one‟s own‟ captured an 
important aspect of poetry, but it was still far from a well-rounded view. The defect 
was obvious. While feeling was recognised as an indispensable ingredient of poetry, 
to portray the poet as a soliloquist in a confined self, with exclusive emphasis on 
subjectivity, would result in a view that was as equally narrow as the utilitarian 
teaching that he tried to challenge.  
Regarding this point, James Martineau, a friend of Mill, made some very useful 
suggestions. „Mr. Mill‟s poet,‟ Martineau contested in a review of the article, „must be 
all loneliness and intensity – a kind of spiritual firework going off by itself in infinite 
night,‟ while on the other hand, a genuine poet should „more than any [go] forth out of 
himself, and [mingle] his very being with the nature and humanity around him.‟69 As 
a matter of fact, to mingle with humanity around him was exactly what the young Mill 
longed for. While he confessed to Sterling about his tendency toward „misanthropy,‟ 
Mill also spoke about his distaste for loneliness and the desire for intellectual 
company.  
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By loneliness I mean the absence of that feeling which has accompanied me 
through the greater part of my life, that which one fellow-traveller, or one 
fellow soldier has towards another – the feeling of being engaged in the 
pursuit of a common object, and of mutually cheering one another on, and 
helping one another in an arduous undertaking.
70
 
 
The fellow feeling, Mill admitted, was for him „suspended.‟ His problem, as he 
further explained, was that „[t]here [was] no human being (with whom I can associate 
on terms of equality) who acknowledge[d] a common object with me, or with whom I 
[could] cooperate even in any practical undertaking.‟71 So he felt himself to be 
travelling all alone in a strange land and, even worse, fighting all alone for an object 
towards which, for all the world, no one apart from himself would show any interest, 
let alone offer assistance. It was not that he was in want of intellectual companions. 
As mentioned before, for Utilitarianism, he had Bentham, his father and the entire 
circle of Philosophical Radicals; and for his newly discovered interest in Romanticism, 
he had, among others, Sterling and Maurice. The only trouble was that at this point of 
his life, he could not become fully immersed with either group. The teachings of 
Bentham and his father, who hardly ever communicated with him on terms of equality, 
were now found to be problematic; whereas his interactions with Romanticists, 
though fruitful, were affected by the failure in cooperation, which was symbolised by 
the breaking up of the London Debating Society. Thus viewed, „What is Poetry‟ is at 
once a self-portrayal and a self-diagnosis. The loneliness of the poet and the 
single-minded emphasis on subjective feelings mirrored Mill‟s condition at that time; 
meanwhile, it also revealed the areas where he must press on. Though he had already 
discovered immense value in the subject of „feeling,‟ he still needed to have a firmer 
grip on the subject, as well as a more plausible view of the role of the poet. In this 
sense, the discussion of poetry in his essay signified the beginning of Mill‟s study of 
aesthetic education. A long way it might be, but the quest had already begun, and the 
progress was well under way. Improvements in those respects were soon to be 
reflected in another essay in which both „feeling‟ and the role of the poet were 
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carefully redefined. 
 
Cultivated Feeling: ‘The Two Kinds of Poetry’ 
 Ten months after the publication of „What is Poetry,‟ Mill‟s second essay „The 
Two Kinds of Poetry‟ came out, again, in The Monthly Repository. Through a 
comparison between Wordsworth and Shelley, the essay provided a second draft of 
what Mill thought to be the ideal poet and poetry. Much of what had been previously 
stated in the first article was repeated and reinforced. Once again Mill made it explicit 
that he regarded „intense feelings,‟ rather than form, as the most crucial feature of the 
„poetic.‟ Thus, shortly after the opening paragraphs, Mill stated: 
 
One may write genuine poetry, and not be a poet; for whosoever writes out 
truly any human feeling, writes poetry. All persons, even the most 
unimaginative, in moments of strong emotion, speak poetry […] What is 
poetry, but the thoughts and words in which emotion spontaneously 
embodies itself? As there are few who are not, at least for some moments and 
in some situations, capable of some strong feeling, poetry is natural to most 
persons at some periods of their lives.
72
 
 
The use of rhetorical question and double negatives („few who are not‟) added a 
significant amount of persuasiveness and, at the same time, gave rise to a somehow 
egalitarian view concerning poetry writing: everyone was a potential poet, and every 
form of speech and thinking, as long as they contained „strong feelings,‟ would be 
counted as good poetry. In fact, Mill had even gone so far as to make „feelings‟ and 
„poetry‟ interchangeable: to be poetic was to show strong feelings, and vice versa. 
And it is necessary to add that such a view was not at all unique in Mill‟s writings. We 
can find the same argument, for example, in his Autobiography, where he frequently 
used „poetic culture‟ to designate various aesthetic experiences that exercised a strong 
impact upon the inner world. From 1814 to 1817, Mill, a teenager at that time, visited 
Ford Abbey, which was then Bentham‟s summer house. The sojourn there, according 
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to Mill, provided a „poetic cultivation,‟ as the grandeur of the architecture nourished 
„the elevation of sentiments.‟73 Similarly, his childhood readings also comprised a 
„poetic culture of the most valuable kind,‟ because those stories excited in him 
sympathy as well as „reverential admiration for the lives and characters of heroic 
persons‟ to whom he would always return „when needing to be carried up into the 
more elevated regions of feeling and thought.‟74 Even the romantic attachment to 
Harriet Taylor was a „poetic culture,‟ which, as Mill explained, had little to do with 
the composition of metrical works but was essentially an experience that enabled his 
faculties to „[become] more and more attuned to the beautiful and elevated, in all 
kinds, and especially in human feeling and character and more capable for vibrating in 
unison with it.‟75 
This sustained enthusiasm for feeling has convinced many critics that the second 
essay is just a further development of his first one, since they expressed essentially the 
same idea. Alan Ryan, for instance, maintains that the second article follows the same 
logic as the first one, since it answers the questions that the latter has brought forward.  
The topic of the first essay, Ryan says, „leads naturally to Mill‟s essay on the “Two 
Kinds of Poetry,” for there he raises the question of the poet‟s subject-matter and its 
transformation into poetry.‟76 F. Parvin Sharpless, in a similar vein, also argues that, 
after the completion of the first essay, which „describes poetry as resulting from the 
poet‟s observation of his emotions in solitude,‟ the second is all too necessary as there 
needs to be a further explanation of „what sort of consciousness is involved.‟77 
 Contrary to all these opinions, I argue that the second essay is not so much a 
furthering of the thesis of „What is Poetry‟ than a revision of it. The most distinctive 
modification consisted in the way that Mill described the role of the poet. Instead of 
soliloquising all by himself, the poet had now come to be depicted as a communicator 
who maintained close relationship with the world around him. This idea was first of 
all illustrated by Mill‟s assessment of Wordsworth and Shelley. Although Wordsworth 
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was labelled as „the poet of culture,‟ who was somehow inferior to Shelley „the poet 
of nature‟ in terms of poetic gift, the former type had his own incomparable advantage, 
because 
 
he has exercised, and continues to exercise, a powerful, and mostly a highly 
beneficial influence over the formation and growth of not a few of the most 
cultivated and vigorous of the youthful minds of our time, over whose heads 
poetry of the opposite description would have flown, for want of an original 
organisation, physical or mental, in sympathy with it.
78
 
 
It seems, as it were, that the picture of the poet was suddenly zoomed out. While 
previously in the first essay, we saw only an individual murmuring to himself, now in 
this one, Mill reminded us – as well as himself – that there was still something else in 
the picture, that the poet was actually surrounded by other individuals. While he 
insisted in the first essay that the poet must be „overheard‟ rather than being „heard‟; 
here Mill told his audience that a good poet must find a way to reach his audience and 
make himself understood. If written with this purpose, the poetry would leave a 
„powerful‟ and „beneficial‟ impact. But if it was not, the natural gift of the poet would 
come to nothing – „would have flown,‟ as Mill described it, over the heads of the 
people like anything airily high-minded. The comparison between Wordsworth and 
Shelley, therefore, had in effect overthrown Mill‟s previous judgment in „What is 
Poetry.‟ This revised version of the poet, following the example of Wordsworth, might 
have included less spontaneous feeling, but it was decidedly more effective in 
delivering poetic messages. In fact, he was a wise teacher, who, instead of producing 
soliloquy that expressed nothing but his own sentiments, had now set forth to 
communicate with other minds through „sympathy‟ and cultivated them accordingly. 
Just as James Martineau had wished, this ideal poet went forth out of himself and 
mingled with humanity around. Thus, several paragraphs later, we find Mill 
emphasising again the necessity to „[find] responses in other hearts.‟79 
 And it was not only communication that mattered. The emphasis on sympathy 
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also led Mill to revise his ideas concerning „feeling.‟ When „What is Poetry‟ was 
reprinted in 1859, Mill added at one point that, apart from getting in touch with his 
own feeling, an ideal poet should also contemplate something other than himself. He 
should, therefore, express feelings „as he [knew] that others [felt] them in similar 
circumstances of solitude.‟80 Considering the fact that most of the revisions in the 
1859 edition were relatively trivial – mainly grammatical alterations and removal of 
italicisation – this substantial change demands particular attention. Although „solitude‟ 
was still upheld, the addition of „others‟ suggested the possibility as well as the 
necessity of „going outward,‟ of connecting the inner subjective world with the world 
outside. 
 While Mill replaced self-regarding feeling with sympathy, he also adjusted the 
relationship between feeling and intellect. Still holding feeling as a precious antidote 
for an arid mind, he was now convinced that the single-headed extolment of feeling 
should be tempered by a well-cultivated intellect. „Overflowing feeling,‟ as Mill now 
saw it, was the weakness of Shelley, who „had not […] reached sufficiently far in that 
intellectual progression of which he was capable,‟ and, therefore, fell short of being 
„the most perfect‟ poet.81 This judgment appeared again in the conclusion. Comparing 
two poetic natures – one of philosopher-poets that united feelings „with logical and 
scientific culture‟ – and the other which was impressive merely for the intensity of 
feelings, Mill stated, 
 
Whether the superiority will naturally be on the side of the philosopher-poet 
or of the mere poet – whether the writings of the one ought, as a whole, to be 
truer, and their influence more beneficent, than those of the other – is too 
obvious in principle to need statement: it would be absurd to doubt whether 
two endowments are better than one; whether truth is more certainly arrived 
at by two processes, verifying and correcting each other, than by one alone.
82
 
 
That „two endowments are better than one‟ was not just a numerical fact; what Mill 
really desired was a reconciliation between the two tendencies. His previous 
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single-headed championing for the Romantic heart being the choice of feeling, now 
Mill came to the realisation that feeling and intellect – Romanticism and 
Utilitarianism, head and heart – could and should correct each other; the best poetry 
could only come from the cooperation of the two. 
In the second essay, Mill also developed a theory of „emotional association,‟ 
which also illustrated his opinion about feeling and intellect. What was special about 
poets, according to Mill, was the way they processed ideas. Poets were poetic, 
because they were so constituted that „emotions are the links of association by which 
their ideas, both sensuous and spiritual, are connected together.‟83 The notion of 
„association‟ was obviously based on Mill‟s early education. Both Bentham and his 
father – and even Mill himself – were spokesmen for the school of „associationism,‟ 
the doctrine of which was first theorised by David Hartley in his Observations on 
Man, published in 1749. In his works, Hartley postulated the theory that virtually all 
human mental activities could be explained in terms of association, through which 
impressions that had been derived from past interactions with external realities were 
added together according to the law of congruity, similarity and causality and, in this 
way, gave rise to new ideas. Bentham and other Utilitarians adopted this theory, 
making it the fundamental principle of Utilitarianism. However, they also pushed 
Hartley‟s argument toward the extreme by putting too much emphasis on the fact that 
humans were subjective to external influences. The stress on the subjectivity of 
humanity practically turned the doctrine into a theory of „mental physics,‟ which 
treated human minds as entities both „passive‟ and „mechanistic,‟ as many scholars 
would point out.
84
  
Mill took over the theory of association from his predecessors; yet, he did not do 
this without contributing his own insight. Unlike many other utilitarians, he identified 
some new „links‟ that formed trains of thought, that is, „emotions.‟ He argued that a 
mind could also work according to laws different from congruity, similarity or 
causality; that feelings could help a mind to acquire new knowledge. This, according 
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to Mill, registered the difference between a poetic mind and a purely rational one. 
Thus, instead of being a passive imprint of external experiences, poetry presented to 
people something „foreign to the habitual course of their every-day lives and 
character.‟85 To put it simpler, it created new experiences through association, but this 
kind of association was poetic rather than logical, dependent on imagination instead 
of reason. The Romantic idea of poetic creativity was therefore recast in a utilitarian 
framework, and this turned out to be a happy union. In this way, Mill gave the 
Romantic conviction new theoretical support and also mended the „mental physics‟ of 
Utilitarianism to such an extent that Bentham‟s doctrine was turned, as Mill would 
later describe, from „mental physics‟ to „mental chemistry.‟ 86  Ultimately, the 
cultivation of spontaneous emotion proved not incompatible with the utilitarian stress 
on rationality: one culture complemented the other, and both should be valued. 
 These modifications supplied an ethical undertone that is almost nonexistent in 
the previous essay. And herein lies the third major revision. The interaction between 
feeling and intellect, as we read in the quotation immediately above, was a process 
indispensable for arriving at the „truth.‟ Elsewhere in the same essay, Mill also argued 
that among all the benefits of feelings, the most important one was the „motives‟ it 
provided, 
 
the motives, consequently, which led human beings to the pursuit of truth. 
The greater the individual‟s capability of happiness and of misery, the 
stronger interest has that individual in arriving at truth: and when once that 
interest is felt, an impassioned nature is sure to pursue this, as to pursue any 
other object, with great ardour.
87
 
 
The significance of this assertion is twofold if it is read in relation to Mill‟s other 
works. It reinforced, first of all, Mill‟s faith in progress. The idea that truth must be 
pursued echoed Mill‟s statement that the ideal poet shaped the „formation and growth‟ 
of different minds: feelings should be developed, and it was through the cultivation of 
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feelings that human beings make progress in their journey through life. The 
„education of feelings‟ that Mill was to promote in his St. Andrews address was now 
clearly in embryo. Secondly, the passage also foreshadows Mill‟s later argument about 
individuality. The inclusion of the inner world as a new aspect of human progress, 
along with a recognition of the diversity of aesthetic experience, was to become a firm 
base for his maintenance of individual liberty. It is very likely that Mill still had in 
mind his earlier assertions from the literary essays when he claimed in On Liberty that 
„[h]uman nature is not a machine to be built after a model […] but a tree, which 
requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the 
inward forces which make it a living thing.‟88 Hence, Walter E. Houghton is surely 
right when he summarises that the education of feelings is a „moral-aesthetic 
development of sentiments‟ that constitutes Mill‟s „fine plea for individuality.‟89 
Yet in the second essay (or in the first one, too), not everything is as lucidly 
explained as it should be. One cannot help but wonder, for instance, what Mill meant 
by „truth.‟ It might refer to „intellectual truth,‟ the knowledge of nature and the 
essence of things; but it could also be a „moral truth,‟ that is, wisdom that assists 
individuals to form a moral character. The latter seems particularly palpable if we 
think about the heavy influence that Mill received from Romanticism, which 
exhibited strong faith in the trio of beauty, goodness and truth or, as Wordsworth had 
so famously put it, „truth in moral knowledge and delight, / that fails not in the 
external universe.‟90 Indeed, the most vital moral knowledge that Mill imparted 
through the investigation of poetry was a call for altruism; that „those only are happy 
[…] who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness.‟91 
Again, this was not a unique vision of life. As Stefan Collini has noted, the 
nineteenth-century cultural milieu, in which Mill was immersed, was distinguished for 
a „primacy of morality‟; and among all different types of moral qualities, altruism 
always received special attention.
92
 But this observation should not lead us to think 
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that Mill was just one among many, for altruism did pose a unique problem in his case. 
How could the preservation of the common good be attained by different individuals 
who followed different „tendencies of the inward forces‟? And to what extent could 
the affirmation of individuality be reconcilable with the antipathy towards selfishness? 
These questions were only hinted at in his literary essays; however, as Mill‟s 
exploration of feeling continued from poetry into the realm of politics and social 
theory, the issue of individuality emerged again under a new light. It posed a more 
complex question, and it was by investigating the very complexity, as I shall show in 
the part to follow, that we realise the importance of the „education of feelings‟ in 
Mill‟s liberalism.  
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Feelings and Democracy: Aesthetic Education in ‘Civilisation’ 
 
‘Pleasures in Cooperation’: Civilisation Redefined 
In 1835, two years after the publication of „What is Poetry‟ and „The Two Kinds 
of Poetry,‟ Mill contributed an article to the London Review, again on literary topics. It 
was a favourable review of a young poet named Alfred Tennyson.
93
 Mill wrote his 
review chiefly for the purpose of defending the reputation of the young man against 
Blackwood’s Magazine and the Quarterly Review, both of which had produced very 
unfavourable comments on Tennyson‟s work; their disparagements, as critics have 
later pointed out, had in fact more to do with Tennyson‟s radical political posture than 
with his poetic capacity.
94
 Mill, however, focused on the literary when he gallantly 
defended Tennyson. To some extent, this review could be regarded as a continuation 
of the previous literary essays, for it nicely recapitulated the key points concerning the 
cultivation of the inner world: 
 
Where the poetic temperament exists in its greatest degree, while the 
systematic culture of the intellect has been neglected, we may expect to find 
[…] vivid representations of states of passive and dreamy emotion, fitted to 
give extreme pleasure to persons of similar organization to the poet, but not 
likely to be sympathized in, because not understood, by any other persons; 
and scarcely conducing at all to the noblest end of poetry […] of acting upon 
the desires and characters of mankind through their emotions, to raise them 
towards the perfection of their nature.
95
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The arguments previously made in „Two Kinds of Poetry‟ and „What is Poetry‟ were 
now gathered and reiterated with so much lucidity that it was impossible to miss the 
message. Cultivation of the inner world was conceived as an indispensable component 
in the whole scheme of the cultivation of mankind. But feeling, if it was to be of any 
value, must be accompanied by „the systematic culture of the intellect,‟ must appeal to 
sympathy and, above all, must be morally edifying, not only strengthening 
sensibilities and intellect but also „acting upon the desires and characters of mankind.‟ 
 It so happened – although on reflection it could be argued that this was not 
accidental at all – that the issue which published the review of Tennyson also 
contained his review of Samuel Bailey‟s Rationale of Political Representation, which 
received equally warm praise. In Mill‟s opinion, Bailey‟s work had not only „excelled 
most of his contemporaries‟ but even stood „not inferior to the best of his former 
productions.‟96 Yet, there is a more significant similarity between the review of 
Tennyson and that of Bailey. Both ended with a stress on cultivation. The poet, as Mill 
argued, should be thoroughly educated in intellect and sentiments in order to cultivate 
mankind, and so it was the same with political representatives, who were responsible 
for educating their community both intellectually and emotionally. It was necessary,  
Mill insisted, that the community should display a certain „state of civilisation,‟ while 
the body of representatives should consist of people „highly cultivated,‟ that is to say 
cultivated so that they could remain „free from narrow or partial views, and from any 
peculiar bias,‟ and, in this way, extend sympathy and understanding towards the 
interests of all.
97
 
So it seems, at some point, that Mill blurred the difference between a literary 
review and a political one. Through the dramatic turn from „What is Poetry‟ to „Two 
Kinds of Poetry,‟ we have already seen in Mill a moralist who laboured hard in order 
to find in poetic beauty some valuable guidance for the formation of individual 
character. But it would be a gross misunderstanding if we, upon seeing the connection 
between his literary criticism and his concept of aesthetic education, instantly 
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concluded that Mill‟s call for aesthetic cultivation came solely from literary 
inspirations. The conclusion of the review of Bailey, however brief it was, warns us 
against a simplification of that kind. Moreover, it provides us with a glimpse into the 
complexity of Mill‟s idea of aesthetic culture by calling attention to its political 
concerns. The complexity would be more comprehensively demonstrated in Mill‟s 
article „Civilisation‟ which came out in the London and Westminster Review in April, 
1836.  
 Just as its title suggests, the essay announced at the beginning a rather theoretical 
ambition, that is to define „civilisation.‟ „The word Civilisation,‟ Mill wrote, „like 
many other terms of the philosophy of human nature, is a word of double meaning. It 
sometimes stands for human improvement in general, and sometimes for certain kinds 
of improvement in particular.‟98 The two „improvements‟ differed from each other in 
that in the former case „civilisation‟ denoted simply a social condition, the customs 
and cultural norms of a people, whereas in the latter, civilisation, being a „particular 
improvement,‟ referred specifically to the progress that a certain human society had 
achieved. It was the second type that Mill wished to explore. Since in that sense, 
civilisation designated a superior quality that led to achievements and progress, the 
concept, as he believed, could not be appropriately defined without comparing and 
contrasting what was superior with that which was not. The following part of his 
essay was consequently devoted to a meticulous study of the difference between 
„civilisation‟ and „rudeness or barbarism.‟ 
 This topic was by no means novel, nor was the strategy for exploring it. When 
conditions of society had not become desolate enough to give rise to that pessimistic 
view of „an advanced state of rottenness,‟ the contrast between civilisation and the 
less advanced had often been taken for granted, eliciting interest from many 
thinkers.
99
 In what aspects, many had asked, did civilisation distinguish itself from 
barbarism? And what was the most crucial feature that characterised a civilized 
society? Answers to these questions not only reflected people‟s understanding of their 
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own position in human history; they also reflected their understandings of their own 
position against that of other nations in the world, thus giving this inquiry a temporal 
dimension as well as a spatial one. Victor de Riquetti, an eighteenth-century French 
political economist, was said to be the first to use the word „civilisation‟ in writing. 
He was also reported to have found the principal source of civilisation in religion, 
seeing it as „undeniably the first and most useful brake on humanity.‟100 Riquetti‟s 
contemporary and acquaintance Montesquieu, on the other hand, had famously 
attributed the unequal advancement of human society in different areas to the unequal 
development of the spirit of law, which was in turn attributed to the diversity in 
climate. The reason for the backwardness of some peoples, Montesquieu insisted, was 
the hot climate, where the heat „may be so excessive as to deprive the body of all 
vigour and strength. The faintness is therefore communicated to the mind; there is no 
curiosity, no noble enterprise, no generosity of sentiment‟ and, naturally, no prosperity 
of civilisation.
101
 
Many other thinkers defined civilisation in terms of population and economic 
achievement. In the History of Civilisation in England, a series of ambitious works 
first published in 1857, the Victorian historian Henry Thomas Buckle listed various 
key points to European progress. Through a comparison with India and Egypt, for 
instance, Buckle argued that European cultures were able to supersede, both because 
they excelled not only in „the accumulation of wealth‟ by making good use of natural 
resources, but also in the preservation of „the energy of man‟ that fuelled economic 
growth.
102
 This was why „formerly the richest countries were those in which nature 
was most bountiful,‟ whereas „now the richest countries are those in which man is 
most active,‟ with minds „more powerful, more numerous, and more able to grapple 
with the difficulties of the external world.‟103 This was indeed the obvious answer, 
considering the social reality that Buckle was living in – was not Victorian Britain the 
most powerful economic entity in the nineteenth-century world? Yet, to some extent 
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the answer is very superficial, too, in that it focused exclusively on the status of men 
as homo economicus, and overlooked other aspects of human nature. 
Elsewhere, the gentleness of character and the development of social institutions 
were also taken into account. Thus, in the article „Barbarism and Civilisation,‟ 
published in The Atlantic Monthly in America in January 1861, the author argued, as 
if recalling Riquetti and Montesquieu in particular, that the loftiness of civilisation 
consisted neither in „religion‟ nor in „climate,‟ but chiefly in the power of control.  
 
We can only say that there is an inexplicable step in progress, which we call 
civilization; it is the development of mankind into a sufficient maturity of 
strength to keep the peace and organize institutions; it is the arrival of 
literature and art; it is the lion and the lamb beginning to lie down together, 
without having, as someone has said, the lamb inside the lion.
104
  
 
What truly mattered in civilisation, according to the author, is not its material 
conditions but the performance of the mind of human beings. Speaking thus out of an 
immediate modern context, in which industrial expansion and the accumulation of 
wealth demanded improvements to institutions both political and cultural, the writer 
was firmly convinced that civilisation should aim to provide an efficient organisation 
for society, and for each individual a perfect combination of courage and civility. 
John Stuart Mill was well acquainted with French culture and politics in the 
eighteenth century, and he was speaking from a social context more or less similar to 
that of Buckle and the Atlantic article. But these similarities only serve to set off the 
contrast. The point that Mill focused on in his „Civilisation‟ was somehow different 
from all those discussed above. Contrasting civilised society with „savage life,‟ Mill 
noted a series of distinctions, and the first one of these was in the way of living. While 
„a savage tribe consists of a handful of individuals, wandering or thinly scattered over 
a vast tract of country,‟ civilised society must be „a dense population […] dwelling in 
fixed habitations, and largely collected together in towns and villages.‟105 The layout 
of the population decided the pattern of daily life; thus a civilised country was 
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distinguished for its advancement in „agriculture, commerce, and manufacture,‟ 
whereas in savage life all these activities were either nonexistent or „next to none.‟106 
Had Mill stopped at this point, his argument would sound more or less the same as 
Buckle‟s criterion of the „accumulation of wealth,‟ which measured the degree of the 
advancement of human society according to its economic performance. But that is not 
how the story ended for Mill. As a matter of fact, he attempted here to capture a 
different aspect of human nature. After discussing the ways of life in civilised and 
savage societies, Mill proceeded to argue that this difference resulted not from 
economic activities but from the degree of cooperation. Hence the following 
observation: 
 
In savage communities each person shifts for himself; except in war (and 
even then very imperfectly), we seldom see any joint operations carried on 
by the union of many; nor do savages, in general, find much pleasure in each 
other‟s society. Wherever, therefore, we find human beings acting together 
for common purposes in large bodies, and enjoying the pleasure of social 
intercourse, we term them civilised.
107
 
 
The emphasis on „community‟ and „joint operations‟ echoed Mill‟s previous 
observation that savage populations were usually thinly scattered, whereas in civilised 
communities, people tend to spend more time in each other‟s company. Yet he was not 
merely repeating himself here. What made the passage above particularly innovative 
was the stress on emotional involvement. Mill regarded the savage life crude not 
merely because of a lack of cooperation; there was little cooperation because the 
tribes‟ members were unable to find „pleasure‟ in each other‟s company. The civilised 
ones, by contrast, prospered not merely due to cooperation; it was because their 
members, as Mill emphatically pointed out, were actually „enjoying the pleasure of 
social intercourse.‟ 
The concern for „cooperation‟ even made the essay „Civilisation‟ slightly 
anachronistic.  To support his argument, Mill chose examples irrespective of their 
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chronological order. Thus civilisation belonged to such ancient people as the Romans, 
who produced the most distinguished enterprise – the Roman Empire – out of 
„voluntary co-operation of many persons independent of one another.‟108 On the other 
hand, savageness could be found in the contemporary world. Why, for example, did 
Spain fail to withstand Napoleon? The chief cause, in Mill‟s opinion, was Spain‟s 
inability to cooperate. Among virtually all the Spanish military and political leaders, 
„no one would sacrifice one iota of his consequence, his authority, or his opinion, to 
the most obvious demands of the common cause‟ and thereby failed spectacularly to 
form „an alliance.‟109 In other words, civilisation was a state of culture, and people 
could only be termed civilised when they embraced the principles of cooperation. 
 This shift in focus, therefore, distinguished Mill‟s definition from that of others. 
Previously, as Montesquieu and Buckle‟s argument illustrated, in order to evaluate the 
advancement of civilised society, it was necessary to observe first of all how 
successfully human beings interacted with their external reality – a whole range of 
material existences, from natural climates to social institutions. For Mill, however, 
civilisation had more to do with the culture of the world within. A civilised society 
was the product of successful cooperation, which in turn was the fruit of fellow 
feeling and mutual understanding. Again, instead of material accomplishments, Mill 
was making a case for the cultivation of humanity. This emphasis was highly 
reminiscent of the revision that Mill had previously made in his literary essays, where 
he replaced the lonely genius with the sympathetic Wordsworthian example that took 
pleasure in communicating with other people. Sympathy thus became the core 
ingredient for both a good society and good poetry.  
In fact, „sympathy‟ also underlined Mill‟s utilitarian theory and even his ideas in 
political economy. The present thesis will not dwell too much on this point, 
considering the bulk of those works, but I think several examples, however brief they 
are, will suffice. In Utilitarianism, the ultimate sanction of the principle of utility and 
the ultimate source of conscience were both identified to be a „subjective feeling.‟ 
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People performed their moral duties out of „conscience.‟ But for Mill, conscience was 
not as simple as a pure idea of duty. It was derived, instead, from many different kinds 
of personal feelings that included sympathy, love, self-esteem, and even religious 
feelings. Likewise, it was also mutual feelings that bounded people together in society. 
Regarding utilitarian morality, Mill asserted that both the foundation and the strength 
of that morality consisted in the recognition of the „powerful natural sentiment,‟ 
which he interpreted as  
 
a social feeling of mankind – a desire to be in unity with our fellow creature, 
which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of 
those which tend to become stronger, […] from the influence of advancing 
civilisation.
110
 
  
The defence of Utilitarianism was thus tied in with the views expressed in the 
essay „Civilisation.‟ „Feeling‟ was their shared cornerstone. Mill‟s ideas of political 
economy also revealed a similar mindset. He claimed, for instance, that the prosperity 
of modern economic life was dependent not on how advanced its technologies or 
institutions were but on how successfully its members conducted „deliberations on 
questions of common interest‟ – in other words, how successfully they were cultivated 
to embrace the spirit of common interest as an inward principle.
111
 Having noticed 
the similar premises in Mill‟s utilitarian ethics and political economy, David O. Brink 
argues that „Mill‟s assumptions about the social components of human happiness 
reflect well-considered evaluative views‟ that rest „on his views of human nature.‟112 
Although this observation is quite insightful with regard to the present topic, I think it 
is also necessary to point out that Mill‟s view of human nature was, in turn, informed 
by an inherent belief that the inner world was highly cultivable and should be 
cultivated. In sum, for Mill, it was from an enlightened inner world that social 
progress and human civilisation stemmed. 
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‘The Rising of the Masses’: Critique of Democracy 
 Mill‟s concern in „Civilisation,‟ however, was not entirely theoretical. The essay 
contained an insightful interpretation of human progress as well as an innovative 
definition of civilisation. But both were actually part of a criticism of contemporary 
life, although later critics often disagree with each other as to how „proper‟ Mill‟s 
criticism was.
113
 The exploration of civilisation in the first part, which highlighted the 
importance of the cultivation of feelings, paved the way for Mill‟s later assessment of 
his own era, to the evils of which Mill prescribed the education of feelings as the most 
powerful solution. Concerning the features of his own society, one of the most 
powerful civilisations at that time, Mill observed: 
 
The most remarkable of those consequences of advancing civilisation, 
which the state of the world is now forcing upon the attention of thinking 
minds, is this: that power passes more and more from individuals, and small 
knots of individuals, to masses: that the importance of the masses becomes 
constantly greater, that of individuals less.
114
 
 
By „the rise of the masses,‟ Mill referred to three specific facts, namely „the gradual 
rise of the trading and manufacturing classes,‟ „the gradual emancipation of the 
agricultural [workers]‟ and „the growth of a middle class.‟ All of them, Mill 
maintained, were leaving more and more of an impact on social affairs. In the old 
feudal system, only prestigious individuals with hereditary status could have access to 
power and wealth; by the early nineteenth century, however, the rise of the masses had 
reached such an extent that the redistribution of power and resources was inevitable. 
Thus, together, all of those new social forces had brought an unprecedented change to 
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British society, causing „bouleversements‟ to the old social structure.115 
 That the power – or to be more specific, the control over laws and social 
institutions – was being passed from individuals to masses was a widely 
acknowledged phenomenon which found representations virtually everywhere in and 
throughout the Victorian era. It was symbolised by the Reform Bill in 1832, which 
illustrated the democratic spirit in the constitutional reforms. It is also found in 
Charles Dickens‟ Bleak House (1853), in the battle between Sir Leicester Dedlock, the 
aristocrat who is respectable but feeble, and Mr. Lawrence Boythorn the new 
bourgeois who is energetic and thriving. And it was also reflected in the Hyde Park 
riot in 1866, which would induce Matthew Arnold to write Culture and Anarchy. Mill 
himself was to come back to this topic some fifteen years later in On Liberty, which, 
again, described his age as „the modern régime of public opinion.‟116 His observation 
in „Civilisation‟ that „the importance of the masses becomes constantly greater,‟ was 
therefore part of, and to some extent a prologue to, a whole range of discussions in a 
society that was undergoing a dramatic transformation from an aristocratic system 
towards modern democracy. 
 One of the most important minds that Mill drew on in „Civilisation‟ was 
Tocqueville, and it is quite easy to see why.
117
 Both took a lively interest in „the 
question of democracy‟ as well as its implications for modern society. Tocqueville‟s 
writings on civilisation and American democracy became influential almost 
immediately following its publication. Just one year before completing his 
„Civilisation,‟ Mill reviewed Tocqueville‟s newly published Democracy in America, 
on which he was to comment again in 1840 when he acquired the second volume. 
Although Mill criticised Tocqueville on some points, they still had much in common. 
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When Mill quoted the French thinker‟s observation that „the movement towards 
democracy [dated] from the dawn of modern civilisation, and [had] continued steadily 
advancing from that time,‟ it was quite difficult to tell whether he was giving an 
account of Tocqueville‟s views or whether he was speaking for himself.118 But there 
was one similarity that came on top of all: like Tocqueville, Mill was also convinced 
that, as society became increasingly democratic, there was a growing demand for a 
cultivation of the inner world. 
To begin with, Tocqueville was not satisfied with every aspect of American 
society. He advocated democracy but, on the other hand, he was also quick enough to 
notice some of its lamentable outcomes. Among all the defects of a modern society, 
Tocqueville was particularly attentive to the issue of taste as well as the problem of 
alienation among individuals – both social and psychological. Democracy, as 
Tocqueville explained, encouraged equality in social status and fast accumulation of 
wealth, which in turn gave rise to a passion for luxury and efficiency. When luxury 
was desired by consumers and efficiency by craftsmen, it was inevitable that the 
artworks thus produced were no longer able to retain a high quality; hence the 
increase of fake jewels and cheap substitutes. As the number of artistic products 
increased, „the merit of each production [was] diminished‟ because the artists 
„frequently withdraw them from the delineation of the soul to fix them exclusively on 
that of the body, and […] substitute the representation of motion and sensation for that 
of sentiment and thought; in a word, they put the real in the place of the ideal.‟119 The 
same aesthetic choices generated problems even in the realm of science. As love for 
the real overtook the love for the ideal, the love for sublime truth tended to be 
replaced by a „trading taste,‟ which directed minds towards „the tangible and the real‟; 
and, as a result, led to a flourishing of practical technologies and the decline of 
theoretical science. This created a huge dilemma for modern society, as people were 
now perplexed by the need to make a choice between either the few but great 
artworks and sublime truths produced in an aristocratic age, or the many but mediocre 
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works from a democratic society.  
 Another potential problem in the democratic age, in Tocqueville‟s opinion, was 
closely associated with the symptom of „individualism.‟ Although he made a 
differentiation between individualism and egoism, noting that the latter was nothing 
but a black instinct and that the former tended to be more mature, Tocqueville was 
never impressed by the call of individualism in a democratic society.  
 
As social conditions become more equal, the number of persons increases 
who, although they are neither rich nor powerful enough to exercise any 
great influence over their fellows, have nevertheless acquired or retained 
sufficient education and fortune to satisfy their own wants.
120
 
 
Yet he was worried that even such a mature feeling as this might in the long run 
destroy all the social intimacy developed by the previous social order. If every 
individual adopted the belief that „[t]hey owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing 
from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing 
alone,‟ it was very likely they would „imagine that their whole destiny is in their own 
hand.‟ When all relationships between human beings were thus severed, each 
individual would become nothing but a capital „I‟ with rationalised selfishness, caring 
for nothing but his own interest and confined „entirely within the solitude of his own 
heart.‟121 
 Mill shared Tocqueville‟s judgments on both points, even though his samples 
were gathered from the other side of the Atlantic. While Tocqueville focused on the 
disproportion between the quality and the amount of artworks in America, Mill 
believed that his own country demonstrated exactly the same problem regarding 
literature. 
 
When books were few, to get through one was a work of time and labour; 
what was written with thought was read with thought, and with a desire to 
extract from it as much of the materials of knowledge as possible. But when 
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almost every person who can spell, can and will write, what is to be done?
122
 
 
The apparent solution, as Mill suggested, would be „reading everything‟, though he 
was obviously being ironical, for few people could possibly adapt their own speed of 
reading to the speed of a printing machine. What happened to the British reading 
public at that time, according to Mill, was similar to what Tocqueville had discovered 
in art: books became more and more ephemeral; those of solidity and wisdom were 
pushed aside, and serious enjoyment of literature was giving way to the „swallowing‟ 
of inferior texts, causing an aesthetic depravity of the entire public. 
 Again similar to Tocqueville, Mill was convinced that the intensely self-regarding 
individuals raised in a democratic society were in need of proper cultivation. Even 
though Mill was generally known as an advocate of freedom and laissez faire, he did 
not carry forward this doctrine without reservation. In many cases, his concern for 
„feeling‟ seems to have been the pivotal element that prevented him from being 
extreme. This is first illustrated in his critique of the economy. To influence each other 
was becoming more and more difficult, as the demand for equality led to „the 
constantly increasing number of those who are vying with one another to attract 
public attention.‟123 Such competition, Mill argued, not only generated hostility and 
alienation among people; it also gave rise to selfish behaviour and therefore caused 
the deterioration of private virtue, public morality and the living conditions of those 
who were socially disadvantaged. It was very likely, Mill feared, that this 
deterioration was already on its way, as it had become a common feature that the 
„intensity of competition [drove] the trading public more and more to play high for 
success, to throw for all or nothing‟ until mutual trust was abandoned, and the socially 
inferior were left completely on their own.  
To counteract such a dangerous tendency, Mill insisted that something should be 
done about the „opulent classes of modern civilised communities.‟ According to Mill, 
the progress of civilisation brought wealth and culture. But as their comfort increased, 
the better-off classes also displayed a proportional decrease in courage and aspiration. 
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Being concerned only with their own interests, many of them knew nothing about the 
condition of people who were not immediately within their own social circles. They 
did not know how much the disadvantaged were suffering; the only pain they were 
familiar with was based on their own personal sorrows. Thus, very often, people who 
enjoyed the benefit of economic and social progress abandoned their ambition for 
further advancement, simply out of fear of their own suffering. Indeed, Mill‟s critique 
of the „opulent classes‟ was so severe that at some point, he almost struck a note of 
socialism; for instance, when he argued that the call for progress was halted because 
„the very idea, of pain, [was] kept more and more out the sight of those classes who 
enjoy[ed] in their fullness the benefits of civilisation.‟124 With his unabated attention 
to the cultivation of feelings, Mill believed that the only solution was the cultivation 
of the aesthetics of heroism, which he explained as follows: „The heroic essentially 
consists in being ready, for a worthy object, to do and to suffer, but especially to do, 
what is painful or disagreeable: and whoever does not early learn to be capable of this, 
will never be a great character.‟125 Mill‟s repeated stress on „sympathy‟ and „love‟ 
easily leads many critics to assume that his aesthetics were essentially idyllic. Indeed, 
such an impression is suggested by a critical exposition of Mill‟s interest in the 
„picturesque‟, as well as by the suspicion that his aesthetics might not accommodate 
the tragic.
126
 The call for heroic sentiments here, however, offered a different view. A 
community which excelled in the education of feelings, as Mill envisaged, was not 
just a world of sympathy and tenderness; to ensure the continuous perfection of their 
society, its members were also required to adopt a heroic aesthetic: to confront 
hardihood, to brave evil, and to make self-sacrifices when necessary.
127
  
The essay „Civilisation‟ is now generally categorised as part of Mill‟s political 
writing for the simple reason that it addressed the issue of how to administer modern 
society. But reading it more closely, I believe that it was actually more concerned with 
the administration of humanity or, in other words, the cultivation of the inner world. 
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Both his definition of civilisation and his critique of democracy highlighted „feeling‟ 
as one of the most important ingredients for the progress of human society. Thus, once 
again, we see how Mill revisited the old theme that he himself had developed in 
earlier writings on literature. Self-centeredness would not produce excellent poets; 
similarly, it would fail to produce qualified social members for a modern civilisation. 
For self-regarding individuals and excessive individualism, the cultivation of feelings 
was always the best cure. 
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The Question of Authority: Mill as an Aesthetic Educator 
 
Elitist or Liberal: Aesthetic Education and the ‘Cultivated Few’ 
There is one point on which Mill strongly disagreed with Tocqueville, namely 
how to understand the diminishing of mutual influence in democratic society. For 
Tocqueville, the diminishing of mutual influence was a sign that people had come to 
embrace equality. As conditions of life became more equal, he noted, people would 
naturally become „neither rich nor powerful enough to exercise any great influence 
over their fellows.‟ As the emphasis on „rich‟ and „powerful‟ indicates, Tocqueville 
associated „influence‟ primarily with economic and social status. So, „influence,‟ as he 
understood it, was a synonym for „oppression‟ or „manipulation‟; it referred to the 
inequality that existed in a pre-democratic society, where wealth and power qualified 
some social members to preside over others.
128
 Mill‟s interpretation of „influence,‟ 
however, was more intellectual and, consequently, he was far less optimistic about 
this new trend in democratic society. Whenever the social phenomenon of the 
„weakening of influence‟ was addressed, Mill always spoke with much more 
uneasiness; at one point, he even went as far as questioning the value of democracy: 
 
Are the decay of individual energy, the weakening of the influence of 
superior minds over the multitude, the growth of charlatanerie, and the 
diminished efficacy of public opinion as a restraining power, – are these the 
price we necessarily pay for the benefits of civilisation?
129
 
 
Mill therefore proposed that the „superior minds‟ should take up their responsibility as 
educators in order to resume their authority over „the multitude.‟ And this was 
precisely what Mill expected for the education of feelings. Since the multitude need 
guidance, he argued, there must be a group that is comprised of the leading intellects 
of the age, „whereby works of first-rate merit, of whatever class, and of whatever 
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tendency in point of opinion, might come forth with […] the approval of those whose 
names would carry authority.‟130 A member from this small group, he believed, 
should not only exert his efforts in cultivating the lower classes for the advancement 
of civilisation. He was also expected to guide the „opulent and lettered classes,‟ who 
had acquired wealth and power but were still in need of aesthetic instruction.
131
 In 
sum, the cultivated few must contribute to „the instruction of the understanding and 
the elevation of the characters of all classes‟, by making improvements „in the general 
understanding‟ and „the feelings.‟132 
 This proposal resembles the opinions of Thomas Carlyle. In 1829, Carlyle 
published in the Edinburgh Review an article entitled „Signs of the Times.‟ Through a 
survey of contemporary British culture, Carlyle found its most outstanding feature to 
be „Mechanical.‟ It was mechanical, he maintained, because people were too much 
absorbed by material gains, and little attention was paid to the inner world. In former 
times, „the wise men, the enlightened lovers of their kind,‟ were preoccupied with the 
„Dynamical,‟ which sought to „to regulate, increase and purify the inward primary 
powers of man.‟133 Now, by contrast, it was always the „Mechanical Province‟ that 
dominated people‟s interest, leading everyone to be concerned with the reformation of 
the world outside instead of the cultivation of the world within. Meanwhile, the 
„mechanical‟ was also an antithesis to the „heroical.‟ According to Carlyle, with 
society functioning as a complex machine and every member being a part of it, 
individual powers had diminished so much that „[n]o individual now hopes to 
accomplish the poorest enterprise single-handed.‟134 Consequently, it was an age with 
no Newton, no Raphael, no Mozart; all past ingenious endeavours were now replaced 
by the mediocre effort that could not possibly rival the old masters. These ideas were 
to be reinforced in Carlyle‟s later works, such as On Heroes and Hero-worship, and 
the call for leadership won a hearty approval from Mill. In a letter to Sterling from 
1831, Mill mentioned that he had recently made an acquaintance with a „Mr. Carlyle.‟ 
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In spite of an initial aversion to his style, Mill conceded that he had „long had a very 
keen relish for [Carlyle‟s] articles in Edinburgh & Foreign Review,‟ among which 
„Signs of the Times‟ stood out as a representative.135 This is perhaps why Mill would 
portray his ideal poets as those who had „exercised, and continue[d] to exercise, a 
powerful, and mostly highly beneficial influence over the formation and growth‟ of 
the minds around him.
136
 Several years later, Mill was to pay homage to this 
acquaintance in his „Civilisation,‟ which echoed Carlyle‟s „Signs of the Times‟ not 
only in the attempt to identify the defects of the age, but, more explicitly, in its 
justification of the education of the inner world by the cultivated few. 
Besides personal acquaintances, historical events also helped to shape Mill‟s 
mind. In August 1830, Mill arrived in Paris to witness the progress of the French 
Revolution that took place in July. He was quite enthusiastic at the beginning, telling 
his father on August 13
th
 that „as there has been an excellent revolution without 
leaders, leaders will not be required in order to establish a good government.‟137 But 
soon that hope dwindled away. Just a week later, on August 21
st
, scenes of hunger, riot 
and the crowd being „careless of public interest‟ made Mill realise that in such 
„turbulent times,‟ it was necessary to have people who were „capable of taking a 
leading part.‟138 He also felt that the majority of the French people were not fit for 
that role. The workmen of Paris, „[h]aving effected their glorious object, […] calmly 
retired to their homes and resumed their accustomed avocations,‟ thus leaving the 
duty of management to the middle and the upper classes. The latter, however, did not 
prove themselves to be worthy of that duty; hence Mill‟s indignant report that, 
concerning the class of „the educated and the rich,‟ 
 
it seems the universal opinion, that both in ability and intention it is unfit for 
its situation – that it is no fair representation of the French nation – that it is 
calculated seriously to retard improvement, and in great measure for the 
present moment to nullify, in a beneficial sense, the effects of the present 
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revolution.
139
 
 
So here is the lesson that Mill learnt from France: first, that an advancing society 
needed leaders and, second, that leaders were representatives of the nation not 
because of their social or economic advantages, but because they were so cultivated 
that they could provide a real benefit. This lesson was to have a lasting impact on 
Mill.
140
 In the ideal poets portrayed in Mill‟s literary essays and the strong faith in the 
„superior minds‟ articulated in „Civilisation,‟ we can see clearly how the French July 
Revolution had stimulated Mill‟s intellectual growth. 
 Mill‟s championing of the cultivated few, along with his appreciation for people 
like Carlyle, has convinced many critics that he was, to say the least, temporarily led 
away from his original liberal ideal. Don A. Habibi, in his study of Mill‟s „ethics of 
human growth,‟ discusses at length Mill‟s „elitism.‟ By „elitism,‟ Habibi refers to 
Mill‟s emphasis on „influence‟ and „leadership,‟ and argues that his political doctrine 
was based on the conviction that „it was the elite that would promote the growth of 
knowledge and uplift the masses.‟141 Other critics might not use the term „elitism,‟ 
but they all agree that Mill‟s ideal society relies heavily on the cultivated few. Ben 
Knights, for instance, places Mill‟s proposal in the philosophical tradition of 
Coleridge and calls it „an idea of clerisy.‟ Alan S. Kahan, putting more emphasis on 
the social and historical indications, refers to Mill‟s values as „aristocratic 
liberalism.‟ 142  This conviction has led other critics to raise further questions 
concerning Mill‟s cultural and even political stance. Thus, Gertrude Himmelfarb, 
                                                        
139 Mill, The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill 1812-1848 60. 
140 Just as Francis E. Mineka has pointed out in the article „John Stuart Mill: Letters on the French Revolution of 
1830,‟ the French Revolution of July 1830 had a profound impact upon Mill; it inspired him on politics and offered 
materials that would find their way into his writings for the next five years. See Francis E. Mineka ed., „John Stuart 
Mill: Letters on the French Revolution of 1830,‟ Victorian Studies 1.2 (1957) 136-54, at 136. Several other critics 
have also addressed this topic. For example, Iris Mueller has pointed out in her study John Stuart Mill and French 
Thought, that French society in the 1830s proved to be a total disillusionment for Mill. Instead of introducing a 
whole new era, the revolution turned out to be just an ordinary change in regime. Those who had ruled were 
disposed of, but the middle classes that rose to power brought little change to either the social structure or the 
living condition of the people. The bitter lessons abroad taught Mill about the reactionary nature of the middle 
classes and, in this way, prompted him to look to elitism as a remedy. Bruce Mazlish, in his James and John Stuart 
Mill: Father and Son in the Nineteenth Century, also presented a similar argument. For reference, see Iris Mueller, 
John Stuart Mill and French Thought (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1956 ) 46-47 and Bruce Mazlish, James and John 
Stuart Mill: Father and Son in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Basic Books 1975) 238.  
141 Don Asher Habibi, John Stuart Mill and the Ethic of Human Growth (Boston: Kluwer 2001) 233. 
142 See Ben Knights, The Idea of the Clerisy in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978) and 
Alan S. Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill 
and Alexis de Tocqueville (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992).  
 66 
having observed Mill‟s passion for the cultivated few, tried to differentiate the 
„conservative‟ Mill from the „liberal‟ Mill.‟ 143  Nicholas Capaldi, in a recent 
biography of Mill, also expresses a similar idea, describing his intellectual 
engagements during the first half of the decade of the 1830s as in part a „flirtation 
with conservatism.‟ 144  With an appropriate definition – and in some cases a 
redefinition – of terms such as „aristocratic‟ and „conservatism,‟ Mill‟s education of 
feelings could certainly be categorised as such. Indeed, those labels are valuable for 
their insight into the complexity of Mill‟s ideas. However, I would argue that in spite 
of his ostensible support for the few superior minds, the liberal Mill and the 
conservative Mill are not separable. What he intended to achieve was in fact a 
synthesis that reconciled the so-called elitism with his liberal belief, and this point is 
best illustrated in his discussion of universities. 
 The last part of „Civilisation‟ was devoted to an examination of the role of 
English universities. Following his previous argument about the importance of 
aesthetic cultivation, Mill insisted that a proper university education should cultivate 
„manly character‟ with instruction in philosophy, politics and, in particular, „poetry 
and art.‟145 But the goal was not to produce minds as great as that of the instructor. 
Although Mill still described the aim of education as „love of truth‟ in the singular 
form, he also maintained that the aim must be achieved „without a particle of regard to 
the results to which the exercise of that power may lead, even though it should 
conduct the pupil to opinions diametrically opposite to those of his teachers.‟146 The 
education of the inner world, as he made it clear, was a cultivation guided by the 
„cultivated few‟ under the liberal principle. People were taught to love, to sympathise, 
and to step forward heroically, but they should never be taught to aspire to the same 
ideals that their superiors loved, or to defend the same doctrines that their superiors 
chose to believe. This principle was reiterated at the end of the essay. While „subjects 
of systematic instruction‟ must be explored „under the most eminent professors who 
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could be found,‟ the professors must be chosen „not for the particular doctrines they 
might happen to profess, but as being those who were most likely to send forth pupils 
qualified in point of disposition and attainments to choose doctrines for 
themselves.‟ 147  Only then, Mill summarised, could education become truly 
favourable to the „freedom of thought and the progress of the human mind.‟ Later, the 
same conviction would emerge again with equal emphasis in a private letter to 
Alexander Bain, where Mill explained his purpose of writing On Liberty: 
 
The „Liberty‟ has produced an effect on you which it was never intended to 
produce, if it has made you think that we ought not to attempt to convert the 
world. I meant nothing of the kind, and hope that we ought to convert all we 
can. We must be satisfied with keeping alive the sacred fire in a few minds 
when we are unable to do more – but the notion of an intellectual aristocracy 
of lumieres while the rest of the world remains in darkness fulfils none of my 
aspirations – and the effort I aim at by the book is, on the contrary, to make 
the many more accessible to all truth by making them more open-minded.
148
 
 
His refusal to be regarded as perpetuating „the notion of an intellectual aristocracy‟ is 
telling enough. Adhering to the principle of being „open-minded,‟ the project, as Mill 
envisioned, did not pose any threat to his liberal beliefs but became an inherent part of 
it. The refinement of the mind was the aim, but in which direction the mind would be 
led was left to the free will of the individual. Individuality and liberal culture, 
therefore, were still Mill‟s motto.  
However, the synthesis of liberalism and elitism in „Civilisation‟ was not entirely 
without fallacy. First of all, Mill did not explain how to avoid the danger of stifling 
individuality in the course of „conversion.‟ Just as Lauren M. E. Goodlad has 
observed in her post-Foucauldian study of Victorian liberalism, Mill‟s elitism 
illustrated the tension between the „emancipatory project‟ of promoting individuality 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, the „perverse effect‟ that intensified a 
„pastoral authority‟ over the individuals. For Mill, as for Foucault, pastorship – the 
means by which to build individuality without homogenizing individuals – „is the 
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central problematic of a modern liberal society.‟149 While the equilibrium that Mill 
tried to maintain between individuality and elitism appeared very fragile, the means of 
cultivation that he proposed was, to say the least, dreamy. At one point in the essay, he 
described the cultivation of feelings as follows: 
 
for so rousing the slumbering energy of the opulent and lettered classes, so 
storing the youth of those classes with the profoundest and most valuable 
knowledge, so calling forth whatever of individual greatness exists or can be 
raised up in the country, as to create a power which might partially rival the 
mere power of the masses, and might exercise the most salutary influence 
over them for their own good.
150
 
 
Here is one of those rare moments in which Mill adopted a highly metaphorical 
language, one that is almost poetical. Yet the poetic elements did not help much with 
his elucidation. Rather, it instilled a feeling of dreaminess that seriously compromised 
the effectiveness of Mill‟s argument. How exactly, for instance, should the cultivated 
few „rouse‟ the slumbering classes and „call forth‟ everyone‟s potential without 
actually resorting to magic? A phrase as general as „using all means‟ was not helpful 
at all, and readers were left to their own to speculate about the mechanism of this 
grand project. While Mill believed that „co-operation among the leading intellects of 
the age‟ would bring to the masses works of „first-rate merit‟ that obtained „the 
approval of those whose names would carry authority,‟ he never spelt out what he 
meant by „leading intellects,‟ and what kinds of works could be judged as having 
„first-rate merit.‟151 Moreover, where did the „authority‟ come from, and how was it 
justified? There were too many open questions in these simple prescriptions; yet none 
of them was adequately answered. In effect, the criteria of Mill‟s elites remained 
obscure. 
 Mill also overlooked the fact that there might be a disagreement among elitists 
themselves. At one point, he proposed that, for the present age, only „two modes were 
left in which an individual mind can hope to produce much direct effect upon the 
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minds and destines of his countrymen generally,‟ and which referred to either „a 
member of parliament‟ or „an editor of a London newspaper.‟152 But in reality – as 
Mill should know quite well, since he was an editor once and later became a Member 
of Parliament in 1865 – in both modes, individuals had to be involved in endless 
quarrels. Do these professions ensure authority? And how to make sure that members 
of parliament or editors of newspapers perform „co-operation‟? The difficulty in 
maintaining cooperation could render the whole project even more self-defeating. 
People do have different opinions, and those with different opinions often fight with 
each other. Hence there is no telling how a group of leading intellects, as Mill 
recommended, would work hand in hand to contribute to the perfection of human 
character and human society. They might cooperate, but it is equally possible that 
different principles would make them end up „vying with one another to attract public 
attention,‟ creating the very democratic chaos that Mill had always been trying to 
avoid in his educational plan. In fact, Mill himself was not altogether unaware of this 
possibility. Talking about the role of the press, he was worried about the prospect that 
„the importance of the newspaper press in the aggregate, considered as the voice of 
public opinion, will be increased,‟ and that „the influence of any one writer in helping 
to form that opinion necessarily diminished.‟153 Even within the press, cooperation 
might be replaced by competition, and the voice of the few might be drowned by the 
roar of the many. 
 For some critics of Mill, the idea of communication is also an issue. This is the 
question that Don A. Habibi raises in his study: „Even when elites are willing to be 
helpful,‟ Habibi maintains, „they may be unable. […] It is not unusual for members of 
an elite class to have problems communicating with the rest of society. It is one thing 
to achieve a high level of knowledge and wisdom; but, it is another to impart it 
successfully to others.‟154 Indeed, to communicate with his audience appeared to be 
quite a challenge for Mill, who, as so many recollections have testified, had a public 
image that featured precociousness as well as unorthodoxy. He never received formal 
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education; he was a political radical; he spoke for the rights of women; and worse still, 
he did not have any religious beliefs, being at some point even rather hostile to 
religion. While many looked on him as a reasoning machine, bearing the trademark of 
Utilitarianism, his homage to the „education of feelings‟ also threatened to alienate 
him from Utilitarians.
155
 So how did Mill perform when he himself took up the 
responsibility of an elitist educator who tried to impart to the audience the importance 
of feeling? While I agree with Habibi that Mill did not offer a detailed guideline 
concerning the means of communication, I would also suggest that he did not do so 
primarily because he himself had already set an example. As a matter of fact, 
communication was not a real problem for Mill the aesthetic educator. Through an 
analysis of his language and style in essays such as „Bentham‟ and „Coleridge,‟ I will 
show that Mill, as one of the „elite class,‟ was in fact quite skilful in imparting his 
ideas.  
 
A Logician Poet: Mill in ‘Bentham’ and ‘Coleridge’ 
In his recent biography, Nicholas Capaldi attempts to portray Mill in a way that is 
very different from the image of an established intellectual icon. Through a 
meticulous study of Mill‟s relationship with the Romantic movement, Capaldi argues 
that Romanticism was a crucial constituent in Mill‟s thinking, so crucial that it could 
be said that one of the major tasks throughout Mill‟s career was to reconcile „his 
father‟s practical program of liberal reform‟ with „nineteenth-century Romantic 
philosophical ideas that his father did not really understand.‟156 Mill, as Capaldi 
attempts to show, was an ardent Romanticist who „constructed a life that strove to be a 
Romantic work of art.‟157 I agree with Capaldi that the Romantic tendency deserves 
much closer attention than it had hitherto received in the study of Mill. Indeed, I have 
borrowed heavily from Capaldi‟s portrayal in my own study of Mill as an aesthetic 
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educator. The reason is obvious: the whole idea of „aesthetic education‟ would never 
have come into being if Mill had not developed an active interest in the ideas of 
people like Wordsworth, Shelley, Coleridge and Carlyle. In this sense, to study Mill‟s 
idea of „aesthetic education‟ is to study his Romantic inclination. 
On the other hand, in spite of all the deep affection for Romanticism, the 
mentality that Mill demonstrated as an aesthetic educator was also genuinely rational. 
It is true that he attempted to reconcile his father‟s ideas with Romantic philosophy, 
but the very attempt at reconciliation also suggests a logician at work. The 
combination of Romanticism and logic was indicated both in what he said and the 
way he said it – successfully incorporating the intellectual and the poetical into his 
own discourse. 
The year 1838 brought two blows to Utilitarians: both Bentham and James Mill 
passed away. Mill‟s essay „Bentham‟ appeared in the London and Westminster Review 
in August of the same year, commemorating the achievement of this great thinker. The 
essay on Coleridge appeared later in March 1840, also in the London and Westminster 
Review. In spite of the two-year gap, his readers could without difficulty detect the 
connection between them – indeed, one who read the 1838 essay would naturally 
expect a sequel on Coleridge, since at the very beginning of the Bentham essay, Mill 
had already stated that Bentham and Coleridge were „two great seminal minds of 
England in their age.‟158 Though both were „closet-students,‟ he proceeded, these 
men were „dissimilar in almost all else.‟159 This idea received even more emphasis 
when he introduced Coleridge. „It would be difficult,‟ according to Mill,  
 
to find two persons of philosophic eminence more exactly the contrary of one 
another. Compare their modes of treatment of any subject, and you might 
fancy them inhabitants of different worlds. They seem to have scarcely a 
principle or a premise in common. Each of them sees scarcely anything but 
what the other does not see.
160
 
 
The two essays, therefore, are parts of one piece, and such a clear-cut contrast of both 
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thinkers seems to suggest that Mill was making „a synthesis of Bentham and 
Coleridge‟s profound half-truths,‟ as some critics have said.161 Indeed, synthesis was 
one of Mill‟s favourite strategies, as we have seen from his literary essays and 
„Civilisation.‟ He synthesised feeling with intellect in order to safeguard the doctrine 
of inner culture from being misunderstood as a justification of excessive subjectivity. 
He synthesised feeling also with morality, turning aesthetic education into a 
cultivation of aesthetic-moral sentiments. With regard to the political significance of 
aesthetic education, he tried to synthesise liberalism and elitism, making his 
educational project an embodiment of both the liberal ideal and the cultivated few. 
Curiously, this expectation of synthesis was not readily fulfilled in these two essays, 
at least not as straightforwardly as Mill had done elsewhere. As F. E. L. Priestley 
rightly points out in his comment on the Coleridge essay, those who read the essay 
closely might in the end be caught by surprise by „the relative scarcity of specific 
references to Bentham and his ideas.‟162 In fact, the same observation also applies to 
the essay on Bentham: in the assessment of the specific views of Bentham, the name 
„Coleridge‟ did not make much appearance either. If there was any synthesis of these 
two completely different minds, as Mill had promised, it was never spelt out and was 
therefore left to be constructed by the readers themselves.  
 But „education of feelings‟ remained as a vital component of Mill‟s argument. 
Admittedly, the issue of feeling did not feature as prominently as it did in the essays 
previously discussed. Aiming for a thorough evaluation of the ideas of the 
above-mentioned thinkers, Mill was now compelled to cover a field as broad as 
possible, showing their specific contributions in diverse realms that ranged from law 
and philosophy to politics and religion. Still, the „education of feelings‟ played an 
important role. Not only did this notion help Mill assess these thinkers respectively; it 
also provided one of those rare occasions in which the two seminal minds could, 
finally, be brought together as specimens of half-truths. The most distinguished 
component in Coleridge‟s thinking, Mill argued, was the principle of „sympathy‟ and 
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his poetic justification of imagination. Both were rejected by Bentham, whose 
philosophy, in the opinion of Mill, showed nothing but contempt for the „most natural 
and strongest feelings of human nature.‟163 On the other hand, as far as the means of 
education was concerned, Bentham‟s conviction was also a potential corrective of 
Coleridge‟s ideas. The latter was an unrealistic „zealot for an aristocratic government‟ 
to conduct aesthetic education, whereas the former supplied the other portion of truth 
by pointing out that the only possible remedy was liberalism instead of aristocracy.
164
 
In short, while Coleridge‟s affirmation of the value of inner culture rectified 
Bentham‟s overly rationalistic views of human nature, Bentham also complemented 
the former with his emphasis on the importance of preserving individuality. In this 
way, Mill personified the controversies about aesthetic education in these two eminent 
thinkers. 
 Apart from the contrast between Bentham and Coleridge, Mill also used 
antithesis to portray each mind. Bentham was set in opposition to his contemporaries 
and predecessors who took for granted the British Constitution and the English Law; 
and Coleridge was contrasted specifically with eighteenth-century philosophers. Such 
a neat structure was very effective in showing readers what Mill wanted to highlight 
in each man‟s thinking. Taking one example from his analysis of Coleridge and the 
eighteenth century, Mill concluded in his brief survey of eighteenth-century 
philosophy that the „Germano-Coleridgian doctrine‟ was the result of a reaction to the 
eighteenth-century rationalism and, therefore, was simply everything that the past 
century was not. Referring to Coleridge‟s idea as „it‟ and that of the eighteenth 
century as „that,‟ Mill produced a succinct list of their differences: „It is ontological, 
because that was experimental; conservative, because that was innovative; religious, 
because so much of that was infidel; concrete and historical, because that was abstract 
and metaphysical; poetical, because that was matter-of-fact and prosaic.‟165 The 
contrast was later repeated in Mill‟s Autobiography, when he tried to illustrate his 
tactic of processing „half-truths‟: 
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The fight between the nineteenth century and the eighteenth always reminded 
me of the battle about the shield, one side of which was white and the other 
black. I marvelled at the blind rage with which the combatants rushed against 
one another. I applied to them, and to Coleridge himself, many of Coleridge‟s 
sayings about half truths; and Goethe‟s device, „many-sidedness,‟ was one 
which I would most willingly, at this period, have taken for mine.
166
 
 
Though Mill was convinced that he had „as firm hold of one side of the truth as […] 
of the other,‟ some later critics did not think so. The problem with his strategy is quite 
obvious: the contrasts are simply too tidy to be true. Do those structures of antitheses, 
one might ask, involve any sacrifice of details and complications? This is the very 
question that led Raymond Williams to repudiate the underlying principle of these 
essays. In Williams‟ view, Mill‟s „comparison and contrast‟ here is „completely 
intellectualist,‟ and it is doubtful whether „those abstract opinions of opposed thinkers 
might profitably complement each other‟ in order to „make what is called a „correct‟ 
doctrine.‟167 But Williams is not just concerned with the outcome of this procedure. 
Be the result „correct‟ or not, his further objection was raised against Mill‟s reductive 
understanding of complex ideas. „We have to ask,‟ Williams proceeded, „whether such 
a procedure would, even in itself, be useful, considering its tendency to isolate the 
„doctrines‟ from those attachments, those particular valuations, those living situations, 
in which alone the „doctrines‟ can be said to be active.‟168  
This critique rightly points out a potential fallacy in Mill‟s treatment of received 
ideas, and I agree that the construction of synthesis and antithesis reveals a mind that 
is deeply intellectualistic. On the other hand, I think William‟s criticism that Mill was 
being negligent towards the living situations of the ideas is not entirely justified, 
because he overlooks the sense of urgency in Mill‟s argument. In spite of his interest 
in the past, Mill was not conducting a thorough research into the history of ideas. As a 
contributor to periodical literature, his priority – as he had explained in „Civilisation,‟ 
for instance, – was to influence the minds of his contemporaries. The purpose was 
rendered even more explicit if we think of Mill‟s uttermost attentiveness to the „living 
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situations‟ of his own age. He might be culpable for not showing a sufficiently 
historical vision when he analysed the philosophical ideas of the past, but the 
conclusion he had reached through that intellectualistic synthesis was loaded with the 
spirit of his time. For instance, his attempt at bringing his liberal beliefs together with 
the elitism modelled after Coleridgian clerisy, as we have noticed, was based on 
nothing else but the features and the need of his age. Without the insight into the 
dubious consequences of democracy, there would not be so much expectation of the 
leading intellects. To think of Mill as a newspaper contributor who addressed 
contemporary social issues, is to see him not as a philosopher but, first of all, as a 
moralist deeply concerned with the values and living situations of contemporary 
society. 
On the other hand, synthesis and antithesis also contributed to Mill‟s eloquence as 
a moralist, by enhancing his skills in demonstration and persuasion. A modern critic 
with considerable subtlety would probably sneer at those clear-cut contraries, but 
Mill‟s contemporaries were less likely to do so. A Grammar of Rhetoric, published in 
1826, had a whole chapter devoted to the discussion of the use of antithesis. 
According to the author, this intellectual device made „the most brilliant appearance in 
the delineation of characters, particularly in history‟ and, when appropriately used, the 
„beauty‟ of it was „considerable.‟169 There is little surprise, then, that Mill, having 
read the works of the ancient Greek writers who were famous for their mastery of 
rhetoric skills, had come to acquire the same intellectual eloquence. Moreover, Mill‟s 
adversaries also confirmed the effectiveness of his eloquence. Two days after Mill‟s 
death, Abraham Hayward published in the Times an obituary which assessed his 
personality as well as intellectual achievement. Hayward‟s opinion of Mill was 
extremely unfavourable, declaring that „many of his opinions on society and 
government have been generally and justly condemned‟ and that, „in his more 
appropriate domain of mental and moral philosophy, he was engaged in unceasing 
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feuds.‟170 Despite all these deprecations, however, Hayward could not bring himself 
to dismiss Mill‟s persuasiveness. Citing the views expressed in another article, 
Hayward observed that the man, as a „trained logician‟ with „most wit,‟ debated well 
in the parliament, where he „seldom failed to command attention‟ in order to teach.171 
To impress and to teach – this was also what Mill did in his writings, in which the 
carefully constructed antithesis revealed a logician with a full command of intellectual 
eloquence. 
Mill himself should therefore not be understood as an „antithesis‟ to his ideal of 
aesthetic educator. An ideal educator, as he argued in his literary essays, was a 
philosopher-poet or „logician-poet‟ who communicated to the largest body of minds 
through feelings and intellect, in order to bring home to them the importance of inner 
culture. Mill himself had tried to put the ideal into practice. The eloquence illustrated 
above shows his ability of making use of the treasure of logicians when he 
communicated with his audience; but that is only half of the picture, for Mill was not 
insufficient in poetic eloquence either. Although the name „John Stuart Mill‟ never 
appears with the title of a „poet‟ and probably will never do, there are moments in the 
essays on Bentham and Coleridge when he became almost as poetical as the perfect 
aesthetic educator he envisioned, especially in the use of imagery.  
Mill regarded the skilful use of images as a requisite for a philosopher-poet. In his 
review of Tennyson, for instance, he argued that imagery was essential to good poetry 
because it had „the power of creating scenery‟ with an embodied symbol; yet, more 
than that, it was also capable to stimulate „some state of human feelings‟ and „to 
summon up the state of feeling itself, with a force not to be surpassed by anything but 
reality.‟172 In order to be effective, the images must show „precision and distinctness‟ 
and must retain these qualities throughout the entire work, so that the feelings excited 
would contribute to the poetic unity. These principles led Mill to praise Tennyson‟s 
„The Lady of Shalott‟ with no reservation. He even refused to take extracts from the 
long poem but reprinted the whole work in the review, as he said, precisely because 
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the sustained „statuesqueness‟ of the images rendered the poetic expression of 
imaginations and feelings unbreakable.
173
  
In the essays on Bentham and Coleridge, imagery also played a vital part. It not 
only complemented the logician‟s eloquence in foregrounding the contrast between 
those minds; integrated within a subtle moral judgment, they highlighted the 
personality of each thinker and, eventually, overthrew the balance that Mill appeared 
to maintain with that delicate structure of synthesis and antithesis. Although 
Coleridge‟s idea about cultivation was found to be a „half-truth‟ because of its 
unrealistic support of an aristocratic agency, he was in many way identified to be a 
genial teacher-saviour-prophet. As a poet, for instance, Coleridge was noted for being 
„instrumental in diffusing‟ the „healthier taste […] and more intelligent canons of 
poetic criticism.‟ As a philosopher, he, too, „promulgated‟ his views to the public.174 
But he was not just an instructor, for his cause was perceived to have a more heroic 
end. In religious philosophy, as Mill described, Coleridge should be honoured for 
having „rescued [the principle of an endowed class] from the discredit in which the 
corruptions of the English Church had involved everything connected with it.‟175 As a 
saviour, Coleridge made constant defences and challenges, but far from a ruthless 
fighter, he was always shown to be a prophet-like saviour with a heart swelling with 
emotions. Thus, he „pleaded most earnestly‟ for „the liberty of criticism with respect 
to the Scriptures,‟ „threw up his hands in dismay‟ when he felt dissatisfied with the 
progress of contemporary scholarship, and „bewail[ed]‟ the pervading error of 
Protestant divinity.  
When Mill moved from a detailed portrayal to a general summary of Coleridge, 
he declared: „It is known that he did live to write down these meditations, and 
speculations so important will one day, it is devoutly to be hoped, be given to the 
world.‟176 This deliberately constructed historical distance – with some exaggeration, 
since Coleridge was actually considered a contemporary to the readers of this essay – 
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conferred a legendary status to the protagonist. The farther he was removed from the 
audience, the more resemblance he seemed to share with those ancient prophets, while 
at the same time, the tone of reverence („devoutly to be hoped‟ and „given to the 
world‟) reasserted his intellectual authority. Moreover, the way the narrative was 
constructed also suggested the role of Coleridge as a teacher-saviour-prophet. The 
essay began with a brief outline of Coleridge‟s distinctions; shortly after that, it 
moved on to a lengthy discussion of eighteenth-century philosophy both on the 
Continent and in England. The historical narrative continued steadily until a sweeping 
generalisation was made concerning the problems of the past age: 
 
There were few poets, and none of a high order; and philosophy fell mostly 
into the hands of men of a dry prosaic nature, who had not enough of the 
materials of human feeling in them to be able to imagine any of its more 
complex and mysterious manifestations; all of which they either left out of 
their theories, or introduced them with such explanations as no one who had 
experienced the feelings could receive as adequate.
177
 
 
Hence came the final judgment: this age, according to Mill, was an age „without 
earnestness‟ and „smitten with an incapacity of producing deep or strong feelings, 
such as at least could ally itself with meditative habits.‟178 This was Mill‟s conclusion 
for the survey of eighteen-century philosophy, but it was also the advent of the 
evaluation of Coleridge. The repeated negatives („none of a high order,‟ „dry prosaic 
nature,‟ „not enough,‟ „left out of‟) created an extensive metaphor which presented the 
philosophical landscape of the past century as a landscape of utter aridity. As the 
emphasis on aridity arrived at its peak, the expectation for something contrary also, 
naturally enough, reached a climax. Thus, Coleridge, the poet and philosopher, with 
his strong feelings, earnestness and the recognition of the value of imagination, was 
introduced as the curer of the „dry prosaic nature,‟ the inability to „imagine,‟ and the 
void of „feelings.‟ He was, therefore, the ultimate saviour. No introduction could be 
more dramatic, and no contrast could be constructed so effectively to the advantage of 
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the man being discussed.  
 Mill also painted Bentham in words, but with a completely opposite effect. 
Despite his claim that Bentham held at least half of the truths, the images employed 
betrayed his true view. The persona that Mill designed for Bentham was that of a 
warrior-child. The warrior role first became distinct when he described Bentham‟s 
place in intellectual history. The fame of this great thinker, Mill said, was earned by 
„carrying the war of criticism and refutation, the conflict with falsehood and absurdity, 
into the field of practical evils […] without intermission.‟ 179  The subsequent 
descriptions of Bentham‟s relationship with his contemporaries reinforced his warrior 
identity: „It was that they were purely negative thinkers, he was positive: they only 
assailed error, he made it a point of conscience not to do so until he thought he could 
plant instead the corresponding truth.‟ This pinpoint contrasting between „he‟ and 
„they‟ thus went on for half a page. The antithesis constructed resembled that between 
Coleridge and eighteenth-century philosophers, but the effect produced was very 
different. In the case of Coleridge, the contrast was set between the thinker and his 
predecessors. As the previous analysis shows, the historical vision highlighted 
Coleridge as a mind more advanced than that of his predecessors and, for that matter, 
corrective of their faults. In the case of Bentham, however, the contrast was mostly 
between him and his contemporaries. Thus, the difference between „he‟ and „they‟ 
became a difference in terms of perspective rather than a divergence resulting from 
progress. Even the syntax gave the same impression. Mill used short brisk sentences 
to illustrate the disagreement between Bentham and his contemporaries. Although the 
explicit purpose of the illustration was to show Bentham as the superior, the contrast 
between „he‟ and „they,‟ along with the rapid syntactic shifts from one side to the other, 
vividly simulates a debating scenario which invited readers, however implicitly, to 
attach the same amount of truth to both sides. As a result, Bentham was cast primarily 
as a fighter instead of a teacher.  
 As the essay goes on, the warrior quality of Bentham becomes ever more distinct. 
Commenting on his utilitarian method, Mill maintained that there was little wonder 
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that the man should have accomplished so much, being „[a]rmed with such a potent 
instrument, and wielding it with such singleness of aim,‟ then added that Bentham 
was the „hardiest assertor‟ of his own view and the „keenest detector‟ of the errors of 
others.
180
 If sometimes Bentham could be said to be teaching, he taught in this 
manner: „Principle after principle of those propounded by him is moreover making its 
way by infiltration into the understandings most shut against his influence, and 
driving nonsense and prejudice from one corner of them to another.‟181 Unlike 
Coleridge‟s tactic of promulgating and diffusing knowledge as a prophet of feelings, 
Bentham‟s instruction embodied a military spirit. The public mind was in general his 
enemy, whose territories forbad his entrance. The only choice for him to transmit his 
own views, therefore, was to invade their mind by making „infiltrations‟ through 
stealthy moves and, afterwards, to declare wars by „driving‟ away the nonsense of the 
enemies around. While Coleridge convinced the public by appealing to their intellect 
as well as their emotions, Bentham simply sought to conquer them.  
 Paradoxically, however, Bentham the war hero was also sometimes depicted in 
the persona of a child. Mill agreed that the thinker had achieved much, but he also 
pointed out the achievement was still „far short of what his sanguine and almost 
boyish fancy made him flatter himself that he had accomplished.‟182 In a similar vein, 
Mill also commented that with „neither internal experience nor external,‟ Bentham 
„lived from childhood to the age of eighty-five in boyish health. He knew no dejection, 
no heaviness of heart. He never felt life a sore and a weary burthen. He was a boy to 
the last.‟183 The indication of the boy persona was clearly deprecating. At the surface 
level, the image seems to contradict that of the warrior, since the former was careless 
and boyish, while the latter was unmistakably masculine. But in my view, the 
contradiction could be easily resolved on the grounds of both personas being 
essentially egoistic. The warrior Bentham, as Mill described him, was keen to make 
others adopt his ideas; but rather than appealing to their sympathy and understanding, 
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he indoctrinated them in an almost aggressive manner, positioning himself as an 
antagonist to his audience. The boyish Bentham had „neither internal experience nor 
external.‟ But inasmuch as he did not conduct self-scrutiny or extend sympathy to 
other people, but only sought to make his self-will prevail, the boy was no different 
from the warrior. Both images revealed Bentham as an emotional invalid and, as a 
result, reduced the half truths held by Bentham to being „fractional‟ truths and thus 
broke the balance that Mill had tried to maintain in his outward claim. Bentham, as a 
result, was shown to be much inferior as a teacher of public minds than his 
counterpart Coleridge.  
 The effectiveness of the images is best reflected in the audience‟s response. W. L. 
Courtney recorded in his recollection of Mill that among all the different articles he 
contributed to the periodicals at that time, „[i]t was the Bentham article which 
seem[ed] to have given offence, for it revealed an attitude toward the oracle which 
was rather that of the critic than of the disciple.‟184 According to Alexander Bain, the 
two articles on Bentham and Coleridge made „a temporary alienation between Mill 
and his old associates, and planted in their minds a painful misgiving as to his 
adhering to their principles.‟185 Nevertheless, Bain also conceded that Mill did have 
the power to „address the feelings.‟ His best speeches, as Bain said with much 
admiration, „leave nothing unsaid that could enlist the strongest feelings of the 
readers‟ and „work by the force of sympathy.‟186 Thus, both the misgivings and the 
enthusiasm of his audience testified to the effectiveness of those poetic images and 
the power of his rhetoric. Later critics who pay attention to Mill‟s rhetorical skills also 
tend to draw the same conclusion. In a more recent study of the essay on Bentham, for 
instance, Eugene R. August, examining Mill‟s techniques against John Holloway‟s 
studies of the „Victorian Sage,‟ argues that the voice of the essay is that of a typical 
sage, who „persuade[s] his readers emotionally‟ through writings that had both „a 
logical surface‟ and „an emotional subsurface.‟187 For my part, I would argue that 
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apart from being a sage, the voice in those two articles on Bentham and Coleridge is 
essentially the voice of an aesthetic educator. Through a skilful use of imagery on the 
one hand, and the synthesis / antithesis on the other, Mill managed to achieve the very 
goal that he had formerly prescribed for the philosopher-poet: to communicate 
through intellect and „to summon up the state of feeling itself.‟ While the previous 
essays on poetry and civilisation presented to us a Mill who was an ardent supporter 
of the cause of the education of feelings, these essays, with their emotional 
sub-surface and logical surface, reveal Mill as the epitome of the philosopher-poet, 
the ideal aesthetic educator according to his own standard. 
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Conclusion 
By 1867, Mill had become a public moralist of established reputation, but the 
reception of his St. Andrews address was seriously divided. Alexander Bain, a 
professor at the University of Aberdeen and also a lifelong friend of Mill, criticised 
the speech as „a very lengthened performance,‟ „a mistake‟ and „a failure.‟ According 
to Bain, the three-hour speech not only exhausted the patience of the audience; with 
too many subjects being named as compulsory, Mill‟s plan for higher education 
showed „no conception of the limits of a University curriculum‟ and, therefore, was 
bound to fail.
188
 „If he had consulted me on this occasion,‟ Bain regretted, „I should 
have endeavoured to impress upon him the limits of our possible curriculum […] so 
as to make the very most of our time and means.‟189 Matthew Arnold, however, held 
a different opinion, even though he was often considered to be Mill‟s lifelong 
adversary. In his Higher Schools and Universities in Germany, first published in 1868, 
Arnold drew on Mill‟s authority and mentioned in particular the St. Andrews address. 
The speech, according to him, contained many sound principles for education and was 
especially laudable for its attempt to vindicate the value of classics for the cultivation 
of „high spirit.‟ The whole idea, as Arnold warmly concluded, should be recognised as 
among „the best educational opinion of the country.‟190  
 The comments by Bain and Arnold, though somehow polarising, have since 
formed the „standard answer‟ in the criticism of Mill‟s St. Andrews address. There 
seems to be a consensus among modern scholars that, since the address is allegedly 
concerned with the principle of education, that is exactly how it should be approached. 
But Mill is not remembered primarily as an educationalist; hence, many critics who 
analyse his „educational theories‟ find little material to draw upon, apart from the 
speech itself and bits of paragraphs taken at random from his other works and, for that 
matter, often out of context. As a result, such criticisms give the impression that the 
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speech is a unique piece in Mill‟s career, embodying a concern that receives little 
systematic treatment elsewhere. Moreover, these conclusions also reflect a simple 
synthesis of Bain and Arnold‟s judgment: that Mill‟s project provides a cause worth 
fighting for (that Mill „displays several of his chief intellectual virtues to good effect‟), 
yet, in practice, the final aim could not possibly be achieved (because it is 
„unrealistically high‟).191 However, I contend that this standard approach to the 
address, though offering a general view of Mill‟s so-called theory for education, still 
leaves at least half of its intellectual significance unexplored. The speech is, in fact, a 
milestone in Mill‟s exploration of aesthetic education. So much of what he had 
thought and said in the past decades had now been weaved together, that the 
statements in the speech are in themselves succinct summaries of the essays 
previously analysed. A brief return to this address, therefore, shall conclude the 
present chapter. 
 Having defined aesthetic education as „the cultivation of the beautiful‟ and „the 
education of feelings,‟ Mill proceeded to call attention to the value of poetry, which, 
according to him, was „the queen of arts.‟ 192  Many looked on poetry as „an 
amusement or excitement, the superiority of which over others principally consisted 
in being that of a more refined order of minds.‟193 In the opinion of Mill, however, 
poetic works were a great „instrument for acting on the human mind,‟ with a 
„permanent influence on the higher region of human character.‟194 One could easily 
recognise here the voice of Mill the literary critic from a good thirty years ago. Back 
at that time, he had already developed the conviction that an ideal poet „has exercised, 
and continues to exercise, a powerful, and mostly a highly beneficial influence over 
the formation and growth of not a few of the most cultivated and vigorous of the 
youthful minds of our time.‟195 His portrait of a poet changed from that of a 
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soliloquist to that of an educator and, as we can tell from his St. Andrews address, he 
continued to regard poetry and poets as essentially instructive. 
Because of the reappearance of the subject of poetry in the address, critics often 
use these passages to illustrate how Mill held steadfastly to his literary interest.
196
 But 
in fact, Mill‟s proposal for aesthetic education in the address was based on many other 
considerations as well. Poetry exercised a beneficial influence on human character, he 
argued, by exciting our feelings. It brings „loftiness‟ and calms the soul but, most 
importantly, it „brings home to us all those aspects of life which take hold of our 
nature on its unselfish side, and lead us to identify our joy and grief with the good or 
ill of the system of which we form a part.‟197 And this benefit was particularly needed 
by people in the present, for 
 
[o]ne of the commonest types of character among us is that of a man all 
whose ambition is self-regarding, who has no higher purpose in life than to 
enrich or raise in the world himself and his family, who never dreams of 
making the good of his fellow-creatures or of his country an habitual 
object.
198
 
 
The criticism of the „self-regarding‟ ambition echoed Mill‟s definition of „civilisation.‟ 
Civilised people act „together for common purposes in large bodies‟ and enjoy „the 
pleasure of social intercourse‟; they, too, have the ambition to improve their lot, yet 
that ambition was anything but self-regarding.
199
 If sympathy was once identified to 
be the core ingredient for the improvement of society, there is little wonder, therefore, 
that Mill should single out this quality again in his educational plan. Similar to what 
he did in the essay „Civilisation,‟ Mill pointed out in the address that unselfish feeling 
was especially needed by an average middle / higher class Englishman. Conscience – 
or rather the desire to stay away from evil – made an Englishman care for his family, 
give „certain sums in charity‟ and restrain from crime. But in Mill‟s judgment, this 
was far from enough. A man like that, he insisted, must also acquire a „higher feeling‟ 
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that helped him look beyond his immediate circle in order to see „the miserable 
smallness of mere self in the face of this great universe, of the collective mass of our 
fellow creatures, in the face of past history and of the indefinite future.‟200 In other 
words, as he had expressed in „Civilisation,‟ it is high time to equip people with 
courage and aspiration and to make them embrace the aesthetic of heroism.
201
 
 The speech even preserved Mill‟s call for the „cultivated few.‟ „You and your 
like,‟ Mill addressed the students directly when he concluded, „are the hope and 
resource of your country in the coming generation.‟ Once outside the campus, „[y]ou 
are to be a part of the public who are to welcome, encourage, and help forward the 
future intellectual benefactors of humanity; and you are, if possible, to furnish your 
contingent to the number of those benefactors.‟202 These words clearly echoed what 
Mill had said in the 1830s, when he described the „leading intellects‟ of the day. To be 
sure, there was a slight difference. While before, he was convinced that such a group 
were only to be found in parliament and the press; here, he hoped that universities 
could take their share of responsibility. Nevertheless, he still had the same concern as 
he did thirty years ago; he was still worried about the „diminishing influence‟ of 
educators in democratic society and still earnestly desired that a group of leading 
intellects could contribute to the advancement of civilisation. Having made this 
observation, one wonders if this widely recognised mistake of the speech – that Mill 
ignored the possible limits of curricula, as Bain had put it – was to some extent 
pardonable. He listed too many subjects, I think, because he had very high 
expectations of the audience. When he urged them to note the importance of „the 
education of feelings‟ and „the cultivation of the beautiful‟, he was actually 
envisaging himself as an aesthetic educator who addressed a group of future aesthetic 
educators that would, in time, exercise great influence on the advancement of 
literature, politics and, ultimately, civilisation.    
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Chapter 2 ‘A Majestic Unity’: Matthew Arnold’s Schillerian 
Aesthetic Education 
 
‘Cromwell’ and ‘Cassandra’: Arnold and Schiller 
The 1843 Newdigate Prize, an award for excellent verse composed by Oxford 
students, went to the author of „Cromwell,‟ a young man named Matthew Arnold. 
Being a prize-poem as well as one of his earliest publications, this work marked the 
beginning of Arnold‟s poetic career, and its success seemed to promise him a brilliant 
prospect. Yet, it is now no longer considered to be one of Arnold‟s major works, 
because it has failed to impress critics who have witnessed his later achievements. For 
instance, Herbert W. Paul, speaking in 1902, thought „Cromwell‟ was „less remarkable 
than „Alaric at Rome,‟‟‟ another prize-winning poem of Arnold; George Saintsbury 
was also convinced that although the work was better than that of his competitors, „a 
prudent taster would perhaps have abstained […] from predicting [in „Cromwell‟] a 
real poet in the author.‟203 As a result, today „Cromwell‟ hardly ever features in 
studies of Matthew Arnold‟s poetry or poetics. The present chapter shall nonetheless 
begin with this somehow insignificant poem – or to be more precise, its German 
epitaph, which has received even less attention: 
 
  Schrecklich ist es, deiner Wahrheit 
  Sterbliches Gefäβ zu seyn.204 
 
Literally translated, these lines mean „It is awful to be the mortal vessel of thy truth.‟ 
The epitaph was taken from Friedrich Schiller‟s poem „Kassandra.‟ The poem 
depicted the Trojan priestess Cassandra calling out to Apollo, lamenting her cruel 
destiny of being able to foretell everything in the future, yet unable to convince other 
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people. Thus when her countrymen were celebrating the wedding of Achilles and 
Polyxena, Cassandra, with her vision of the imminent destruction of the city, had no 
choice but to bear her woes alone.  
So one of the most obvious questions here to be raised is why Arnold chose this 
passage as the epitaph of his own work, and this question becomes especially 
interesting when we realise that the two protagonists of the poems have in fact not 
much in common. The sense of helplessness seems to be the most immediate link. 
Whereas Cassandra is tortured by her gift of prophecy, Cromwell, however heroic his 
life has been, is in the end seized by death. But that is about the only similarity; while, 
on the other hand, the difference between these two characters is even more obvious. 
Although both were mortals, Cassandra‟s pain of being the vessel of the truth of 
destiny finds little echo in Cromwell. The priestess is in utter despair because she 
knows something that no one else could possibly imagine or even trust, while the hero 
in Arnold‟s poem, characterised by his „dauntless will‟ and „bold actions,‟ wins 
support from many. The only cruel destiny for him is death, but that is an experience 
he shares with all human beings. Cassandra‟s awful „truth,‟ the truth that she is a 
lonely prophetess amidst a distrustful crowd, is simply not a theme in the poetic 
biography of Cromwell. No wonder, therefore, that Andrew Hickman, in a study of 
Arnold‟s poems, should describe the epitaph of „Cromwell‟ as „presumptuous,‟ 
suggesting the potential discrepancy between the two characters.
205
  
I agree that Cassandra‟s lines might not be an appropriate summary for the life of 
Cromwell; nevertheless, I think the epitaph provides us with an occasion to think 
about the intellectual link, not between the two characters, but between the two 
authors. Although the epitaph from Schiller has often been ignored by critics of 
Arnold‟s poetry, the intellectual connection between this German philosopher and the 
Victorian poet does not go unheeded. As early as 1967, William Madden was already 
arguing that Schiller, as an important figure in the constellation of the „German and 
English Romantics,‟ was a possible source of the aesthetic principles of Arnold and 
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his age.
206
 Later in 1985, David Lloyd also paralleled Arnold with Schiller in „the 
politics of aesthetics‟ and surmised that the latter anticipated the aesthetic theories of 
the former.
207
 In a similar vein, Linda Dowling, in her study of Victorian aesthetics 
and liberalism, put Arnold firmly in the aesthetic tradition developed by Shaftesbury, 
Winckelmann, Goethe and Schiller. Schiller‟s On the Aesthetic Education of Man 
brought a revolutionary understanding of aesthetics: it provided „the first moment at 
which the aesthetic sense is presumed to possess a power of agency in the world, not 
simply to register beauty in a passive way but to suggest a vital means of altering 
social reality.‟ And this, according to Dowling, was the belief that Arnold and his 
fellow Victorians had adopted.
208
 These observations inspired me in my study of 
Arnold‟s idea of aesthetic cultivation, and I intend to make further explorations along 
this line. Although possible intellectual connections between Arnold and Schiller have 
been identified, as is shown in the examples above, none of the critics bothered to go 
into detail. Madden and Dowling mentioned Schiller briefly as part of a whole school 
that exerted an influence on the Victorians, among which Arnold was but one example. 
Lloyd paid more attention to the similarity between Arnold and Schiller, but he 
obviously hesitated to substantiate the intellectual link when he chose to maintain that 
Arnold was „anticipated‟ by Schiller, instead of being „influenced‟ by him. In fact, 
even if Arnold was „anticipated,‟ this link would still appear rather feeble since his 
article, due to its short length, focused only on Arnold‟s idea of Irish politics.  
What I shall do in this chapter, therefore, is to validate the above hypotheses in a 
more concrete way, by showing how Arnold‟s idea of aesthetic education embodied 
many Schillerian elements. But before embarking on my project, it is helpful to take a 
brief look at the reception of Schiller in Victorian English culture. From the 1820s to 
the mid-nineteenth century, England witnessed a steadily growing interest in 
Schiller.
209
 Many nineteenth-century English newspapers, as Frederic Ewen notes in 
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his study, exalted Schiller to „sainthood,‟ while, according to an anthology of 
Schiller‟s poems and plays, published in 1889, most of the English translations of 
Schiller‟s works had appeared by the 1840s.210 The reputation of the German „saint‟ 
rested not only on his poetry and drama, which became almost immediately popular 
once they were translated; English readers also showed great interest in his aesthetic 
philosophy. Though much more difficult to digest than his poetic and fictional works, 
Schiller‟s aesthetic ideas received much attention. For instance, The Athenaeum, a 
magazine of solid literary reputation at the time, published reviews of Schiller‟s 
works and ideas in almost every issue from 1844 to 1852; and among all the works, it 
introduced with special care Schiller‟s correspondence with Korner and his 
philosophical ideal expressed in the discussion of art.  
The finest appraisal of Schiller‟s aesthetic ideas came from two individuals: 
Thomas Carlyle and Edward Bulwer Lytton. The former began to publish the first 
English biography of Schiller in 1823; the latter, in the 1840s, devoted considerable 
time and effort to translating Schiller‟s poems. Carlyle, in The Life of Friedrich 
Schiller, noted that Schiller‟s On the Aesthetic Education of Man (hereafter referred to 
as Aesthetic Letters), which, charting the „progress to the pinnacles of true human 
grandeur,‟ well served his end to redeem modern men who were „isolated on this 
fragment of the universe.‟ Schiller was also right, according to Carlyle, to point out 
that the source for grandeur lay in the internal world of human beings, and that 
aesthetic cultivation should address the „inmost nature‟ of men by calling upon them 
„to rise into a calm cloudless height of internal activity and peace.‟211 But Carlyle did 
not just paraphrase Schiller. Being a spokesman of his time, he was eager to show the 
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ways in which Schiller‟s aesthetic theory could benefit English culture in the 
nineteenth century. The whole scheme of Schiller, Carlyle maintained, „soar[ed] into a 
brighter region, very far beyond the ken of our „Utilities‟ and „Reflex-sense‟.‟212 The 
capitalised „Utilities‟ was an obvious reference to Utilitarianism, which was notorious 
for its slighting of art and literature; the „Reflex-sense,‟ on the other hand, was a key 
concept in nineteenth-century neurology, which explained the function of the inner 
world from a thoroughly scientific perspective.
213
 Schiller‟s aesthetic ideas, Carlyle 
believed, by soaring „into a brighter region,‟ provided an alternative and, for that 
matter, a superior interpretation of humanity; for this reason, they should be cherished 
by readers. 
Bulwer‟s evaluation attached even more significance to Schiller‟s idea of 
aesthetic education. When his translation of the Poems and Ballads of Schiller came 
out, Bulwer prefaced it with a biographical sketch of the author. Part of this sketch 
was conducted as a comparative study between Schiller and his contemporary Johann 
Gottfried von Herder, who had also developed a theory of aesthetics. In Bulwer‟s 
views, both Schiller‟s and Herder‟s theory of aesthetics were built upon the 
experience that they had gained from real life, but they approached these through very 
different means. Whereas Herder sought common interests in humanity in various 
„broad and popular topics,‟ Schiller concentrated on aesthetic cultivation, „that 
development of ideal beauty‟ which was „regarded as the flower and apex of human 
accomplishment.‟214 In fact, Bulwer would go so far as to argue that aesthetic 
cultivation was a theme that dominated Schiller‟s entire intellectual pursuit. Thus at 
the end of his short biography, Bulwer concluded that the career of Schiller could be 
viewed as an attempt „to ennoble‟; as both his poetry and his philosophy, as well as 
his letters on aesthetic education, were designed to impart knowledge of the beautiful, 
„to make the great and pure popular; to educate the populace up to purity and 
greatness.‟215 Bulwer‟s comments on Schiller won approval from the public. A 
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review of his translation in the North British Review, for instance, also sang high 
praise of Schiller‟s „deep philosophy‟ of aesthetic cultivation.216 
Arnold knew Schiller‟s works very well. The epitaph in „Cromwell‟ was but one 
example of how he borrowed from Schiller. His 1853 Preface, as I shall discuss at 
length in the following part, also quoted Schiller‟s comment on the function of art and, 
along with this, the emphasis on the ideal man as a complete aesthetic being. Another 
Schillerian quotation, „Im engen Kreis verengert sich der Sinn‟ (in a narrow sphere, 
the mind becomes narrowed‟, from Schiller‟s play Wallenstein), which appeared 
several times in Arnold‟s notebooks, also signified Arnold‟s attempt to invoke Schiller 
in his own condemnation of English sectarian narrowness.
217
 Even in works which 
made no explicit reference to Schiller, the influence could still be detected. Thus, „The 
Forsaken Merman,‟ argues Park Honan, is „a perfect illustration of Schiller‟s essay on 
the naive [On Naive and Sentimental Poetry].‟218  
Among all Schillerian ideas that Arnold borrowed, aesthetic teaching always 
appeared with special emphasis. In 1868, some twenty years after the first publication 
of his translation of Schiller‟s works, Bulwer reprinted the biography of Schiller in the 
collected Miscellaneous Prose Works, and sent one copy to Arnold. Upon receiving it, 
Arnold wrote back to express his gratitude. He told Bulwer that, although some essays 
in the volume were published in the Quarterly anonymously and were therefore 
missed by him, others were already familiar, reminding him of his readings of Schiller 
back in the Oxford days. In particular, Arnold recalled the „transcending effect‟ that 
the biography had produced in his mind. „The Life of Schiller,‟ he recalled, „came into 
my hands just at the moment I wanted something of the kind. I shall never forget what 
they then gave to me – the sense of a wider horizon, the anticipation of Germany, the 
opening into the great world.‟ 219  For those who had read Schiller‟s aesthetic 
philosophy, the descriptions of „transcending,‟ „wider horizon‟ and „great world‟ were 
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telling enough. What Arnold experienced through his contact with Schiller‟s work 
was exactly what Schiller intended to achieve through aesthetic education: to exalt 
human beings from confined individuals to free spirits and to transform the fragments 
of reality to greatness and nobility. This was also what Arnold himself would deliver 
to his Victorian English audience. He was keen to share the aesthetic teachings that he 
had received from Schiller. In a letter dated January 1865, he told his friend 
Constance de Rothschild: „Tell your sister not to poison her mind with too much light 
literature, but to go back to the Aesthetic Letters.‟220 In this sense, the brief comment 
on Bulwer‟s essay was a testimony to both what Arnold had received and what he 
wanted to pass on. Schiller‟s ideal of human nature and his view of humanity offered 
a philosophical anchor; or, to borrow Arnold‟s own words, „a point of view,‟ a view, 
as we shall see, that helped him to assess the cultural and social milieu of his own 
time.  
In the following part of the thesis, I shall begin with a brief analysis of Schiller‟s 
idea of aesthetic education, and then investigate Arnold‟s „aesthetic education‟ with 
regard to three aspects: his poetry, his literary criticism and his criticism of Victorian 
society. While still identifying Schiller as the originator of a tradition that shaped the 
thinking of many Victorians including Arnold, I shall argue for a more prominent 
influence that Schiller held specifically over Arnold, in particular his aesthetics. 
Taking up Dowling‟s exposition of Schiller‟s belief that aesthetics was a transforming 
power in society, I shall demonstrate that Arnold followed Schiller not only in his 
belief in aesthetics as a social agency; he was also truly Schillerian in the sense that 
his proposal for aesthetic education embraced the very concepts that Schiller 
developed and demonstrated their shared anxieties. To recognise this link, I believe, 
would benefit our understanding of both men. With regard to Schiller, a study of this 
kind offers a more concrete illustration of his impact on Victorian thinking; whereas, 
in the case of Arnold, it highlights an intellectual source which has been pointed out 
before, but has so far been treated only discursively.  
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Above all, a study of this kind will also help us to better understand Arnold as an 
aesthetic educator. What kind of aesthetic education did he advocate? Literature and 
art are the subjects that come most immediately to those who try to answer this 
question. Matthew Potolsky, for example, describes Arnold‟s „theory of aesthetic 
education‟ as cultivation through „beauty of art and literature‟221 Ralph A. Smith also 
alleges that he has found in Arnold‟s writings much concern for aesthetic education, 
that is „a conviction of the importance of excellence in art education.‟222 In both cases, 
Arnold the aesthetic educator is portrayed as a devotee to the artistic and the literary, 
as if an aesthetic educator does nothing more than give instructions on how to read 
poetry or how to interpret art. Such a characterisation demonstrates a rather 
superficial understanding of Arnold‟s thinking. If we make further inquiries, some 
questions are bound to arise: for instance, did Arnold speak for all kinds of art and 
literature? If not, what was his favourite? Why did he take so much trouble to 
convince his audience of the value of those works? Therefore, to summarise Arnold‟s 
view of aesthetic education simply as cultivation through literary means is to ignore 
the complexity of his thinking. Also ignored is the role of Arnold himself, who, in his 
writings, spoke both as a poet and as a critic. If we only focus on his literary criticism, 
„Arnold‟s idea of aesthetic education‟ would become relevant only to Arnold the critic, 
while the poet and his poetry are generally dismissed as if they have nothing to 
contribute. The answer I offer, and which I shall elaborate later in this chapter, is that 
Arnold is essentially a Schillerian aesthetic educator: he not only incorporated 
Schiller‟s concepts of „aesthetic man‟ and „aesthetic state‟ in his poetry, literary 
criticism and social criticism; also like Schiller, he propounded an aesthetic education 
that treated beauty as a power of agency which had the potential to transform society.  
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‘One Aim, One Business, One Desire’: Aesthetic Education in ‘The 
Scholar-Gipsy’ 
 
‘The Unity of the Ideal’: Schiller’s Aesthetic Education 
Friedrich Schiller‟s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, first published in 1795, 
was largely a response to the aesthetic philosophy developed by Baumgarten and Kant. 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten coined the term „aesthetics.‟ which appeared first in 
his voluminous Aesthetica, beginning in 1790. Arguing against the pure rationalistic 
intellectualism represented by Descartes and Leibniz, Baumgarten defined aesthetics 
as „scientia cognitionis sensitivae‟ („a science of sensuous knowledge‟ or „a science of 
sensitive cognition‟). It had been a long-held notion that to know an object through 
rational cognition was different from knowing it through aesthetic sensibility. But 
unlike the pure rationalists who saw nothing useful in sense perceptions, Baumgarten 
insisted that aesthetic sensibility played an important role in our cognition of the 
world, and that it was simply irreplaceable by conceptual knowledge. Thus, through 
coining the word „aesthetics,‟ Baumgarten had in effect justified the autonomy of 
sensuous knowledge. Aesthetics, as far as it dealt with sensuous knowledge, he 
maintained, must also be regarded as an autonomous power in our perception and 
understanding of objects.  
Although Baumgarten‟s philosophy signified a departure from rationalism, his 
aesthetic was still understood in terms of rational principles: a „science‟ that 
contributed to our cognition of the world. This point was seized upon by Immanuel 
Kant, who declared it a major deficiency. In a note in his Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant argued that Baumgarten‟s aesthetics was problematic in that „he hoped to bring 
our critical judging of the beautiful under rational principles, and to raise the rules for 
such judging to the level of a lawful science.‟ The effort, Kant believed, was 
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„futile.‟223 To judge something as beautiful, in Kant‟s opinion, was not to give an 
account of the attributes of that object; rather, the judgment should be referred to 
ourselves, that is, our inner feeling as well as the condition of our consciousness. 
According to this principle, aesthetics dealt with our subjective self rather than with 
the objective reality. 
„[I]t is Kantian principles,‟ said Schiller, at the beginning of his Aesthetic Letters, 
„upon which the propositions that follow will for the most part be based.‟224 But there 
is in fact a considerable difference between them. Both Baumgarten and Kant were 
occupied with the autonomous status of aesthetics as a subject. By the time Schiller 
put forward his philosophy, however, the status of aesthetics had already been firmly 
established. Hence his chief purpose was to examine the function or, in his own words, 
the „spiritual service‟ that aesthetics could provide for human beings. Because of his 
concern for educative influence, the word „aesthetic‟ in Schiller‟s discourse acquired a 
different connotation. It no longer described a special process of cognition, as 
Baumgarten had indicated; nor did it refer to the Kantian idea of the judgment of taste 
and beauty. Rather, it designated a condition of humanity, in which man, through a 
cultivation of beauty, achieves a harmony between the rational self and the sensuous 
self.
225
 Thus Schiller‟s analysis of beauty, as the title of his work suggests, put equal 
emphasis on „aesthetic‟ and „education.‟ Beauty, as he understood it, was essentially a 
spiritual synthesis, the most important quality of the ideal humanity; and, for that 
reason, it was the aim after which the cultivation of man should always strive.
226
 
However, philosophical inquiries into the past were not the only source of 
inspiration. Schiller‟s aesthetic philosophy also contained another type of response, 
namely a response to the social and cultural conditions in eighteenth-century Europe. 
While his predecessors had opened up a new field by making the study of aesthetic 
education possible, the social realities made that study all too necessary. In the second 
letter, Schiller declared that „I should not care to be living in another century, or to 
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have worked for another,‟ and that he firmly believed that man should „submit his 
decision to the needs and the taste of his century.‟227 But he also conceded that the 
decisions made by his contemporaries were perhaps not too brilliant. Thus the age, 
lamented Schiller, was an age of „Necessity‟ and „Utility,‟ which „bend[ed] a degraded 
humanity beneath its tyrannous yoke‟ and to which „all powers must do service and all 
talents swear allegiance.‟228  
By the age of „utility,‟ Schiller referred to the sweeping influence of the 
Enlightenment, which had begun in the seventeenth century and flourished in the 
eighteenth. As one of the major intellectual and cultural movements in human history, 
the Enlightenment is particularly known for its passion for natural laws. Knowledge 
of the natural world accumulated at an unprecedented rate, producing 
ground-breaking discoveries by scientists such as Newton, Kepler and Galileo. Indeed, 
the success of natural science was so impressive that many people at the time were 
determined to apply the laws of nature to the study of various other fields. The 
assertion by the French mathematician and philosopher Jean Lerond d‟Alembert in 
1759 illustrated well the mindset of the day. Knowledge of natural laws, he rejoiced, 
had not only led to „the discovery and application of a new method of philosophising‟ 
but had brought about a revolution in almost all aspects of intellectual life: 
 
[T]he kind of enthusiasm which accompanies discoveries, a certain exaltation 
of ideas which the spectacle of the universe produces in us – all these causes 
have brought about a lively fermentation of minds, spreading through nature 
in all directions like a river which has burst its dams.
229
 
 
D‟Alembert was enthused by the vision that discoveries in nature would change the 
mind as well as the world „in all directions.‟ But his simile created an unintended 
irony. Would the river that „has burst its dams‟ cause disaster? Would knowledge of 
nature that spread „in all directions‟ bring irredeemable loss to other fields? The 
mathematician was perhaps too intoxicated to notice it, but some people believed that 
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the damage was real, particularly in the realm of art and literature. As the historian 
Thomas L. Hankins explained in his exploration of the Enlightenment age, the study 
of natural science was considered superior to the study of art and literature because 
science „progressed.‟ While poets and artists struggled in the swamp of archaic 
expressions and principles by ancient masters, natural philosophers always managed 
to find something new.
230
 Although in eighteenth-century Europe, scientists and 
natural philosophers were still regarded, and regarded themselves, as „men of letters,‟ 
as the Enlightenment progressed, they came to enjoy a much higher reputation than 
those who excelled in artistic and literary subjects. Thus as a study shows, a common 
– and often quite successful –  career path at that time was to first establish a 
reputation in the realm of science and then proceed to political and social areas.
231
 
Even people who were generally considered literary took an active interest in science 
and, for that matter, accepted the status quo. Voltaire, for example, performed 
scientific experiments, propagated a Newtonian system and deemed the decline of art 
and literature as a „regrettable necessity.‟232 This was the cultural context in which 
Schiller spoke; yet, he obviously held a very different notion than the mainstream. His 
condemnation of the age of „necessity‟ made it clear that he might have retorted to 
Voltaire by arguing that decline was regrettable, but by no means necessary. 
 Meanwhile, people‟s attention was also drawn increasingly away from art and 
literature by the political turmoil of the day. The French Revolution, beginning in 
1789, shook the entire continent. Initially, the bold strive for freedom by the French 
people won much support from German intelligentsia. Many regarded their actions as 
the beginning of a new era, the commencement of a „new dawn.‟233 As the revolution 
continued, however, anxiety gradually replaced applause. The execution of Louis XVI, 
the Reign of Terror, and the disorder everywhere seemed to have turned the promising 
new dawn into a terrifying nightmare. The change of attitude was well reflected in 
Schiller. He had been tracking the progress in France through newspapers; but in the 
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year 1793, about a month after Louis XVI was put to death, he told his friend in a 
private letter that „I‟m so revolted by these butchers that I haven‟t been able to read a 
French newspaper for the last fortnight.‟234 His Aesthetic Letters also alluded to the 
event. In the second letter, he noticed that „[t]he eyes of the philosophers are fixed as 
expectantly as those of the worldling upon the political arena where at present, so it is 
believed, the high destiny of mankind is being decided.‟235 And from this he went on 
to explain that the letters were motivated by the recognition that every individual was 
„an interest party both as human being and as citizen of the world.‟ For this reason, 
before they devoted themselves to politics, revolutions and even killing, they must 
first of all, have „a heart […] dedicated with a fine enthusiasm to the welfare of 
humanity.‟236 The Aesthetic Letters, therefore, embodied Schiller‟s attempt to solve 
the problem that the French Revolution – and the Enlightenment as well – had 
somehow failed to solve: to produce qualified citizens of the world through adequate 
cultivation of the „laws of beauty‟ and, thereby, to promote the welfare of humanity. 
In the fifth letter, we find Schiller‟s fiercest criticism of „the present age‟ and of 
„contemporary humanity,‟ the most distinctive feature of which was found to be the 
loss of order and the overgrowth of individualism: 
 
It is true that deference to authority has declined, that its lawlessness is 
unmasked, and, although still armed with power, sneaks no dignity any more; 
men have awoken from their long lethargy and self-deception, and by an 
impressive majority they are demanding the restitution of their inalienable 
rights.
237
 
 
Schiller took no interest in going back to the old days in order to have authority fully 
restored. As he recognised, the lawlessness, however alarming it was, nevertheless 
provided „a physical possibility‟ of „making true freedom the basis of political 
association.‟238 The real problem was the lack of „moral possibility.‟ In other words, 
in order to acquire dignity and inalienable rights, people should not only challenge the 
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old „rotten foundations‟ but, more importantly, they must be morally cultivated so that 
a new foundation would be possible. However, in Schiller‟s view, this task was 
extremely demanding, for neither the lower nor the higher orders of society 
demonstrated any competency. While the former was „hastening with ungovernable 
fury to their brutal satisfaction,‟ the latter became victims of their own intellectual 
refinement and material comfort. As a result, „selfishness‟ was deeply embedded 
everywhere, and „we experience all the contagions and all the calamities of 
community without the accompaniment of a communal spirit.
239
  
And it was not just the community that was being torn apart; the cultivation was 
also defective to such an extent that it violated „the whole of humanity.‟ Thus in the 
sixth letter, by contrasting modern humanity with that of ancient Greece, Schiller 
described the devastating consequence of „enlarged experience and more precise 
speculation.‟ Instead of each individual possessing the whole of humanity like the 
ancient Greeks, at present, 
 
the image of the race is scattered on an amplified scale among individuals 
[…] in a fragmentary way, not in different combinations, so that you have to 
go the rounds from individual to individual in order to gather the totality of 
the race.
240
 
 
Hence the consequence would be twofold. It produced in every member of society a 
„narrow heart,‟ through which each one suffered from the „dismemberment of their 
being.‟241 In the meanwhile, it also gave rise to „a ruinous conflict‟ that „set [human 
nature‟s] harmonious powers at variance.‟242 In this way, the lack of wholeness 
produced both conflicts between individuals and conflicts within them. Hence people 
with a business turn of mind, being restricted by their own sense of practicality, would 
estimate „all experience whatsoever by a particular fragment of experience,‟ while 
those who were dominated by the speculative spirit would, on the contrary, strive after 
„imperishable possessions in the realm of ideas‟ and eventually lose themselves in 
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utter subjectivity.
243
 The best treatment for both, Schiller insisted, was to be found in 
a cultivation that encouraged people to „submit the multiplicity in him [the individual] 
to the unity of the ideal‟ so that they could transcend the limits that the external 
practicalities had enforced on them and, ultimately, become an „aesthetic man.‟244  
It is the same concern with unity that informs Schiller‟s idea of the „aesthetic 
state,‟ an idea that I shall further analyse in the last section of this chapter. The 
condition of the state, though apparently a political concept, is in Schiller‟s view 
closely associated with the condition of human nature. Thus instead of discussing 
practical mechanisms such as institutions and legislations, his Aesthetic Letters 
explored the political entity with particular attention to its relationship with man, 
especially his internal world. Every individual man, Schiller observed, „carries in 
disposition and determination a pure ideal man within himself,‟ and it was natural for 
this ideal to find its correspondent form in the state. Thus, „[t]his pure human being, 
who may be recognized more or less distinctly in every person, is represented by the 
State, the objective and, so to say, canonical form in which the diversity of persons 
endeavors to unite itself.‟ 245  This stress on unity and the disparagement of 
multiplicity appeared several times throughout the Aesthetic Letters. As later critics, 
such as H. B. Garland, have rightly noted, the unity that worked against multiplicity is 
the main theme in Schiller‟s Aesthetic Letters and, for that matter, a key point in his 
principle of aesthetic education, which aims at the „idealistic and objective,‟ „ignores 
incidental and transitory details and concerns itself with essentials.‟246 This was the 
main principle for Schiller; yet, as we shall see in the following part, it was also the 
very principle on which Matthew Arnold constructed his own aesthetic ideal. 
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The Binding Effect of Imagination: the Aesthetic of ‘The 
Scholar-Gipsy’ 
One of Arnold‟s earliest portrayals of the Schillerian „aesthetic man‟ is found in 
„The Scholar-Gipsy,‟ a poem published in 1853. Before we try to make any 
connection with Schiller, however, I will first demonstrate in this section how the 
poem as a whole constitutes an „aesthetic education‟; and in order to do so, I will give 
a brief analysis of Joseph Glanvill‟s The Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), which Arnold 
purchased in 1844 and which then appeared in his reading list in October 1845.
247
 To 
turn to Glanvill, here it should be noted, is not to diverge from the thesis of the 
present chapter; as the following analysis suggests, knowledge of Arnold‟s adaptation 
of Glanvill actually testifies to the Victorian poet‟s interest in the education of the 
internal world and, in that way, reveals him – and even Glanvill, for that matter – to 
be a fellow explorer of Schiller. The book by Glanvill recorded the anecdote of „a Lad 
in the University of Oxford,‟ who was forced by poverty to leave his studies and then 
found company among „Vagabond Gypsies.‟248 Having spent some time with the 
gipsies, the young man met some old acquaintances, to whom he explained that „the 
people he went with were not such impostures as they were taken for, but that they 
had a traditional kind of learning and could do wonders by the power of 
imagination.‟249 His audience was of course suspicious, so the young man gave them 
a demonstration of the special gipsy art. He left them to talk with each other, then 
returned and gave a full account of their conversation. When asked for an explanation 
for this wonder, the young man said that „what he did was by the power of 
Imagination, his Phancy binding theirs [..] and that when he had compass‟d the whole 
secret, some parts of which he said he was yet ignorant of, he intended to leave their 
company, and give the world an account of what he had learned.‟250 
 Many critics. fascinated by Arnold‟s poem and Glanvill‟s story, have been trying 
                                                        
247 Kenneth Allott, „Matthew Arnold‟s Reading-Lists in Three Early Diaries,‟ Victorian Studies 2.3 (1959) 254-66 
at 257.  
248 Joseph Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing 196. 
249 Glanvill 197. 
250 Glanvill 198. 
 103 
to identify the exact influence the story held on Arnold. Alan Grob finds in Arnold and 
Glanvill a shared interest in „the hypnotic wonders,‟ and therefore concludes that the 
poem signifies Arnold‟s affinity with Romantic poetic traditions.251 Anthony H. 
Harrison, on the other hand, believes that the poem is in essence highly topical. With a 
brief survey of „the gypsy problem‟ in mid-Victorian England, Harrison argues that 
Glanvill‟s story elicits Arnold‟s interest in the „ongoing controversy over English 
gypsies‟ in his own days.252 Both interpretations hold ground. But here I would like 
to draw attention to a passage from Glanvill‟s work which, in my opinion, shall offer 
a better clue on what Arnold tried to convey through the character of the 
Scholar-Gipsy. In his preface to The Vanity of Dogmatizing, Glanvill asserted that 
„[t]he knowledge I teach, is ignorance, and methinks the Theory of our own natures, 
should be enough to learn it us.‟253 Although different kinds of theoretical accounts 
of life existed at the time, Glanvill observed that, regarding human life, there were 
still many mysteries that remained unsolved:  
 
We see, we hear, and outward objects affect our other senses; we understand, 
we will, we imagine, and remember; and yet know no more of the immediate 
reasons of most of these common functions. […] We love, we hate, we joy, 
we grieve; passions annoy us, and our minds are disturb‟d by those corporeal 
estuations. Nor yet can we tell how these should reach our unbodyed selves, 
or how the Soul should be affected by these heterogeneous agitations.
254
 
 
The „ignorance‟ that Glanvill tried to teach, therefore, was the ignorance of sensuous 
perceptions and the inner world. His work aimed to explain the working of sensuous 
perceptions by first of all highlighting their complexities and the need to understand 
those complexities.  
Glanvill‟s story of the Scholar-Gipsy served the same purpose. The account of the 
mysterious character was followed by an exploration of the „mechanism‟ of 
imagination, which Glanvill described as a process in which the brain received 
impressions through sensuous contact with external objects and then passed the 
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knowledge on to other minds, just „as it is in Musical Strings tuned Unisons.‟255 This 
declaration has led some critics to regard Glanvill as a pioneer in modern 
psychology.
256
 But the fact that he put so much emphasis on the primacy of sensuous 
perceptions, the „unbodyed selves‟ and, above all, on the workings of imagination, 
easily reminds us of the aesthetic philosophy that was going to be developed by Kant, 
Shaftesbury and Schiller, whose major works all started from the same affirmation of 
the value of aesthetic experience. In this sense, it is also justifiable to say that 
Glanvill‟s work pioneered the study of aesthetics, with the anecdote of the 
Scholar-Gipsy being a seventeenth-century exploration of the aesthetic experience of 
human life. 
 When Arnold adopted the character of the Scholar-Gipsy from Glanvill, he also 
took over his exploration into the binding effects of imagination. The poem begins in 
the world of the poet, who lies on the grassland, looking at the „Oxford towers‟ on „a 
summer‟s day‟ (ll. 20 and 30). The specification of time and location, along with the 
detailed description of the environment – the „scarlet poppies,‟ the „yellowing stalks,‟ 
the „perfumed showers,‟ the „bleating of the folded flocks,‟ the „distant cries of reapers 
in the corn,‟ and Glanvill‟s book that lies on the grass nearby – gives a vivid sense of 
the poet‟s world in the present. From the fourth stanza on, however, as the poet begins 
to wonder about the mysterious Scholar-Gipsy, he becomes gradually removed from 
the scene of the summer‟s day. There is first of all a brief summary of Glanvill‟s story: 
 
    […] that the gipsy-crew, 
    His mates, had arts to rule as they desired 
    The workings of men‟s brains, 
    And they can bind them to what thoughts they will. (ll. 44-47) 
 
And from there, the poet falls into a daydream. While in the previous stanzas he is 
firmly situated in his own reality, now his thoughts start to wander, and the world he 
experiences is no longer the summer‟s day at present, but the reality of the 
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Scholar-Gipsy or, to be more precise, the Scholar-Gipsy‟s world as the poet envisions 
it. 
But this transition is gradual. In the seventh stanza, the poet only begins to sense 
an intimacy with the Scholar-Gipsy. Feeling that „I myself seem half to know thy 
looks,‟ he is still unsure where to find the curious figure. So he asks the shepherds „if 
thou hast passed their quiet place‟ and wonders on his own „if thou haunt‟st their shy 
retreats‟ (ll. 65 and 70). But soon the uncertainty is replaced by convictions, as if a 
vision, freshly developed yet blurred, is now gaining more and more clarity as it is 
gradually brought into focus. Thus, instead of „ifs‟ and „wonder,‟ the poet exclaims, 
with much excitement: 
 
  For most, I know, thou lov‟st retired ground! 
   Thee at the ferry Oxford riders blithe, 
    Returning home on summer-nights, have met 
   Crossing the stripling Thames at Bab-lock-hithe, 
    Trailing in the cool stream they fingers wet, 
     As the punt‟s rope chops round; 
   And leaning backward in a pensive dream, 
    And fostering in thy lap a heap of flowers 
    Plucked in shy fields and distant Wychwood bowers, 
   And thine eyes resting on the moonlit stream. (ll. 71-80) 
 
The four stanzas that follow all adopt the same structure and style, each one giving a 
detailed description of how the Scholar-Gipsy roams across the land in a different 
season. So now the poet has become fully immersed into the reality of the 
Scholar-Gipsy. He not only confirms the factuality of his vision through positive 
statements („I know, thou lov‟st retired ground!‟); the sense of realness is also 
intensified by details. And they are not just details from the external world, for the 
poet is now also able to penetrate the inner world of the Scholar-Gipsy and, thereby, 
to see what he sees („thine eyes resting on the moonlit stream‟), to sense what he 
senses („cool stream,‟ „fingers wet‟) and even to reach his psychological depth, 
learning his „pensive dream.‟ Hence following Glanvill‟s example, Arnold‟s poem 
provides an equally substantial illustration of the binding effects of imagination as 
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well as an illustration of how it is possible to know and feel what others know and 
feel; only this time it is not the Scholar-Gipsy who gets access to others‟ minds, but 
the poetic speaker who, through the quest for the Scholar-Gipsy, becomes increasingly 
identified with the mysterious character. 
 Nevertheless, the poem is not a simple repetition of Glanvill‟s anecdote, for 
Arnold does give it new significance. According to the original plot, the Oxford lad 
continues his gipsy life after chatting with his old acquaintances, and no one is to 
meet him again. But the poem is an account from the perspective of a 
nineteenth-century speaker. Therefore, even after the story of the Scholar-Gipsy 
comes to an end, the story of the speaker still carries on. Hence the speaker‟s 
exclamation in the fourteenth stanza: „But what – I dream!‟ (l. 131) Now the poet 
suddenly realises that the wandering Scholar-Gipsy, however vivid he seems, is 
actually a person who lived „two hundred years ago‟ (l. 131). This revelation gives 
rise to a twist in the theme of the poem. Many critics believe that Arnold has 
overthrown Glanvill‟s conclusion. For example, Kenneth Allott, the editor of Arnold‟s 
poems, notes that the exclamation, echoing Keats‟ question „Was it a vision, or a 
waking dream‟ in „Ode to a Nightingale,‟ features a Romantic convention and 
therefore suggests the fragility of the bonds of imagination.
257
 But I think Allott 
misses one important point, that is, Keats‟ question appears at the very end of his 
poem, while in Arnold‟s work, it is raised in the middle. Keats asks the question 
without supplying the answer, so the elaborate delineation of the nightingale is turned 
into a vision which is mysterious yet fragile. In Arnold‟s poem, however, the 
revelation both concludes the vision previously described and signifies the poet‟s 
entrance (or re-entrance) into his own world. Thus the poem continues in the next 
stanza: 
 
  -- No, no, thou hast not felt the lapse of hours! 
           For what wears out the life of mortal men? 
    „Tis that from change to change their being rolls; 
     „Tis that repeated shocks, again, again, 
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     Exhaust the energy of strongest souls 
    And numb the elastic powers. (ll. 140-45) 
 
Now that the poet has returned to his own world, his feeling about it is completely 
changed. Previously, he was intoxicated by the pastoral scene, but now, the quest 
awakes him to the bleakness of his own world and, in particular, the contrast between 
the fate of modern men and the life of the Scholar-Gipsy. Dream or not, as he comes 
to believe, the two-hundred-years‟ gap does not prevent the Scholar-Gipsy from 
acting as an antidote for the „worn-out life‟ of the present. In this way, the poem does 
not overthrow Glanvill‟s conclusion but, instead, moves on from an illustration of the 
binding effects of imagination to a criticism of the present. It now seeks to confront 
the reality of the nineteenth century by demonstrating the Scholar-Gipsy‟s value for 
the modern world; and this is the point where an even closer analogy between Arnold 
and Schiller begins.  
 
Against Multitudinousness: the Scholar-Gipsy as a Schillerian 
Aesthetic Ideal 
 The fact that the poet discovers important messages for his own age by 
imaginatively binding himself to the Scholar-Gipsy is a fine illustration of what 
Schiller described about imagination. „On the wings of imagination,‟ he said in 
Aesthetic Letters,  
 
Man leaves the narrow bounds of the present, in which mere animality is 
enclosed, in order to strive forward to an unbounded future; but while the 
infinite rises before his dazed imagination, his heart has not yet ceased to live 
in the particular and to wait upon the instant.
258
 
 
Glanvill‟s story showed how the binding effect could eliminate spatial distance 
between an individual and his fellow beings. For Schiller, however, even the temporal 
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distance could be eliminated. When properly cultivated, as he explained, imagination 
enabled an individual to get beyond „the present‟ and strive for „an unbounded future‟ 
yet, at the same time, „wait upon the instant.‟ In other words, he stays in the present 
but is not trapped by contemporaneity. His existence in the present is not narrow when 
the infinite is constantly kept in front of him, and the vision of the past and the future 
is meaningful only when its infinity finds relevance in the present. Such a dialectic 
understanding of human existence is precisely what Arnold‟s poem aimed to convey 
through the juxtaposition of two realities – the dreamy world of the Scholar-Gipsy on 
the one hand, and the speaker‟s own reality on the other. The Scholar-Gipsy‟s world, 
being a vision of the ideal that „hast not felt the lapse of hours,‟ is both the past and 
the „unbounded future‟ that the poet aspires to; while, on the other hand, the 
awakening from the dream and the consequent focus on „our‟ life – „the life of the 
mortal men‟ that „exhaust[s] the energy of strongest souls‟ with repeated shocks‟ – 
registers „the bounds of the present‟ (ll. 140-41, 143-44).  
 More importantly, Arnold also held the Schillerian conviction that the contrast 
between the ideal and the present was the contrast between unity and the many. For 
those who estimated „all experience whatsoever by a particular fragment of 
experience‟ or lost themselves in the „imperishable possessions in the realm of ideas,‟ 
Schiller proposed that a modern individual should „submit the multiplicity in him to 
the unity of the ideal‟ („die Mannigfaltigkeit in ihm der Einheit des Ideals 
unterwerfen‟).259 Similarly, Arnold found in his Scholar-Gipsy an embodiment of 
unity, purity and constancy. All of them, in his views, were qualities that men of the 
present age desperately needed. The „strange disease of modern life,‟ as Arnold 
described it, consisted in „its sick hurry‟ and „divided aims.‟ The unfortunate „we,‟ 
tormented by „sick fatigue‟ and „languid doubt,‟ 
 
[…] fluctuate idly without term or scope,  
Of whom each strives, nor knows for what he strives,  
And each half-lives a hundred different lives; (ll. 167-69) 
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That man of two hundred years ago, by contrast, enjoys life as a whole: 
 
  For early didst thou leave the world, with powers 
   Fresh, undiverted to the world without, 
   Firm to their mark, not spent on other things; (ll. 161-63) 
 
The most crucial quality of the Scholar-Gipsy is that he „hadst one aim, one business, 
one desire.‟ (l. 152). The word „one‟ is repeated and italicised; in fact, it is the only 
word that is italicised in this long poem. The indication of this „one‟ is manifold. It is 
the „undiverted‟ power that stands against the „divided aims‟ of modern men; it is the 
wholehearted devotion to the truth as opposed to „casual creeds‟ by „[l]ight half 
believers‟; it is the „immortal lot‟ that withstands the traumatic shocks and changes of 
modern life; and it is, ultimately, the individual Scholar-Gipsy who, with the unity in 
aim, business and desire, distinguishes himself from the modern „hundred different 
lives‟ that „hesitate and falter life away, / And lose to-morrow the ground won to-day‟ 
(ll. 178-79). 
Notes should be made, however, that it was not the first time that Arnold made 
such a diagnosis of his age; nor was it the first time that he tried to incorporate this 
diagnosis into poetry. The ultimate parallel between Arnold and Schiller is found in 
the ways that they judge their society. Eighteenth-century Germany was in many ways 
different from nineteenth-century England, but both critics came to decide that unity 
was the most needed quality for their own society. While Schiller disliked its 
„multiplicity‟ (Mannigfaltigkeit), Arnold was also convinced that his era was inflicted 
by „multitudinousness.‟ One of the earliest examples of his condemnation can be 
found in his poetic response to the theory of Joseph Butler in 1844. When Arnold was 
in Oxford, Butler was a name revered by many, and his ethical philosophy was 
particularly influential.
260
 Refuting Hobbes‟ ethical egoism, which maintained that 
humans ought to do whatever was in their self-interest, Butler insisted that virtue was 
an essential part of human nature. In order to support this position, Butler also brought 
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forward his own theory of human nature. Humanity, according to him, consisted of 
different „natural principles‟ at different levels, such as benevolence, affections and 
reflections. Actions that appealed to the superior natural principles were suitable and 
appropriate, whilst those that did not were unsuitable and should therefore be 
avoided.
261
 However, with too much emphasis on the hierarchical order of natural 
principles, Butler was unable to explain how these principles cooperated and 
communicated with each other and, as a result, he made human nature appear less as 
an organic entity but more like a bag of assorted principles. Arnold disagreed with 
Butler. In the poem „Written in Butler‟s Sermons‟ (1849), he challenged this theory by 
first of all exposing its absurdity. „So men,‟ the poet summarised Butler‟s idea, 
„unraveling God‟s harmonious whole, / Rend in a thousand threads this life of ours.‟ 
(ll. 3-4) But then, the satirical tone becomes solemn, and the poet describes his own 
vision of the ideal human nature: 
 
  […] Deep and broad, where none may see, 
  Spring the foundations of that shadowy throne 
  Where man‟s one nature, queen-like, sits alone, 
  Centred in a majestic unity. (ll.5-8) 
 
The contrast that Arnold would later construct in „The Scholar-Gipsy‟ was already in 
the making: below „a thousand threads,‟ he perceived the „one nature.‟ While Butler 
regarded a human being as a compound of various principles, Arnold represented him 
as featured by its beautiful and „majestic unity.‟ In this sense, it could be said that his 
preference for unity was an aesthetic choice provoked by resistance to an overly 
rationalistic understanding of human nature. 
 This preference was also provoked by what Arnold perceived as the dilemma of 
modern poets, a topic that he repeatedly discussed with his best friend Arthur Hugh 
Clough. It seems that in the year 1848, the time between his purchase of Glanvill‟s 
book and the composition of „The Scholar-Gipsy,‟ Arnold was particularly concerned 
with the issue of „multitudinousness.‟ Thus in one of the letters of 1848, he compared 
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modern poets with masters such as Shakespeare and Milton, and drew the conclusion 
that the latter were superior because they had much less to say: 
 
[H]ad Shakespeare and Milton lived in the atmosphere of modern feeling, 
had they had the multitude of new thoughts and feelings to deal with a 
modern has, I think it likely the style of each would have been far less 
curious and exquisite. […] In the 17th century it was a smaller harvest than 
now, and sooner to be reaped: and therefore to its reaper was left time to stow 
it more finely and curiously. Still more was this the case in the ancient world. 
The poet‟s matter being the hitherto experience of the world, and his own, 
increases with every century.
262
 
 
Indeed, he might as well have quoted from Wordsworth, who had made a similar 
observation a good forty years ago: „The world is too much with us.‟ But Arnold‟s 
solution was not to go back to nature, as Wordsworth had suggested. According to 
him, a successful defence of poetry against „the multitude of new thoughts and 
feelings‟ was possible only when the poets found a sure ground for themselves. Thus 
in another letter, also dated 1848, Arnold boldly challenged Keats and Browning: 
 
As Browning is a man with a moderate gift passionately desiring movement 
and fullness, and obtaining but a confused multitudinousness, so Keats with a 
very high gift, is yet also consumed by this desire; and cannot produce the 
truly living and moving, as his conscience keeps telling him. They will not be 
patient – neither understand that they must begin with an Idea of the world in 
order not to be prevailed over by the world‟s multitudinousess.263 
 
So in order to make poetry effective, poets should first of all define themselves; and 
this could only be achieved if they managed to distinguish their beings from the 
„movement and fullness‟ and „confused multitudinousness‟ of modern experiences. 
Capitalised and singular, the „Idea‟ once again demonstrates Arnold‟s aesthetic of 
unity. It was precisely what he would later find so admirable in his Scholar-Gipsy, 
who had nothing else but „one aim, one business, one desire.‟ Moreover, as a response 
to those who argue for the similarity between „The Scholar Gipsy‟ and „Ode to a 
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Nightingale,‟ one could even surmise that this letter suggests in fact Arnold‟s „twist‟ 
on Romantic convention: the poet was awakened at the middle of the poem instead of 
the end, so that he could grasp an „Idea‟ that helped to turn the fragile Romantic 
vision into a powerful antidote for his own world. 
 Yet in introducing this ideal to his own world, Arnold was not just targeting 
society at large. As his correspondence with Clough continued, it also became clear 
that his exaltation of unity had a personal cause: the lack of unity was a problem that 
he had identified in his closest friend. In 1853, having been accused by Clough of 
being cold and distant, Arnold fought back and, in an almost blunt way, expressed 
what he thought was really problematic in their friendship. In Arnold‟s opinion, 
Clough was „too content to fluctuate,‟ always striving after an infinite variety of 
knowledge and possibilities of life that he was in danger of losing himself to 
multiplicity. „You ask me in what I think or have thought you going wrong,‟ Arnold 
said to Clough, 
 
in this: that you would never take your assiette as something determined final 
and unchangeable for you and proceed to work away on the basis of that: but 
were always poking and patching and cobbling at the assiette itself – could 
never finally, as it seemed – „resolve to be thyself.‟264 
 
This was why, Arnold explained, „I feel it is necessary to stiffen myself – and hold 
fast my rudder.‟265 In his detest for Clough‟s „poking and patching and cobbling,‟ 
Arnold again recalled Schiller, who had insisted that individuals should submit the 
multiplicity within them to the unity of the ideal.
266
  
The final lines of „The Scholar-Gipsy‟ well reflected Arnold‟s resolve. Instead of 
welcoming the protagonist from two hundred years ago as the saviour of modern men 
afflicted by „sick hurry‟ and „divided aims,‟ the poet urges him to shun the world and 
to „flee‟ to „solitude.‟ The poet even employs two similes, one brief and the other 
extensive, to reinstate the necessity of staying away. The Scholar-Gipsy is first of all 
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compared to Dido the queen: 
 
  Still fly, plunge deeper in the bowering wood! 
 Averse, as Dido did with gesture stern 
 From her false friend‟s approach in Hades turn, 
Wave us away, and keep thy solitude! (ll. 207-10) 
 
And after that, he is also compared to „some Tyrian trader,‟ who, averse to join the 
„light-hearted‟ Greeks, decides to travel alone: 
 
   Descried at sunrise an emerging prow 
  Lifting the cool-haired creepers stealthily, 
   The fringes of a southward-facing brow 
    Among the Aegean isles; 
  And saw the merry Grecian coaster come, 
   Freighted with amber grapes, and Chian wine, 
   Green, bursting figs, and tunnies steeped in brine – 
  And knew the intruders on his ancient home, 
  The young light-hearted masters of the waves – 
   And snatched his rudder, and shook out more sail; (ll.233-42) 
 
The poem ends therefore with the image of the trader undoing „his corded bales‟ at the 
shore of the Iberian. These final lines have elicited much discussion and debate. 
George Saintsbury once claimed that „no ingenuity could work out the parallel 
between the „uncloudedly joyous‟ scholar […] and „the grave Tyrian who was 
indignant at the competition of the merry Greek, and shook out more sail to seek fresh 
markets.‟267 Many other critics disagree with Saintsbury; but then, the interpretations 
they produced are also diametrically different. E. K. Brown, for instance, argues that 
„both flights express a desire for calm, a desire for aloofness.‟268 G. Wilson Knight, 
on the other hand, believes that the poem signifies not an escape but a return. He sees 
Rome and Greece as equivalents to nineteenth-century Britain which represented the 
„Western, or European tradition,‟ while the Iberian world, the destination of the Tyrian 
trader, represents the oriental influence that helped Arnold to revaluate his own 
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cultural tradition.
269
 This interpretation has won many supporters, and some have 
even identified the oriental source specifically as the Bhagavad-Gita, a Hindu 
scripture that Arnold was familiar with. So, does the poet desire aloofness, or does he 
want to be actively engaged with the reformation of his own cultural traditions? 
 My answer is both. Having read the previous part of the poem as an affirmation 
of unity, I read the final stanzas as the self-portrayal of Arnold, the aesthetic educator. 
The similes of Dido and Tyrian trader certainly create ingenious parallels, but the 
parallel, I maintain, consists first of all in the characters‟ determination to be 
themselves. The stories of Dido, of the Tyrian trader, and even of the Scholar-Gipsy 
are all about the confrontation of an individual with a people. The Scholar-Gipsy as a 
being of aesthetic unity is everything the modern world is not. Dido tries, though 
unsuccessfully, to compete for Aeneas‟ love with a future empire, whereas the Tyrian 
trader, unsatisfied with the Greeks who are intoxicated by luxury, „snatched his 
rudder‟ – in the same way, we might add by recalling those words to Clough, as 
Arnold would „hold fast‟ to his. The determination of Dido and the Tyrian trader, 
therefore, reflects the determination of Arnold himself, who felt it necessary to keep 
aloof from the sickness of the modern world and the minds he found problematic. The 
aesthetic unity he propounded here was precisely an „Idea‟ of the world he would 
begin with in order not to be prevailed over by the world itself. 
But to resolve to be oneself was not the ultimate aim. No matter how anxiously 
the poet urges the Scholar-Gipsy to flee, he has nevertheless gained an insight into the 
beauty of unity and, in this way, becomes gradually identified with him. Although the 
character from two hundred years ago stays safe from the contamination of the 
modern world, the poet, being an individual from that modern world, has to step 
forward and fight. When describing the mission of those who propounded aesthetic 
ideals, Schiller once remarked: 
 
Let some beneficent deity snatch the infant betimes from his mother‟s breast, 
let it nourish him with the milk of a better age and suffer him to grow up to 
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full maturity beneath the distant skies of Greece. Then when he has become a 
man, let him return to his century as an alien figure; but not in order to 
gladden it by his appearance, rather, terrible like Agamemnon‟s son, to 
cleanse it.
270
 
 
In a similar manner, in the final line of Arnold‟s poem, the Tyrian trader „on the beach 
undid his corded bales.‟ So, after all, he did not travel with free hands; the action of 
undoing bales on the beach would be entailed by exchange, and his cargo would find 
its way to the world again. In this sense, the destiny of the Tyrian trader – and that of 
Arnold the aesthetic educator, too – was at once an escape and a return. The strong 
faith would persuade both to seek aloofness; but, meanwhile, it would lead both back 
to reform the spirit of their worlds. Thus read, „The Scholar-Gipsy,‟ as a poetic treaty 
on aesthetic education, not only demonstrates convictions that Arnold would continue 
to propound, but also defines the posture that he would take in fulfilling that mission.  
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The Unified and Animating Action: Aesthetic Education in Arnold’s 
Literary Criticism 
 
What is ‘Action’? Arnold’s Debate with his Critics 
When his first volume The Strayed Reveller and Other Poems came out in 1849, 
Arnold was initially quite confident about its popularity. He reported to his sister with 
much satisfaction that the poems were warmly received: „I hear from Fellows that it is 
selling well; and from a good many quarters I hear interest expressed about it, though 
everyone likes something different (except that everyone likes the Merman) and most 
people would have this and would have that which they do not find.‟271 But that 
optimism did not last long. Soon Arnold found himself besieged by stern critics. 
Instead of „everyone likes something different,‟ each critic seems to have found 
something different to deplore, ranging from the problematic rhythm and excessive 
interest in „Hindoo-Greek philosophy‟ to the „indolent, selfish quietism.‟272 As a 
result, Arnold felt compelled to confront these critical attacks; and thus came the 1853 
Poems, his third volume of poetry. This collection was noted not only for new poems, 
such as „The Scholar-Gipsy‟; it was also known for its brilliant and controversial 
Preface, through which Arnold responded to various unfavourable criticisms of his 
work. The Preface dealt particularly with the issue of the subject of poetry. It began 
with a brief explication of the absence of Empedocles on Etna, the title piece of his 
second volume published in the previous year. The poem was now excluded, Arnold 
explained, because it depicted a „continuous state of mental distress‟ with little 
„action‟ involved and, therefore, offered little poetic enjoyment. From there Arnold 
continued, turning his apology into an active assault: 
And why it may be asked, have I entered into this explanation respecting a 
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matter so unimportant as the admission of the Poem in question? I have done 
so, because I was anxious to avow that the sole reason for its exclusion was 
that which has been stated above; and that it has not been excluded in 
deference to the opinion which many critics of the present day appear to 
entertain against subjects chosen from distant times and countries; against the 
choice, in short, of any subjects but modern ones.
273
 
 
To rise against anything „from distant times and countries,‟ Arnold claimed, was „a 
fair sample‟ of the critical dicta of the present day.274 He was strongly against this 
principle, and this disagreement between him and his critics, as I shall show, reflects 
once again the Schillerian aesthetic that he had already incorporated into his early 
works.  
The so-called „critical dicta‟ was taken from a review in the Spectator in 1853; 
and here are the words that Arnold quoted in his Preface: „The poet who would really 
fix the public attention must leave the exhausted past, and draw his subjects from 
matters of present import and therefore both of interest and novelty.‟275 Arnold 
faithfully recorded what the reviewer had said, but he was not entirely fair to conclude 
that the reviewer would rise against „the choice […] of any subjects but modern ones.‟ 
The quotation was originally taken from the Spectator‟s review of Sir Edwin Arnold, 
whose Poems Narrative and Lyrical displayed a distinctive – indeed, almost obsessive 
– Romantic attachment to subjects such as „The Egyptian Princess,‟ „The Alchemists‟ 
and „The Fairy‟s Promise.‟ By „past,‟ the reviewer was referring to a mysterious past 
that was too far removed from reality. In other words, to describe the past was not a 
mistake; what was truly problematic was the indifference towards the present. When 
the Spectator eventually came to Matthew Arnold‟s works, the same position was 
reiterated. It found fault not with Arnold‟s ancient subjects but with the author‟s 
attitude toward contemporary society. Suitable subjects for poetry, the reviewer was 
firmly convinced, were „to be found in modern times more easily and more 
abundantly than in ancient times; not that the question is at all one of dates, but of 
changes of thought, feeling and manners.‟ He then proceeded to accuse Arnold of 
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neglecting the need of contemporary society, which, according to the reviewer, 
 
needs more than any other its interpreter, who shall declare its sickness and 
point out its cure; and that, specially fitted or not to supply poetical subjects, 
it is here, in the midst of this age, that his Maker has planted him, for the 
especial purposes, if he really possess poetical faculties, of showing how man 
conquers circumstances, and is in his own spirit the fountain of beauty and 
strength and all that makes the elements of poetry. What a mean and 
cowardly mood it is, this scorn and dislike of one‟s own time!276 
 
What was again being questioned here was not just Arnold‟s choice of subjects, but 
also, more importantly, his qualification as an „interpreter‟ of his own age. The 
reviewer was unimpressed by Arnold‟s poetry primarily because he did not think that 
the poems successfully described the sickness of society, or provided any solutions to 
its problems.  
 Many other reviewers concurred on this point. Diverse as the criticisms appeared, 
they were surprisingly unanimous in one aspect. No matter what they regarded as the 
major fault, all agreed that Arnold‟s relationship to contemporary society presented a 
problem. W. E. Aytoun took offence at the poet‟s purposefully kept distance from the 
public. He condemned Arnold‟s attitude throughout the volume as „affected 
misanthropy‟ and criticised his refusal to take part in the concerns of everyday 
existence. Similarly, G. D. Boyle demanded that the poet demonstrate „greater 
sympathy with the wants of the present generation.‟ Commenting on „Resignation,‟ 
Charles Kingsley also deplored the poem‟s „hungry abstraction‟ of life. The vision of 
human life as „a placid and continuous whole,‟ in Kingsley‟s view, was characteristic 
of a poet who posed as a nonchalant spectator and therefore failed to appreciate the 
diversity of life and its concrete details: „Life unrolling before him! as if it could 
unroll to purpose any where but in him; as if the poet, or any one else, could know 
aught of life except by living it, and that in bitter, painful earnest.‟277 In this respect, 
Arnold‟s close friend Clough was perhaps the most outspoken of all. In order to 
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perform its function properly, Clough insisted, poetry must „deal more […] with 
general wants, ordinary feelings, the obvious rather than the rare facts of human 
nature‟; in other words, „the actual, palpable things with which our everyday life is 
concerned.‟278 Instead of „turning and twisting his eyes‟ in the hope of seeing things 
as the Greek masters saw them, Clough counselled Arnold to focus on these things 
„by seeing them, by accepting them as he sees them, and faithfully depicting 
accordingly.‟279 In fact, even later critics, who hold much more favourable opinions 
of Arnold‟s poetry, sometimes feel it hard to reconcile his poetic achievements with 
„his refusal to regard poetry as a medium through which to address the age.‟280 
However, I shall defend Arnold against those questionings, both old and new. In 
my opinion, he was not an escapist who contentedly lost himself in the dreams of an 
age long gone, but a genuine interpreter who provided a needed service for his age by 
– just as that Spectator reviewer demanded – „identifying its sickness‟ and „pointing 
out its cure.‟ The disagreement between Arnold and his critics, in my opinion, 
consisted primarily in their different assessments of their age and different views 
about the aim of cultivation. While Arnold thought it necessary to safeguard poetry 
against the multitudinousness of the world, his critics preferred an „everyday realism‟ 
in poetic creation that acknowledged the diversity of life.
281
 While he complained 
about the world being too much for poets, they believed that in order to serve the 
needs of society, a competent poet should give concrete illustrations paralleling 
modern experience. To highlight these differences, I shall focus on the concept of 
„action‟ in the Preface. Arnold‟s definition of „action,‟ as I shall try to demonstrate, is 
a fine illustration of how he adopted the aesthetic principles in his criticism of modern 
ailments. 
 Arnold excluded the long poem Empedocles on Etna because it failed to represent 
an „action.‟ This stress on action echoed the views of many of Arnold‟s critics. Boyle, 
for instance, strongly recommended to the poet: 
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Less of aversion to action in all its forms, – greater sympathy with the wants 
of the present generations, will endear him to many who would now turn 
away contemptuously from the self-complacent reverie, and refined 
indolence, which too often disfigures his pages.
282
 
 
The concept of proper „action,‟ as Boyle suggested, was clearly modern: it was not 
only based on a close study of modern life, but was also the very means through 
which the poet secured the interest of his readers. Thus one of the most important 
criteria of good poetry, according to Boyle, was the distance between the action and 
the contemporary scene: the closer these two things were, the better the poem. 
Moreover, it was also in this contemporaneity that the success of the poet consisted. 
An excellent poet, as Boyle maintained, dealt with the problems of the present time. 
His success consisted in finding actions „nearest‟ to his audience and not necessarily 
in his adaptability „for all ages and for all times.‟283 
 Aytoun even more vividly expressed the belief that a first-rate poet should always 
minimise the distance between his subjects and the hustle-bustle of modern life. 
Following the pronouncement that Arnold was a misanthropist, he proposed a cure:  
 
If he is a Tory, can‟t he find work enough in denouncing and exposing the 
lies of the League, and in taking up the cudgels for native industry? If he is a 
Whig, can‟t he be great upon sewerage, and the scheme of planting colonies 
in Connaught […] If he is Chartist, can‟t he say so, and stand up manfully 
with Julian Harney for „the points,‟ whatever may be their latest number?284 
 
Aytoun was highly conscious of himself as a Victorian or, to be more precise, a 
Victorian with a distinctive political identity. For him, the success of contemporary 
poets resided in how actively they could participate in the political life of the day and, 
for that matter, how well they could live up to their identity, which was in turn defined 
chiefly by the political party they belonged to. Indeed, it might be said to be a pity 
that in his later criticism of Victorian society, Arnold did not return to this particular 
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comment. It could otherwise furnish a good example of the sectarianism he so 
ardently condemned.  
 When Arnold, in the opening of his Preface, expressed his regret that the poem 
Empedocles on Etna depicted situations „in which the suffering finds no vent in action; 
[…] in which there is everything to be endured‟ but „nothing to be done,‟ he seemed to 
have complied with the orders of his critics; only in fact he did not.
285
 For him, action 
did not simply equal activities of all kinds. To qualify as a proper subject matter, it 
must be an action that appealed to „the great primary human affections‟ and „those 
elementary feelings.‟286 By thus redefining „action‟ as a generator of „elementary 
feelings,‟ Arnold modified the views of his critics to such a degree that „action‟ came 
to bear almost opposite connotations. As Arnold expressed it, although a modern 
action had the advantage of being closer to the audience, it was not necessarily the 
best subject for poetry. Instead of being contemporary, actions should be universal and 
therefore accessible to people of „all ages‟ and „all times‟; instead of dealing with 
external reality, they must first and foremost be directed toward the „inward man.‟287 
With the concept of „inward man,‟ Arnold was referring to the spiritual experience 
shared by human beings in general, the feelings which „subsist permanently in the 
race, and […] independent of time.‟288 In this sense, the main criterion for poets and 
poetry no longer consisted in their intimacy with modern life. They succeeded in so 
far as they could capture what was permanent and elementary in human nature or, as 
Arnold put in a more succinct way, to deal with the „essentials.‟289 
An emphasis on essentials as opposed to flux registered a fundamental divergence 
between Arnold and his critics with regard to the mission of a poet. When his critics 
directed the poet‟s attention towards contemporary life, they regarded poets, and 
people in general, as beings whose identities were determined by specific temporal, 
spatial and social circumstances, and who should therefore apply their efforts directly 
to an improvement of their realities. But in Arnold‟s view, before returning to examine 
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their own specific temporal, spatial and social existence, poets should first of all 
transcend their realities in order to get in touch with the primary, the essential and the 
constant. Once again, we can see this conviction well reflected in another debate 
between Clough and Arnold. Whereas Clough argued that poetry should imitate 
modern novels by depicting binding circumstances and the true sphere of individual 
beings – „the indispensable latest addenda‟ which „if we forget on Sunday, we must 
remember on Monday.‟290 Arnold, unimpressed by novels and their realistic depiction 
of the „latest addenda‟, retorted that the most important quality for poets consisted not 
in the way they were confined by their circumstances, but in their „passion as men‟, 
which contained „nothing local and casual.‟291 
 
‘Unified’ and ‘Animating’: ‘Action’ as a Schillerian Concept 
Apart from being essential, Arnold‟s concept of „action‟ was also characterised by 
its special emphasis on unity. In this respect, Arnold challenged not only his critics but 
his fellow poets as well. Also in 1853, shortly before Arnold‟s Poems was published, 
another volume of Poems appeared, slightly slimmer than Arnold‟s work. This was a 
collection by Alexander Smith, a representative of the Spasmodic School which was 
noted for its depiction of intense passion and psychological drama. Although his 
family‟s poverty impeded his education, Smith, with the help of critics such as George 
Gilfillan, managed to publish poems intermittently. His poetical gift impressed many, 
and his 1853 collection proved a large success. As his biographer later recalled, 
double the usual number of copies sold in just a few months, and the poet‟s name 
appeared in reviews not only in Europe but also across the Atlantic, with thousands of 
copies sold in America.
292
 But Arnold held a different view. He told Clough in a 
personal letter that he believed Smith‟s poems would never go very far, and explained 
the reason for this in the 1853 Preface. The poems, Arnold felt, „exist[ed] merely for 
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the sake of single lines and passages,‟ gratifying readers with „a shower of isolated 
thoughts and images‟ instead of a „total impression.‟293  Yet, curiously enough, 
Arnold‟s judgment did not completely conflict with that of Smith‟s admirers. Before 
his successful Poems came out, Smith had published a poem which was entitled, quite 
characteristically, „Life Fragment.‟ According to a commentator from The Eclectic 
Review, a periodical noted for its devotion to literature, the „power and beauty‟ of 
Smith‟s works consisted „in the exquisite thoughts and images which [were] scattered 
[…] over its pages.‟294 So this reviewer saw exactly the same qualities as Arnold, 
only the former applauded it while the latter chose to be critical. Just like what 
happened in Arnold‟s debate with his critics concerning the proper subject of poetry, 
the contrast here illustrated not different judgments on any particular work, but 
different poetic principles.  
 The preference for „total impressions‟ over „isolated thoughts and images‟ also 
informed Arnold‟s distinction between „action‟ and „expression‟ in his Preface. 
According to him, action must be unified, illustrating an essential human nature, 
while expression referred to those „separate thoughts and images which occur in the 
treatment of an action.‟295 Modern poetics prescribed false aims and practices, Arnold 
believed, because it distorted their relationship: instead of putting actions above 
anything else, it gave priority to elements that were individual, accidental, and passing. 
True poetry, therefore, was possible only when the poet managed to construct a poetic 
unity divested of any personal irregularities; and Arnold illustrated the impression 
thus: 
 
It [the story] stood […] as a group of statuary, faintly seen, at the end of a 
long and dark vista: then came the poet, embodying outlines, developing 
situations, not a word wasted, not a sentiment capriciously thrown in: stroke 
upon stroke, the drama proceeded: the light deepened upon the group; more 
and more it revealed itself to the riveted gaze of the spectator: until at last, 
when the final words were spoken, it stood before him in broad sunlight, a 
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model of immortal beauty.
296
 
 
This passage contains an extended metaphor of poetry as well as a metaphor of the 
experience of writing poetry, and unity is still the feature of both. A poem, as Arnold 
described, was like a statue, in which all the strokes, words and sentiments worked 
together to contribute to a sense of wholeness, and none should distinguish itself with 
any peculiarity. Consequently, in order to create that „total impression,‟ poets must 
first of all determine „outlines,‟ then develop various „situations‟ and, most important 
of all, they should always remember not to let extra words or sentiment violate the 
poetic unity. Thus the „model of immortal beauty‟ remained highly consistent with the 
„majestic unity‟ which Arnold had so elegantly depicted in the poems „Written in 
Butler‟s Sermons‟ and „The Scholar-Gipsy.‟ While in the poems, human nature was 
portrayed as a statue-like unity emerging out of conflicting parts, here, in the Preface, 
Arnold described ideal poetry as an aesthetic unity where action predominated over 
expressions. The repetitive use of the statue metaphor confirms just how central the 
unified form was in Arnold‟s aesthetic principles. 
 An action that was both essential and unified, as Arnold maintained, enabled 
poetry to transcend the local and the casual, much in the same way as the „one aim, 
one business, one desire‟ of the Scholar-Gipsy could, potentially, combat the disease 
of contemporary society. Viewed in this way, it is very appropriate that the Preface 
should appear in a collection where „The Scholar-Gipsy‟ is one of the major works. 
Though one was in prose and one in verse, the preface and the poem echoed each 
other, exemplifying the aesthetic ideal that Arnold was determined to implement in his 
own society. Still, it would be wrong to assume that the Preface was but a prose 
version of the poem. In spite of their common appeal to the aesthetic form, the 
Preface reflected a change of mind. In November 1853, the same month in which the 
Poems and the Preface came out, Arnold wrote to Clough about what he now thought 
of „The Scholar-Gipsy‟: 
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I am glad you like the Gipsy Scholar – but what does it do for you? Homer 
animates – Shakespeare animates – in its poor way I think Sohrab and 
Rustum animates – the Gipsy Scholar at best awakens a pleasing melancholy. 
But this is not what we want.  
  The complaining millions of men 
  Darken and labour in pain – 
What they want is something to animate and ennoble them – not merely to 
add zest to their melancholy or grace to their dreams. – I believe a feeling of 
this kind is the basis of my nature – and of my poetics.297  
 
As a poet, Arnold was known – and for that matter, always criticised – for his 
melancholy.
298
 Indeed, a „pleasing melancholy‟ precisely described the poem, 
especially its ending part, in which the Tyrian trader, in order to preserve aesthetic 
integrity against the „divided aims‟ of the Greeks, travelled alone across the sea. But 
to „flee‟ was no longer considered to be the best choice. Now, as Arnold made plain in 
the letter, the most important mission of the poet was to „animate‟; and this was the 
new conviction that the Preface expressed. „It is demanded,‟ Arnold said here of the 
poetic representation of actions, „not only that it [poetry] shall interest, but also that it 
shall inspirit and rejoice the reader: that it shall convey a charm, and infuse 
delight.‟299 
 According to Arnold, it was Schiller who provided the rationale, whom he 
subsequently quoted: „“All art,” says Schiller, “is dedicated to Joy, and there is no 
higher and no more serious problem, than how to make men happy. The right Art is 
that alone, which creates the highest enjoyment.”‟300 This quotation came from 
Schiller‟s „On the Use of the Chorus in Tragedy‟ (1803), the preface to the play The 
Bride of Messina. In this preface, Schiller addressed in particular the effect of poetry 
upon the audience, and here is the passage in English that Arnold quoted from: 
 
But if the theatre be made instrumental towards higher objects, the pleasure 
of the spectator will not be increased, but ennobled. It will be a diversion, but 
a poetical one. All Art is dedicated to pleasure; and there can be no higher 
and worthier end than to make men happy. The true Art is that which 
                                                        
297 Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold: 1829-1859, vol. 1, 282. 
298 Aytoun 341.  
299 Arnold Preface, vii. 
300 Arnold Preface, vii. 
 126 
provides the highest degree of pleasure; and this consists in the abandonment 
of the spirit to the free play of all its faculties.
301
 
 
In its original German version, the word for „diversion‟ was „Spiel,‟ which, as a verb, 
also means „to play.‟ It is a key concept first presented in Schiller‟s philosophy of 
aesthetic education. In the fifteenth letter of his Aesthetic Letters, Schiller argued that 
„in every condition of humanity it is precisely play, and play alone, that makes man 
complete and displays at once his twofold nature.‟302 The „twofold nature‟ referred to 
the „sensuous impulse‟ and the „formal impulse,‟ respectively. The former asserted the 
physical being of man and, when acting exclusively, turned man into nothing „but a 
unit of magnitude, an occupied moment of time‟; the latter, on the contrary, asserted 
the law of rationality, highlighting man‟s „rational nature.‟303 According to Schiller, 
neither impulse should be allowed to predominate in man and must be harmonised 
before each played its own role. The aesthetic play impulse („Spieltrieb‟) was the key. 
By setting free body and mind, it brought harmony to those two aspects of human 
nature, reorganised the conflicting impulses into alliance, forged „the unity of these 
two necessities‟ and, thereby, made man a being that enjoyed both beauty and 
happiness.    
 
Hellenism for the Present Time: Arnold and Schiller’s Classicism  
 In his Preface, Arnold did not dwell much on philosophical reasoning. 
Nevertheless, he borrowed directly from Schiller‟s conclusion that art should yield joy, 
and even used the same example as Schiller to illustrate the ideal. For both of them, 
the best embodiment of their aesthetic principles – the essential, the unified and the 
joyous – was the art of ancient Greece. According to Schiller, Greek art, „[c]ombining 
fullness of form with fullness of content,‟ „[united] the youthfulness of fantasy with 
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the manliness of reason in a splendid humanity.‟304 In Arnold‟s view, too, Greek 
poetry provided a model in multiple ways. It was superior first because of its subject: 
the Iliad, the Oresteia and the story of Dido delineated actions that displayed the 
essentials of human nature. But more than that, in Greek poetry, Arnold also found a 
most balanced treatment of humanity because in it the parts were always subordinated 
to the whole. Therefore, he called out to his fellow poets, advising them to study 
Greek poetry more closely and to appreciate the happiness it rendered, its „noble 
simplicity‟ and, in particular, the „unity and profoundness of moral impression.‟305  
Arnold‟s passion for antiquity attracted fierce criticism from his contemporaries 
and later critics. Many have attacked his „pseudo‟ classicism. In his review of the 
1853 Preface, G. H. Lewes protested that the „Greek,‟ as advocated by Arnold, was 
not Greek in its real appearance and that Arnold‟s opinions concerning Greek and 
Latin literary works were largely misrepresented and „very far removed from the 
truth.‟306 Many later critics supported this opinion. For instance, Warren Anderson, in 
his illuminating examination of classical references in Arnold‟s works, observes that 
the „Greek‟ in Arnold‟s discourse does not correspond with the actual „Greek,‟ and 
thus concludes that in much of what Arnold said about the classical world, „the 
portrait that he gives us misleads more than it misinforms.‟307 Despite its „vividness 
and charm,‟ Anderson says, ancient Greece as represented by Arnold „cannot seem 
adequate to the average cultured reader today, let alone the specialist.‟308 
 But before making a final judgment like that, I think it is necessary to ask: were 
those references to Hellenism intended for specialists? Or – to modify the question in 
order to include a response to the critics who challenged Arnold‟s fascination with the 
past – what was his intention with all his praise of the beauty of ancient poetry? It is 
all very well to point out his misrepresentation in order to show how much our 
knowledge of the ancient world and of ancient literature grows, but to dismiss Arnold 
as a „pseudo‟ classicist does not contribute much to our understanding of his ideas. In 
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fact, Arnold, as we should remember, recommended the study of ancient Greek poetry 
not to any „specialist.‟ He was addressing a group of poetry readers, as well as writers, 
from all walks of life. He believed that they, like those moderns in „The 
Scholar-Gipsy,‟ and probably like he himself, were constantly confused by the 
palpable life of the everyday world, and exhausted, both spiritually and physically, by 
„its sick hurry‟ and „divided aims.‟ A study of poetry from ancient Greece was 
therefore necessary since „we,‟ unlike those ancients, lived in a time when „confusion‟ 
was „great‟ and „the multitude of voices counselling different things bewildering.‟309 
Arnold later repeated this idea in his inaugural address for the Poetry Chair at Oxford 
in 1857. Similar to the 1853 Preface, the address was characterised by a complete 
devotion to the Hellenistic spirit, which he identified as „grace,‟ „light‟ and the 
practice of „[seeing] life steadily, and [seeing] it whole.‟310 In the meanwhile, the 
address also bore the same purpose of serving the present. It was entitled „On the 
Modern Element in Literature,‟ and the achievement of ancient Greece was taken as 
the model, as Arnold explained, because the beauty the Greeks had aspired to had 
„successfully solved for their ages the problem which occupies ours.‟311  
Both his description of the Hellenic spirit and the contrast between ancient 
Greece and „our‟ problems are highly reminiscent of Schiller‟s Aesthetic Letters, 
which argued – as I have quoted previously – that the ancient Greeks possessed „the 
whole of humanity‟ whereas modern individuals had nothing but fragments and 
„narrow hearts.‟312 Schiller‟s interest in Greek art and poetry, therefore, was largely 
based on his contemplation of „the present age‟ and „contemporary humanity.‟ Just as 
Philip J. Kain has contended, the ancient Greek world in Schiller‟s argument should 
not be understood as „the actual Greek polis‟; rather, it was „the model after which the 
modern world was to be remade.‟313 The same thing might as well be said about 
Arnold, who constantly found examples from the past in order to illustrate what he 
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desired in his own society. Viewed in this light, those who criticised Arnold‟s „pseudo‟ 
classicism or his indifference to the needs of contemporary society had done him 
great wrong. His call for aesthetic culture was not a reverie of the past but firmly 
grasped the nineteenth-century British context; the ancient Greek culture that he 
endeavoured to convey to the audience might not be entirely authentic, but that was 
because he intended it to be an aesthetic ideal, a model, to borrow Kain‟s words, „after 
which the modern world was to be remade.‟   
To some extent, aesthetic culture was also something that Arnold himself aspired 
to. When he published his poems and delivered speeches on poetics, he was not 
making a living as a poet. That youthful vision of being a glorious poet was fast 
fading; by the time his third volume of Poems and the Preface came out, he had been 
working as a school inspector for two years, a job that brought endless travels and 
„drudgery.‟ It constantly threatened to stifle his literary aspirations but provided him 
with adequate means to support his family. The condemnation of „sick hurry‟ and 
„divided aims,‟ of „confusion‟ and bewilderment, one might suspect, were thus not just 
derived from his observation of general social trends, but could also be based on the 
experience he had gained as an ordinary breadwinner. In a letter to his friend 
Wyndham Slade, dated October 1852, Arnold wrote from a Derby hotel, where the 
whole family had to stay because of his inspection tour: 
 
I write this very late at night, with Smith, a young Derby banker, tres sport, 
completing an orgy in the next room. When that good young man is calm 
these lodgings are pleasant enough. You are to come and see me fighting the 
battle of life as an Inspector of Schools some day.
314
 
 
Did not those aesthetic principles, we might ask, also provide the ammunition that 
Arnold needed in that battle, which was perhaps less intellectual but equally 
important? 
 At any rate, Arnold regarded the ideal of beauty as necessary in the battle of life 
in general. The accusation that he posed as a nonchalant spectator, or that he did not 
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take part in the concerns of existence, or even that he preached pseudo classicism, are 
all rendered invalid if we approach his comments on literature as an attempt to 
implement aesthetic culture in order to tackle the problem of his own age. As Arnold 
himself stated, the ultimate aim was „to educe and cultivate what is best and noblest in 
themselves.‟315 If there appears to be an insufficient engagement with reality in his 
poems and literary criticism – compared with some of his fellow poets who addressed 
political, moral and religious issues of the day more directly – that is only because 
Arnold was occupied by a different reality, one which, in his view, could alleviate the 
damage in the present one. In this respect, J. D. Jump has made a very insightful 
observation. Although Jump is here talking about Arnold‟s poetics, I think the same 
description applies well to his idea of aesthetic education: 
 
Arnold was not protected by private income, personal gift, sinecure, or 
legacy from the obligation of working for a living in the ordinary Philistine 
sense of the phrase. Because he knew it in his own life, Arnold presents in his 
verse the dilemma of many who in the modern world are compelled to live 
their lives in circumstances which fail to satisfy their natures, which distract 
them indeed from learning what those natures are, and which they must for 
their own well-being periodically elude. If Arnold‟s landscapes are 
commonly those of a week-ender […] at least he also knew and gave 
utterance to that unease which drives the week-ender to the countryside.
316
 
 
 The aesthetic principles, presented by Schiller and embodied by ancient Greek 
poetry, were part of Arnold‟s countryside. There he gathered various types of 
ingredients and extracted the material he thought could be useful for life in the 
modern world. Nevertheless, to dress this lesson up in ancient forms and bid the 
audience to study these relics was not always very effective. Indeed, as we have seen, 
the sheer amount of the charges made by his contemporary critics had shown how 
easily a practice like that could be misunderstood. It was high time, therefore, that 
Arnold, the aesthetic educator, should become more assertive, addressing himself 
more directly to the modern world.  
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‘Grand Style’ and ‘Aesthetic State’: Aesthetic Education in Arnold’s 
Social Criticism 
 
‘Grand Style’: Aesthetic Education for the Middle Classes 
In 1859, the school inspector Matthew Arnold was sent on a tour to France by the 
Newcastle Commission on Elementary Education. Two years later, he produced a 
parliamentary report, entitled Popular Education in France. Later, the preface to the 
report was republished as an independent essay under the title „Democracy,‟ which is 
today generally read as an important text illustrating Arnold‟s social and political 
thought. But, as some critics have observed, despite its avowedly political interest, the 
essay focused not on political institutions, but upon „the question of cultural values 
and intellectual and aesthetic standards.‟317 In this chapter, I will take up this notion 
and investigate how Arnold‟s social and political criticism formed another vital 
component in his idea of aesthetic education. 
 „Undoubtedly,‟ concluded the essay „Democracy,‟ „we are drawing on towards 
great changes; and for every nation the thing most needful is to discern clearly its own 
condition, in order to know in what particular way it may best meet them.‟318 This 
portrayal of the age was accurate, because democratisation was the very change that 
English society was then undergoing. During the time when Arnold was busily 
engaged in various pursuits, the democratic spirit had begun to find its way into many 
aspects of social life. In politics, it was made evident by the decline of aristocracy and 
the rise of the middle classes; in academia, it was represented by a celebration of the 
independent and critical mind; in political economy, it was embodied in the doctrine 
of laissez-faire; whereas culturally, it was best illustrated by the middle class liberalist 
ardour for self-improvement. Changes of these kinds entailed a reflection on the role 
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of authority, especially the authority of the state. Since an increase of the prominence 
of the individual became inevitable, many people began to be concerned about how 
the power of the state should adapt itself to this enormous change. There is little 
wonder, then, that a Victorian bestseller, entitled Self-Help and published in the same 
year as Arnold set out for France, should begin with the chapter „National and 
Individual.‟ According to its author Samuel Smiles, the chief function of a central 
state should be „negative and restrictive‟; it should represent „an aggregate of 
individual conditions,‟ and protect people‟s life, liberty and property; but that was 
about all it was supposed to do. The cultivation of each individual was largely a 
personal issue, and civilisation a „personal improvement.‟ 319  Even the best 
institutions, Smiles insisted, could „give man no active aid‟ other than „leav[ing] him 
free to develop himself and improve his individual condition.‟ 320  Any central 
authority which called on people to follow certain models that were not immediately 
individual was therefore classed as „despotism […] in its worst forms.‟321 The 
celebration of individual freedom as opposed to the authority of the central state made 
the author of Self-Help a spokesman for the liberalism of the day; its status as an 
immediate bestseller after publication proved the popularity of that doctrine. 
 But this enthusiasm for democracy and liberalism was not shared by everyone. 
The Reform Bill of 1832, as we should remember, did not pass smoothly, and the 
prospect of the power of the masses deeply agitated some minds. It was through his 
criticism of democracy, for instance, that Carlyle proposed his famous doctrine of 
hero-worship, which, as one critic has perceptively pointed out, could be interpreted 
as a reaction against the dominion of the masses by „restoring the aristocracy to 
power.‟ 322  Arnold, on the other hand, was neither interested in heroes nor in 
aristocracy, at least not at the surface level. When he alleged in „Democracy,‟ with his 
habitual strategy of creating dialogues within monologues, that „I know what a chorus 
of objectors will be ready. One will say: Rather repair and restore the influence of 
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aristocracy,‟ it is very likely that he had Carlyle‟s words in mind.323 For Arnold, 
democracy was not in itself objectionable; yet, nor was it a blessing. But he believed 
that the change was destined to come. With a dialectic historical vision, he argued that 
democratisation was initiated „by natural and inevitable causes‟ because human beings 
by instinct desired „expansion and fuller life.‟324 The old aristocratic system failed to 
cater for that need and, consequently, was bound to be superseded and replaced. Yet, 
he was also concerned about the problems this entailed. Who would be able to replace 
the aristocrats? The middle classes, whose power and virtue were celebrated at the 
time, seemed to be the only suitable choice; but, in Arnold‟s view, this group was not 
yet ready to assume the leading role. According to his standard, they still lacked the 
„grand style‟ which was „that elevation of character, that noble way of thinking and 
behaving.‟325 
 The reference to „grand style‟ also registers another difference between Arnold‟s 
and Carlyle‟s discussion of democracy, namely the ideal of the cultivation of 
humanity. Carlyle believed that salvation of the era depended on heroes, by which he 
meant individuals „great enough […] wise enough and good enough.‟326 Echoing 
Aristotle‟s „Magnanimous Man‟ and anticipating Nietzsche‟s „Superman,‟ his „hero‟ 
appeared very often as an individual that encompassed the potential of all human 
beings. Thus when he set out to define poets as heroes, Carlyle argued that the poet 
should demonstrate „an infinitude.‟ 327  True poetry was therefore „[a] kind of 
inarticulate unfathomable speech, which leads us to the edge of the Infinite, and lets 
us for moment gaze into that.‟328 Concerning this point, Arnold held a very different 
view. If led to the edge of the „Infinite,‟ he would declare that he saw nothing but 
chaos and anarchy. This distrust for the infinite was already indicated by his aversion 
to multitudinousness in poetry; and now as a critic who preached the „grand style‟, it 
became even more obvious. The term „grand style,‟ Arnold reminded his audience, 
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had also appeared in his On Translating Homer, the series of lectures given in 1860 
and published in 1861. There he had defined „grand style‟ as the style which arose 
when „a noble nature, poetically gifted, treats with simplicity or with severity a 
serious subject.‟329 The idea of „gifted‟ and „noble‟ seemed to draw Arnold‟s poet 
close to the Carlylean hero, but the emphasis on „simplicity‟ set them apart. 
„Abundance of poetical gift‟ and „abundance of noble natures,‟ according to Arnold, 
was never in shortage. What was truly rare was the combination of poetical gift and 
noble nature in „a continuous style.‟330 In Arnold‟s opinion, most of the poets in the 
present age were either those who „had the gifts of nature and faculty in unequal 
fullness […] without the circumstances and training which make this sustained 
perfection of style possible,‟ or those who „caught this perfect strain now and then, in 
short pieces or single lines, but have not been able to maintain it through considerable 
works‟; few could meet the requirement of the ideal.331 Once again, the appeal to 
aesthetic unity as opposed to fragmentary flashes of genius was clear: grandeur 
denoted not only „wise enough‟ and „good enough.‟ but excellence as a whole. 
 While being an antidote against the multitudinousness of the world, the notion of 
„grand style‟ also contained Arnold‟s repudiation of the excessive individualism of the 
middle classes. In fact, the Homer essay was not the first place in which Arnold had 
talked about the „grand style.‟ The term had already appeared in his 1853 Preface, 
where poets from ancient Greece were regarded as the best specimens of 
„unapproachable masters of the grand style.‟332 According to Arnold, the grandness 
of their works consisted first of all in the fact that they, instead of fixing attention „on 
the value of separate thoughts and images,‟ regarded the work as a whole.333 This was 
achieved, as Arnold went on to explain, because those Greek poets made „actions‟ 
predominate over „expressions,‟ keeping the latter simple and subordinated. 334 
Whereas action suggested a unity that dealt with the essential human nature, 
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expression, with its diversity, was highly individualistic. What Arnold wanted to 
achieve with „grand style‟ was an aesthetic unity purged of excessive individual taste: 
grandness in literature was the effect created when poetry gave prominence to what 
was essential in human nature as opposed to personal preferences; and grandness in 
culture, similarly, was achieved when the cultivation of humanity focused on the 
permanent and the enduring, rather than the temporary. Thus it could be said that 
while the Carlylean hero was an ideal against mediocrity, Arnold‟s was against 
irregularities. By calling for the middle classes to cultivate grand style, he was in fact 
bidding them to temper their excessive individualism – „doing as one likes‟, as he 
would later describe it in Culture and Anarchy.  
Arnold has constantly been accused of being too vague with his terms and 
concepts, and „grand style‟ was often cited as one example.335 Arnold himself had 
foreseen this challenge. Talking about the grand style in On Translating Homer, he 
warned his audience that the term was „the last matter in the world for verbal 
definition to deal with adequately.‟ The only proper way to understand it, therefore, 
was „to feel it.‟336 It was doubtful whether such a spiritualistic tone could convince 
his audience; some certainly refused to buy it, hence the comment from The North 
British Review that Arnold not only made his terms inaccessible but also provided an 
explanation „worse than affected.‟337 But I would argue that the term „grand style‟ is 
general rather than vague, and it is necessarily general. As Arnold‟s aesthetic model, it 
embodies a variety of concerns: the idea underlies both Arnold‟s literary criticism and 
his social criticism, signifying both the poetic principle that held simple actions above 
elaborate verbal decorations and the criticism of individualism in an increasingly 
democratised society. Understood in this way, the vagueness of the term becomes the 
source of flexibility, the very power that enabled Arnold to maneuver between 
different spheres of criticism and, as if following his own dictation, enabled him to 
unify his literary principles with political aspirations into an aesthetic ideal. 
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‘Aesthetic State’: the Social End of Aesthetic Education 
 If „grand style‟ conveys Arnold‟s criticism of his society, „state‟ is the one that 
contains the remedy he proposed. The only way to replace the old aristocracy without 
going back, Arnold insisted, was to look toward the „State.‟ He borrowed from 
Burke‟s definition that the state was „the nation in its collective and corporate 
character,‟ yet also suffixed it with his own interpretations. Thus the „State,‟ according 
to his definition, was also  
 
an ideal of high reason and right feeling, representing its best self, 
commanding general respect, and forming a rallying-point for the 
intelligence and for the worthiest instincts of the community, which will 
herein find a true bond of union.
338
 
 
There is an interesting parallel between the „State‟ and the character of the 
Scholar-Gipsy. Both, as Arnold saw it, were embodiments of the harmoniously 
developed reason and feeling; and both, when properly established, would represent 
to the public „the worthiest instincts‟ that helped form a true bond, a union, out of 
chaos and multitudinousness. The parallel also holds true for the reason that Arnold, 
in the essay „Democracy,‟ seems to have been somewhat negligent of the function of 
the state as a political and social machine. In spite of his interest in politics as an 
individual, in the essay, he did not touch on the issue of institutions, displayed little 
concern for political parties and deliberately avoided the idea that the state could 
become a coercive power that caused pain to its subjects, which, as he explained, 
posed no serious problem for English people in the nineteenth century. When all these 
concerns were removed, the „State‟ became less a political entity and more of a 
cultivated individual, who, just as the Scholar-Gipsy, won „respect‟ from the world by 
demonstrating his „best self.‟ 
 Such a state, humanised and impersonalised, was highly reminiscent of Schiller‟s 
concept of „aesthetic State‟ in his Aesthetic Letters. It should be pointed out, however, 
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that in the English version, Schiller‟s „aesthetic State‟ appears sometimes quite 
confusing, because some translators used the same word „state‟ for two different 
German words, „Zustand‟ and „Staat.‟339 When translated more precisely, the first 
means condition, the state of being, while the latter refers to the political state, the 
actual body of the nation. It was in the aesthetic condition, as Schiller argued, that 
humanity found its unity: „we feel ourselves snatched outside time, and our humanity 
expresses itself with a purity and integrity as though it had not yet experienced any 
detriment from the influence of external forces.‟340 The latter, on the other hand, 
stood for the most advanced level that human society could achieve. To illustrate this 
point, Schiller compared the „aesthetic state‟ with two other types of state, dynamic 
and ethical. The dynamic, driving man into social bonds, made society possible, while 
the ethical state „implanted social principles‟ and subjected the individual will to the 
general will. But the aesthetic state distinguished itself from both. Although it was 
also a collective of individuals, the relationship between society and individuals was 
maintained neither by power nor by discipline, but by beauty and harmony. Thus it 
was in the aesthetic state that „[b]eauty alone can confer on him [the individual] a 
social character,‟ and „[t]aste alone brings harmony into society, because it 
establishes harmony in the individual.‟341 Only in this way, Schiller maintained, 
could the aesthetic state become a state of dignity and freedom, one that best 
represented the collective interest.  
 However, it is understandable that some English translators did not make a 
sufficient distinction between these two types of „aesthetic state.‟ The two concepts 
are so intrinsically connected that sometimes, they do seem to be interchangeable. 
Although the aesthetic state in the political sense emphasised the relationship between 
individuals, while the aesthetic condition stressed the world within each one, harmony 
was the feature of both. And as far as harmony was concerned, the aesthetic state was 
an external reflection of the aesthetic condition or, to borrow Schiller‟s own words, it 
was the „social character‟ of purity and integrity that was derived from individuals 
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who possessed exactly the same qualities. In his analysis of aesthetic „Staat,‟ David 
Pugh comments that Schiller presented a „depoliticized picture‟ in which „political 
goals are subordinated to the needs of human development and culture.
342
 This 
observation grasps the core of the concept, and I would add that much of the 
depoliticising came from the fact that the state, in Schiller‟s mind, was primarily a 
condition of culture. Ultimately, both the aesthetic condition and the aesthetic state 
were regarded as an ideal that the cultivation of humanity should strive for. 
 The interconnection between state and condition in Schiller‟s aesthetic education 
provides the key to understand the concept of state in Arnold‟s „Democracy,‟ where, 
as has been repeatedly noted, the image was equally depoliticised. Because of his 
explicit support for state action in solving problems in an increasingly democratised 
Victorian England, scholars who study Victorian education usually categorise Arnold 
as a pro-state figure amidst the Victorian debate of state versus private. As a result, he 
is not only accredited for Victorian educational reforms but also identified as a typical 
antagonist to John Stuart Mill in social theory and practice.
343
 I have no quarrel with 
these long-established portrayals of Arnold, and I agree that the contrast between 
these two eminent figures was plain enough. However, following my argument that 
both were avid aesthetic educators, I wish to point out that the disagreement between 
them was not just one about social theory and practice. Rather, it reflected a deeper 
divergence, namely, their different understandings of humanity and, for that matter, 
the ideals of human cultivation. 
 Where Arnold conceived the state as a representative of the essential part of 
human nature, Mill, with the mentality of a typical liberal, was highly distrustful of 
the effort of the nation. „A general state of education,‟ Mill contended, 
 
is a mere contrivance for modeling people to be exactly like one another; and 
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as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant 
power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an 
aristocracy or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is 
efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by 
natural tendency to one over the body.
344
 
 
For Mill, state intervention should be excluded because it cultivated uniformity 
among individuals and, thereby, made people all alike. The best education, in his view, 
should bring forward an „intellectual diversity,‟ 
 
that multiform development of human nature, those manifold unlikenesses, 
that diversity of tastes and talents, and variety of intellectual points of view, 
which not only form a great part of the interest of human life, but by bringing 
intellects into stimulating collision, and by presenting to each innumerable 
notions that he would not have conceived of himself, are the mainspring of 
mental and moral progression.
345
 
 
With Mill‟s characteristic emphasis on „multiform‟ and „manifold,‟ the passage offers 
us a clear idea of what he considered to be the best cultivation: it should, by all 
possible means, promote intellectual expansion, independent thinking as well as 
individual judgments. Following this logic, a state education, which imposed central 
authority, was certainly not to be recommended. 
 Arnold also valued the expansion of humanity. The Greek ideal, as he had so 
famously put it, represented human nature „in its completest and most harmonious 
development,‟ and Hellenism aimed at „perfecting all [parts of men], leaving none to 
take their chance.‟ But all these stresses on completion and expansion had one 
important premise, namely that human beings should learn to look inward and find the 
essential elements shared by all. Expansion in itself was not to be cherished, because 
chaos, fragments and excessive subjectivism were also among its products. A proper 
education must therefore make sure that its final aim was not expansion of the 
eccentricity of the individual, but promulgation of the best self. Viewed in this way, 
the disagreement between Arnold and Mill concerning state education was not 
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immediately political but was based largely on their conflicting views of what human 
cultivation should achieve. 
 When Arnold proposed the state as a solution, however, he was not only speaking 
against the liberal cause championed by Mill. The aesthetic ideal of a central state 
based on the best self of human nature also had another target in reality, that is, the 
issue of sectarianism in education. The Victorian age saw heated debates over the role 
of the state in schooling. The churches had always been considered to be the most 
capable providers of education, in which the government took little part. 
Denominational schools and the variety of religious organisations involved, such as 
the National Society, testified to the power of the church in classrooms.
346
 But this 
practice caused difficulties in some respects. Since it was various religious groups that 
provided education, classrooms sometimes were turned into a battleground of 
different sects. And it was not just different religious sects that were at conflict with 
each other; disagreement between the church and the dissenters was also a common 
issue.
347
 Things became even more complicated as the economy developed. The rapid 
growth of industry and the subsequent emergence of a large working population 
demanded mass education, which could never be realised in the current sectarian 
system.
348
 Efforts along this line would eventually give birth to the Forster's 
Education Act of 1870, which announced the beginning of the modern national 
system of education in this country. This was the very act that Arnold had been 
looking for when he wrote „Democracy‟ a decade ago. 
But in Arnold‟s opinion, the most serious impediment was not the trouble caused 
to public administration; rather, it lay in the fact that sectarianism in education 
encouraged sectarianism in human nature. This problem was particularly evident in 
the middle classes, who were then the most active power in the management of social 
affairs. The only antidote, according to Arnold, was to subject one‟s self interest to 
state power, which alone could supply the middle classes (and other classes as well) 
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with a national character, „a greatness and a noble spirit‟ that would replace their 
„condition of real inferiority.‟349 This was also the central idea that Arnold developed 
in another essay on education, A French Eton, and, eventually, in his famous Culture 
and Anarchy. In A French Eton, he disparaged the provincialism of the middle classes, 
insisting that this group „only tries to affirm its actual self‟ and „to impose its actual 
self.‟350 In Culture and Anarchy, similarly, he made the „best self‟ the very aim of 
culture: „by our best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony‟; hence the claim: „we 
want an authority, and […] culture suggests the idea of the State. We find no basis for 
a firm State-power in our ordinary selves; culture suggests one to us in our best 
self.‟351 That „culture suggests the idea of the State‟ is a very interesting notion, 
because in „Democracy,‟ where the central state was looked at as the best agent for the 
cultivation of humanity, the central idea might also be summarised as „the State 
suggests the idea of culture.‟ Just like Schiller‟s aesthetic condition and aesthetic state, 
Arnold‟s „State‟ and „culture‟ were also concepts that, in a way, could be understood 
as synonyms. 
 Because of Arnold‟s constant mentioning of „state-power,‟ his criticism of 
liberalism and, above all, his explicit quest for „authority,‟ critics are often haunted by 
the idea that Arnold was in his heart an authoritarian. Herbert F. Tucker, for instance, 
talks about Arnold‟s „authoritarian edict,‟352 and Leon Albert Gottfried also criticises 
his „authoritarian bias‟ in the attempt to modify the teaching of Romanticism.353 Peter 
Keating, though trying to defend Arnold‟s „great achievement,‟ nevertheless admits 
that his educational ideas and criticism of the middle classes betray indeed „some 
authoritarian element‟ through his desire for a „stringent power of repression.‟354 But 
in my view, not all these characterisations are well grounded; whether or not they are 
sound, largely depends on what critics mean by the word „authoritarian.‟ If by 
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„authoritarian‟ they refer simply to Arnold‟s somewhat rigid adherence to the form of 
central authority, this is all very true. From Greek poetry to state power, Arnold had 
always been looking for some embodiments of his ideal of aesthetic education. 
Because he was speaking of the aim of human cultivation, and because his ideal was 
an aesthetic unity based on the essential nature of human beings, it was necessary to 
establish an example above common humanity; a vision of the centre, therefore, was 
inevitable.  
Nevertheless, it would be a downright misunderstanding if we take this example 
as an external authority established at the expense of human freedom. The authority of 
the state, for Arnold, consisted in its ability to represent the essential elements of 
human beings, but so it was with the „ideal man,‟ who, by following grand examples, 
was able to differentiate the permanent elementary part of nature from his 
individualistic trait in order to make the best prevail. Similar to Schiller, whose 
„aesthetic state‟ is but an external equivalence to ideal humanity, Arnold also sought 
true authority from within human beings. Even more significantly, for both of them, 
establishing an aesthetic state was the way not to contain but to achieve freedom. The 
ability to „rise out of the narrow circle of natural ends‟ of ourselves, Schiller believed, 
brought us „freedom that belongs to spiritual nature.‟355 In the same vein, Arnold 
argued in Culture and Anarchy that our freedom resides in our elevation „to the idea 
of a perfected humanity‟ by subordinating „all the multitudinous, turbulent, and blind 
impulses of our ordinary selves.‟356 Freedom, Schiller and Arnold agreed, was the 
ultimate aim of aesthetic education; only, it consisted not in doing what man wanted 
to do according to their ordinary selves, their impulses or circumstances; instead, it 
should be the free play of an ennobled soul. Hence it was natural that, after a lengthy 
discussion of various social problems in the Victorian age, Arnold‟s „Democracy‟ 
should conclude with a reflection on humanity. „Human thought,‟ he said, „which 
made all institutions, inevitably saps them, resting only in that which is absolute and 
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eternal.‟357 None of the institutions, or external agencies in any form, could ensure 
the perfection of human beings; ultimately, it was men‟s knowledge of themselves – 
the absolute and the essential – that led them toward perfection. 
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Conclusion 
 Culture and Anarchy, Arnold‟s best-known work, was first published in book 
form in 1869. Similar to Mill‟s inaugural address, it contained many ideas about 
aesthetic education that Arnold had already discussed in his previous writings. Thus in 
Culture and Anarchy, the scathing criticism of English society very often led to, or 
culminated in, the description of perfect human nature. And it is interesting to observe 
that in Arnold‟s view, ideal humanity always had some distinct „formal‟ qualities. 
Human cultivation, he argued, led to the perfection of character, which was in essence 
a „general‟ as well as „a harmonious expansion of human nature.‟358 Mere expansion 
did not suffice; as the use of italics indicated, Arnold also insisted that the final 
product of this expansion must have an orderly and unified structure. In other words, 
perfection was accomplished not simply by cultivating every human faculty to its 
utmost, but also – and more importantly – by making every faculty work in 
accordance with each other as a whole. Ignore this principle, and cultivation would 
only result in „strong individualism,‟ „hatred of all limits to the unrestrained swing of 
the individual‟s personality‟ and „intense energetic absorption in the particular pursuit‟ 
that each one felt compelled to take – in sum, qualities that made civilisation 
„mechanical and external.‟359 Harmony and unity were what Arnold found in his 
Greek examples which, once again, were recommended as the ideal of human 
perfection. The essence of Hellenism, according to him, consisted in „the impulse to 
the development of the whole man, to connecting and harmonising all parts of him, 
perfecting all, leaving none to take their chance.‟360 
But Arnold did not prescribe antiquity as the only antidote. He also tried to 
convince his audience to embrace a new understanding of the „State.‟ The English 
antipathy toward this concept, he maintained, was derived from the definition of the 
state as „the class in occupation of the executive government‟ and the conviction that 
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people „are only safe from one another‟s tyranny when no one has any power.‟361 
This, in turn, was based on the observation that individuals „are separate, personal‟ 
and, consequently, „at war.‟ While these convictions could ward off the danger of 
tyranny, they could also lead people into the trap of anarchy. The best solution, 
therefore, was to alter the concept of self from „separate, personal, at war‟ into „united, 
impersonal, at harmony,‟ and meanwhile to modify the state in such a way that instead 
of representing class interests, it would become a representation of the best self.
362
 
All of these arguments – the stress on harmony and unity, the passion for the 
civilisation of ancient Greece, and the depoliticised „State‟ as an ideal of human 
cultivation – would never sound strange for readers who have been familiar with 
those aesthetic principles underlying Arnold‟s poetics and criticism at a much earlier 
stage. Moreover, these arguments also compel us once again to think about Arnold‟s 
principles for aesthetic education. His aesthetic education, as I have demonstrated 
throughout this chapter, is not as simple as „a conviction of the importance of the 
excellence in art and literature‟; nor is Arnold the aesthetic educator a simple devotee 
to art and literature. Rather, he was in many ways a Schillerian aesthetic educator. His 
affinity with Schiller was not only evidenced in the quotes incorporated into his 
criticism. Deep down they shared the same aspiration towards unity and harmony as 
the ideal of aesthetic cultivation, and they both regarded beauty as a „power of 
agency‟ in the progress of society.  
 As in the case of Mill, Arnold‟s aesthetic aspiration also affected his own manner 
of presentation. Analysing Arnold‟s rhetorical style, James A. Berlin notes that its 
main feature is the use of synthesis and analysis. Berlin looks particularly at Culture 
and Anarchy, the structure of which, he argues, as „a whole as well as each section […] 
proceeds along the lines of successive stages of synthesis and analysis.‟ According to 
Berlin, the categories of „Barbarians, Philistines, and Populace‟ and the polarisation of 
„Hellenism and Hebraism‟ are both examples of how Arnold combined „dialectical 
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parts‟ in order to arrive at truth.363 In my view, however, to describe Arnold‟s rhetoric 
as „synthesis‟ is quite misleading, especially if by synthesis, it is suggested that 
Arnold was combining separate elements to form a coherent whole.  
This point might become clearer if we compare Arnold again with Mill. Mill used 
synthesis extensively in his argument. He synthesised feeling and intellect, feeling 
and morality, liberalism and elitism and, eventually, Bentham and Coleridge. 
Syntheses of those polarised parts were needed, as he explained, because each 
component within every set contained „half-truth‟; hence his final conclusions were 
always based on the observation that each part, however defective, had its own merit 
that must be incorporated if one wanted to achieve a balanced view. Arnold, by 
contrast, saw in Barbarians, Philistines or Populace little quality that was worth 
recommending, and he clearly preferred Hellenism to Hebraism. He criticised each 
group in the first set for not being sufficiently close to the ideal humanity, and praised 
Hellenism for offering the best example of a sound conception of human nature. „We 
see, then,‟ he called out to his audience at the end of chapter three in Culture and 
Anarchy, where he had exposed the unsatisfactory side of every class of English 
society, „how indispensable to that human perfection which we seek is, in the opinion 
of good judges, some public recognition and establishment of our best self, or right 
reason.‟ Immediately following that, he declared: „We see how our habits and practice 
oppose themselves to such a recognition, and the many inconveniences which we 
therefore suffer.‟364 This is a fine illustration of how Arnold constructed his argument. 
Rather than starting from various elements that opposed each other, he started from 
the idea of perfection that he considered indispensable; only after that would he come 
down to those elements, revealing their defects and „inconveniences‟ by examining 
them against the ideal.  
Arnold borrowed aesthetic ideals from Schiller; yet, by seeking the ideal above 
contemporary reality, he also suffered the same pain that Schiller had described. Now 
let us take another look on the epitaph of his „Cromwell‟ that was quoted at the very 
                                                        
363 James A. Berlin „Matthew Arnold‟s Rhetoric: The Method of an Elegant Jeremiah,‟ Rhetoric Society Quarterly 
13.1 (1983) 29-40, at 35-36. 
364 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy 125. 
 147 
beginning of this chapter: “it is awful to be the mortal vessel of thy truth.‟ After 
rereading Arnold as a Schillerian aesthetic educator, it seems to me that Schiller‟s 
Cassandra was less a parallel of Cromwell than a parallel of Arnold himself. In 1818, 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine introduced Schiller‟s „Kassandra‟ by quoting from 
Madame de Staël‟s Germany: 
 
We see in this Ode what a misfortune it would be to a human being could he 
possess the prescience of a divinity. Is not the sorrow of the prophetess 
experienced by all persons of strong passions and supreme minds? Schiller 
has given us a fine moral idea under a very poetical form, namely, that true 
genius, that of sentiment, even if it escape suffering from its commerce with 
the world, is frequently the victim of its own feelings.
365
 
 
There is no evidence whether Arnold had ever read this comment. It is possible that he 
had, given the popularity of Madame de Staël‟s book, Arnold‟s familiarity with her 
works and, above all, his lifelong interest in German culture. At any rate, the 
similarity between what Schiller endeavoured to convey and what Arnold would 
confront is startling. With the same „strong passions‟ and „supreme minds‟ – whether 
these were genuine or self-conferred – Arnold was to echo exactly the „sorrow of the 
prophetess.‟ The Cassandrian anxiety that the precious truth would be ignored by her 
fellow countrymen appeared again and again in Arnold‟s writings. When talking about 
the function of criticism, he gloomily admitted that the era for true literature had long 
gone, and that in spite of his single-minded emphasis, „[t]hat promised land it will not 
be ours to enter.‟366  Illustrating the ideal education for the middle classes, he 
concluded his observation with the voice of a prophet by calling out to „[c]hildren of 
the future, whose day has not yet dawned.‟367 In both cases, he was haunted by the 
possibility that his vision would not make any impact on his contemporaries. For all 
his life, Arnold was to prophesise about the value of criticism, to propound sweetness 
and light, and to tell every order of society that they must begin with „an Idea of the 
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world‟ in order not to be prevailed over by the world‟s multitudinouness. In this sense, 
those lines from Schiller were, symbolically, an epitaph of the life of Arnold. 
Throughout his career as an aesthetic educator, he was precisely a „mortal vessel‟ of 
the truth he had gained from his own observations of literature and life; and the 
conception of human nature in its unified and essential form was the very „Idea‟ he 
brought to his world.  
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Chapter 3 Behold and Be Good: John Ruskin’s Aesthetic Education 
as an Education of the Eyes 
 
The King of the Golden River: Ruskin’s Aesthetics of Seeing 
This chapter focuses on John Ruskin, whose „aesthetics‟ has never been a subject 
understudied. Landmark works in this area include, among others, George P. 
Landow‟s The Aesthetic and Critical Theories of John Ruskin (1971) and Elizabeth K. 
Helsinger‟s Ruskin and the Art of the Beholder (1982). The former contains 
comprehensive research on Ruskin‟s art theories, and the latter offers much insight 
into his Romantic tendencies. In spite of their different perspectives, however, both 
authors portrayed Ruskin essentially as an art critic. My study of Ruskin‟s idea of 
„aesthetic education‟ in the present chapter is much indebted to those works, but what 
I intend to achieve here is different from both. I do not aim to provide a 
comprehensive account of Ruskin‟s „theories,‟ but shall concentrate instead on his 
idea of perception and the moral significance of seeing. I also do not analyse his 
works in the context of art history, but shall put him firmly within the context of 
nineteenth-century England. Most important of all, I do not see Ruskin as primarily an 
art critic. In fact, one of the central arguments that I shall make in this chapter is that 
Ruskin the aesthetic educator played an active role in a variety of fields other than art, 
and that to study his aesthetic education requires a close examination of his works that 
addressed a variety of concerns other than artistic issues. In order to illustrate this 
point, I shall begin with a work that was hardly ever mentioned in the study of 
Ruskin‟s aesthetic ideas, namely, The King of the Golden River, a short story written 
in 1841.  
Discussing Ruskin‟s The King of the Golden River, Northrop Frye argues that 
„Ruskin‟s treatment of wealth in his economic works [is] essentially a commentary on 
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this fairy tale.‟368 But not everyone agrees with Frye. Cliver Wilmer, for instance, 
insists that even if the story contains some ideas that were later expounded in Unto 
This Last, to give it a central importance is a downright exaggeration because it is, 
after all, a fairy tale written by a young man.
369
 The present chapter on Ruskin will 
focus on aesthetic cultivation instead of economics; hence there is not much to say 
about the debate between Frye and Wilmer. Nevertheless, as far as the significance of 
The King of the Golden River is concerned, my judgment is the same as Frye‟s. In my 
view, with its heavy emphasis on perception and the moral significance of seeing, the 
story contains the most important essence of Ruskin‟s idea of aesthetic cultivation.  
The plot of The King of the Golden River is quite simple. Three brothers, Hans, 
Schwartz and Gluck, live in a bountiful valley. One day they are visited by Mr. 
South-West Wind, who has disguised himself as a strange old man begging for shelter 
and food. Gluck treats the guest kindly, but Hans and Schwartz turn him away. A 
disaster thus follows. The climate changes all of a sudden and the whole valley 
becomes a desert. The only way to save it, they are told, is to cast three drops of holy 
water into the Golden River up in the mountains. Hans and Schwartz set off on the 
expedition one after the other, but both fail to pass the test and, consequently, are 
turned into black stones. Only Gluck succeeds. Eventually, the valley becomes a 
garden again. In terms of structure and characterisation, the story resembles both 
those of the brothers Grimm and The Arabian Nights.
370
 Indeed, Ruskin followed a 
conventional plot when he described the punishment of the greedy selfish brothers. 
Yet in one respect his story is unique: the narrative makes it clear that the two brothers 
deserve their misery because they not only fail the test on morality but also the test on 
perception. They are blind, both to nature and to the suffering of other creatures. 
When Hans is on his way to the river, he meets a poor thirsty dog which, in his 
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eyes, is simply „an object‟ that „moved.‟ When he refuses to save the dog, his fate is 
first foreshadowed in the form of visible signs: „He […] spurned the animal with his 
foot, and passed on. And he did not know how it was, but he thought that a strange 
shadow had suddenly come across the sky.‟371 But this is only a feeling, as Hans‟ 
eyes are „fixed‟ on the Golden River alone. He could not perceive the natural message 
clearly or decipher its meaning, let alone respond to the message properly. Later, 
when he meets a thirsty child, the same thing happens again. He refuses to save the 
child who, as he sees it, is but „something‟ that „moved in the path above him.‟372 
After that, „a dark grey cloud came over the sun, and long, snake-like shadows crept 
up along the mountain sides.‟ This, however, was not what Hans has perceived. Again, 
he simply ignored the signs and „struggled on.‟373 When Hans refuses to offer help 
for the third time, the ominous signs from nature are becoming even more distinct. 
The waves of the Golden River „were filled with the red glory of sunset: they shook 
their crests like tongues of fire, and flashes of bloody light gleamed along their 
foam.‟374 Hans, still unable to understand the meaning embodied in these signs, hurls 
his flask of water into the river with enthusiasm. Instead of having his prosperity 
restored, he is punished for his unkindness and is turned into a black stone. 
After that Schwartz sets off. Like Hans, he never gives any help to the creatures 
he meets. To his selfishness, nature also gives warnings: 
 
Then again the light seemed to fade before his eyes, and he looked up, and, 
behold, a mist, of the colour of blood, had come over the sun; and the bank of 
black cloud had risen very high, and its edges were tossing and tumbling like 
the waves of the angry sea. And they cast long shadows, which flickered over 
Schwartz‟s path.375 
 
To some extent, Schwartz is more perceptive than Hans. While the latter only fixes all 
his attention on the Golden River, turning a blind eye to everything else, Schwartz can 
                                                        
371 Ruskin, The King of the Golden River, Unto this Last and Other Writings, ed. Clive Wilmer (London: Penguin 
Books, 1997) 49-71, at 64. 
372 Ruskin, The King of the Golden River 64. 
373 Ruskin, The King of the Golden River 65. 
374 Ruskin, The King of the Golden River 65. 
375 Ruskin, The King of the Golden River 67. 
 152 
„behold‟ the changes around him. On one occasion, when he passes another dying 
creature without doing anything, Schwartz even „thought he saw a strange expression 
of mockery about its lips.‟ 376  But seeing is different from understanding. In 
Schwartz‟s case, perception remains perception only; those signs do not motivate him 
to behave in any different way. No matter how clearly he sees, he draws no 
connection between the signs and their moral indications and, consequently, is also 
turned into a black stone. 
 Gluck, by contrast, has very perceptive eyes, and he is also quick in 
understanding. When the first creature, an old man, approaches him, Gluck instantly 
grasps every detail, seeing that it is „an old man coming down the path above him, 
looking very feeble, and leaning on a staff.‟377 Clear perception helps him to make 
the right decisions. When the old man asks for water, Gluck „looked at him, and when 
he saw that he was pale and weary, he gave him the water.‟378 When this is done, 
happy little changes happens in the mountain: „there were all kinds of sweet flowers 
growing on the rocks, bright green moss, with pale pink starry flowers, and soft belled 
gentians, more blue than the sky at its deepest, and pure white transparent lilies.‟379 
Having noticed these little changes, Gluck feels that he „had never felt so happy in his 
life.‟380 When the third creature, a dog, begs for water, Gluck, having little left for 
himself, almost refuses. But his heart is touched by what he has seen: „he looked 
closer and closer at it, and its eye turned on him so mournfully, that he could not 
stand it.‟381 Compelled by what he sees, Gluck gives all the water left to the dog and, 
in this way, passes the test. 
Thus unlike conventional moral stories where the evil witch always does bad 
things and ends up with a painful death, and where the brave knight always does good 
things and wins a glorious wedding, Ruskin‟s story has its own moral to tell. It shows 
how kind actions are rewarded, but it also gives moral lessons on the importance of 
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being perceptive. Virtue in The King of the Golden River has therefore multiple 
connotations. To be a virtuous person means to do good things, as well as to have a 
clear vision. Indeed, at some point „seeing‟ appears even more crucial since it is 
sensitiveness that makes Gluck sympathetic towards fellow creatures and responsive 
towards natural signs. In this sense, the success of Gluck and the happy ending of the 
bountiful valley are both ultimately due to a perceptive eye.  
In his later works, Ruskin continued to expound the importance of perception, in 
both art criticism and criticism of society. No subject better illustrates his enthusiasm 
for „seeing‟ than his aesthetic principles, and this shall be the subject of the present 
chapter. In his John Ruskin: the Argument of the Eye (1976), Robert Hewison also 
addressed Ruskin‟s aesthetic of the eye across a variety of works, and the present 
thesis is much indebted to his insights. But there is a significant difference between 
my argument and his. While Hewison tried to demonstrate that there is a consistently 
„visual dimension‟ in Ruskin‟s thinking, my thesis has a much smaller scope.382 I am 
more interested in Ruskin‟s consistent emphasis on the necessity to cultivate 
perception. Thus instead of following Hewison on „the argument of the eye,‟ I shall 
analyse in depth „the education of the eye.‟ My study in this respect consists of three 
parts. The first part shall focus on the first two volumes of Modern Painters. These 
works are generally recognised as cornerstones in Ruskin‟s career, as they introduced 
the anonymous Oxford Graduate to the public and helped him to claim his own 
authority in art criticism. Through a comparison between Ruskin and critics such as 
Rippingille, Hazlitt and Reynolds, my study will demonstrate how Ruskin 
distinguished himself from his fellow art critics with his untiring emphasis on the 
„perception of nature.‟ The aesthetic cultivation in the Modern Painters series, as I 
shall show, begins with an instruction to see: beauty, as Ruskin maintained, could be 
reached only through a close observation of nature, which was „authoritative and 
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inviolable.‟ 
The investigation of Ruskin‟s idea of perception in the artistic realm shall be 
carried on in the second part, but with a different focus. While in his fine description 
of Venetian architecture Ruskin continued to urge his audience to pay attention to 
physical details, „seeing‟ in this discourse was no longer a purely physical activity. My 
reading of passages from The Stones of Venice and related works shall therefore 
concentrate on Ruskin‟s visual-moral explications. For Ruskin, as I shall argue, to see 
properly was also to see „with a Pure Heart‟; thus the cultivations he offered to the 
audience became at once aesthetical and moral. The third part of this chapter shall 
turn to Ruskin‟s social criticism and, in particular, his criticism of industrialisation in 
„Of Queens‟ Gardens.‟ Although in this work, Ruskin did not address the issue of 
„seeing‟ in such an explicit manner as he had done in the criticisms of paintings and 
architecture, the idea of „perception,‟ in my view, still dominated his argument. While 
in his previous writings, Ruskin attached much consequence to a close examination of 
natural as well as moral truths, here, he created an ideal female, visualising the 
„beauty‟ that he had all along been extolling. This icon facilitated his criticism of 
industrialisation, but the inherent conflict between different identities of that ideal 
female also made his views about the role of aesthetic education highly ambiguous. In 
this section, I shall explore the complications in this visual embodiment and will also 
explore how, for that matter, the audience of Ruskin‟s social criticism failed to 
„perceive‟ what he had intended them to see.  
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‘The Authority of the Beautiful and the True’: Modern Painters and 
the Idea of Perception 
Shortly after Ruskin‟s first volume of Modern Painters came out in 1843, a 
reviewer from The Britannia congratulated him for having opened a new epoch. „This 
is the bold title of a bold work,‟ the reviewer said, „a general challenge to the whole 
body of cognoscenti, dilettanti, and all haranguers, essayists, and critics on the art of 
Italy, Flanders, and England, for the last hundred years.‟383 This is a generous 
compliment indeed; and in the years to come, the same judgment about Ruskin‟s 
talent would be echoed thousands of times. But I find this remark interesting for 
another reason. The courageous author of Modern Painters might have opened a new 
epoch; but, as the reviewer reminds us, he did not necessarily create a brand new 
realm. Instead, he worked along an old path that had been well trodden, a subject 
upon which many had given their opinions. The book was a „general challenge‟ 
precisely because the author had too many rivals to defeat and too many 
misconceptions to correct. 
The reviewer did not specify what he meant with labels such as cognoscenti and 
dilettanti, and, perhaps out of caution, he did not mention any names that would fit 
into those categories. But it is almost certain that he had in mind people such as 
Edward Villiers Rippingille and William Hazlitt. Both tried to educate the public in 
matters of taste and, in their own ways, the former fitted well into the group of 
„cognoscenti,‟ and the latter was well known for his „essayist‟ style. Ruskin‟s works 
also contained explicit references to both of them and, just as the reviewer said, he 
disagreed with both, criticising Hazlitt‟s amateurish description and judging 
Rippingille „all wrong.‟ Both the reviewer‟s comments and Ruskin‟s own words 
extend much critical interest to those two figures, because Ruskin‟s disagreement with 
them would eventually help to shape his own mind and, thereby, bring forward the 
most crucial message that he would offer to the audience. Considering this, the 
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present section shall begin by first of all examining the ideas of Ruskin‟s rivals. This, 
I think, will provide much insight into how Ruskin took up the subject as a „challenge‟ 
and, more importantly, how he invested his effort into the same project but did so in a 
very different manner.  
 
A Professional Campaign: Rippingille’s Aesthetic Education 
In November 1843, John Ruskin, who had just published the first volume of 
Modern Painters, experienced deep anxiety about his future career. The cause of his 
anxiety was a series of essays from The Artist and Amateur Magazine by Edward 
Villiers Rippingille. Rippingille was once an exhibition artist at the Royal Academy 
and was then trying his hand as an art critic. His art criticism is now almost forgotten, 
but at the time, it impressed many, including Ruskin. On November 30
th
, Ruskin 
confessed in his diary, in a somewhat annoyed tone and even with a slight touch of 
jealousy, that he was worried that the artist was to utter exactly the same words on the 
subject that he was long pondering. „In the Artist and Amateur I see a series of essays 
on beauty commenced,‟ said Ruskin, „which seem as if they would anticipate me 
altogether.‟384 But his anxiety did not last long. After a month‟s reading, Ruskin felt 
much relieved. It appeared that, even though Rippingille shared his interest, their 
opinions were drastically different. Thus, in the entry on December 30
th
, Ruskin 
declared with regained confidence: „Find Rippingille all wrong in his essay on beauty: 
shall have the field open.‟385 
 For a writer like Ruskin, who constantly sought to impress readers with boldness 
and originality, to admit himself to be anticipated – even if almost – was no small 
issue. Considering the fact that he had then just published the first volume of Modern 
Painters and was thinking about the second, one would naturally expect to read more 
comments on Rippingille. But further reference to that name in his writings is scarce. 
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Consequently, Rippingille is hardly mentioned in Ruskin scholarship today, and few 
would care about the above little anecdote any more. Yet, there are still many 
questions unsolved, and the answers to them are potentially enlightening. Why, for 
example, did Ruskin worry so much about being anticipated? Why did he become less 
uneasy later? Did he make any attempt to correct his rival in order to actually „have 
the field open‟? If yes, can we see that in his works? With these questions in mind, I 
think a brief return to Rippingille at this point is all too necessary, as it promises a 
context which shall be helpful to identify Ruskin‟s own concern with his voluminous 
writings on beauty and aesthetics. 
 „[M]y grand object in bringing forward this work,‟ said Rippingille in his preface 
in The Artist and Amateur Magazine, „is to open a source of information on the 
subject of arts of design, and to attempt the cultivation and refinement of the public 
taste.‟ The latter part received special emphasis as he went on, addressing his readers 
directly: 
You will ask, perhaps, Are there no such sources of information open to the 
public? Alas! if I am obliged to reply in the spirit in which it is asserted this 
work will be conducted, I must honestly confess I do not believe there is a 
single one to be found. Nothing that is offered in the way of instruction or 
comment is derived from men whose knowledge is of learned and practical 
character combined. The only efficient information which can be offered or 
obtained must come from the painter.
386
 
 
Rippingille‟s intentions were twofold. While trying to convince his readers of the 
originality of the essays, he also aimed to convince them of the competence of the 
author, not as an exhibition artist but more as a guide for public taste. Rippingille 
certainly knew his own disadvantage in the latter role. As a painter, he was generally 
known for his skill on canvas, rather than his skill with the so-called „public.‟ Thus, 
by stressing that the guides should be of „learned and practical character combined,‟ 
he was in effect justifying his calibre as a tutor. His eagerness for teaching is also 
evident in the way that he transformed the preface from a personal account into an 
interlocution between „you‟ and „I‟ – with amateur-readers on the one hand and the 
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artist-author on the other. But the most telling evidence is found several lines later, 
where Rippingille stated explicitly that he wished to „teach what is desirable‟ in order 
to prepare the public for the reception of beauty „by an appropriate education‟ in this 
realm.
387
 
 Rippingille did not the use the term „aesthetic education,‟ but that was exactly 
what he wanted to convey with his magazine. Little wonder, then, that his 
examination of beauty would finally lead to a discussion of the means of cultivation. 
Beauty consists in variety, Rippingille argued, and the „beau ideal‟ was the form 
which combined all pieces of beauty together. In order to perceive beauty in its fullest 
sense, „there was a method at hand of obtaining the knowledge required; and this was 
to pursue the study upon the principles adopted by the creation of the thing, or in the 
mode of the artists. Indeed, common sense points out there can be no other.‟388 Good 
taste, as he maintained, belonged only to those who „learn[ed] to see, think and feel in 
the manner of artists.‟389 In other words, those who wished to enjoy beauty must first 
of all familiarise themselves with the rules of artistic creation and, even more 
preferable, become artists themselves.  
The essays that followed show even more clearly how much Rippingille was 
attached to his own profession. The entire body of essays is but an elaboration of the 
central argument in the preface: that artists, or painters, to be more specific, were the 
ultimate authorities in the judgment of art. In fact, the same conviction informed 
many of Rippingille‟s other works. In 1824, he was invited to deliver lectures on the 
techniques of painting in Bristol. But half way through the lecture, Rippingille 
digressed towards the issue of the responsibility of painters. Thus according to a 
report in the Bristol Mercury, the major theme of the lecture became the importance 
of formal arts and „the little which Artists themselves have done to make the public 
acquainted with the principles of Art, especially considering the obvious good that 
must result, and the real and universally admitted want of general knowledge in it.‟390 
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More than a decade later, the audience of that lecture could still recall how the 
artist-critic struck them with „the belief that he possess[ed] a scientific knowledge of 
his profession‟ and the deepest veneration for it.391 
It would require considerable exaggeration to reduce Rippingille‟s aesthetic 
education program into an advertisement for a painting course; nonetheless, he clearly 
believed that painters like himself should have the final say on how to appreciate 
beauty. In the early nineteenth century, it was not at all uncommon to see proposals 
for aesthetic cultivation of the public intermixed with a professional campaign. In his 
Royal Academy lectures delivered in 1807, John Opie, a renowned English painter, 
also expressed a similar conviction. Why did English art and taste suffer so much 
from mediocrity? In Opie‟s view, it was simply because painters did not take up their 
share of responsibility and too often subjected their will and talent to the „wretched 
prejudices of every ignorant and tasteless individual‟ who commissioned and 
collected their works.
392
 In order to revive art and refine taste, Opie urged his fellow 
artists to come forward boldly: 
 
Keeping the true end of art in view, he must rise superior to the prejudices, 
disregard the applause, and contemn the judgment of corrupt and 
incompetent judges; far from aiming at being fashionable, it must be his 
object to reform and not to flatter; to teach and not to please.
393
 
 
„To teach and not to please,‟ to this proposal Rippingille would surely agree with all 
his heart. 
 But Ruskin had a different opinion. As he had promised in his diary, he had 
detected Rippingille‟s error and would fight back. The result was an essay contributed 
to The Artist and Amateur’s Magazine in January 1844. There Ruskin said that he 
could not agree more with Rippingille that the public should trust an „accomplished 
artist‟ rather than „the common newsmonger‟ in matters of taste. Nevertheless, there 
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was always a misgiving, he added, „whether that can really be great Art which has no 
influence whatsoever on the multitude and which is appreciable only by the initiated 
few.‟394 What troubled Ruskin was Rippingille‟s unreasonable demand on the public. 
In his view, an interest in paintings did not only belong to those who knew how to 
paint, and aesthetic sensitivity was never exclusive to people who excelled in pictorial 
arts. Knowledge of technique was helpful, but those who knew how to interpret art 
and beauty well did not have to be well informed with techniques of drawing. To 
carry out aesthetic education with the effect of turning every pupil into a painter was, 
therefore, not only a mission impossible, but also signified a narrow interpretation of 
aesthetic cultivation. If Rippingille achieved his goal, the multitude would break into 
two parts: a small group of people who acquired paintings skills and were therefore 
able to appreciate beauty; and a large group of those who could not excel in painting 
and therefore were deprived of the enjoyment of art. Even then, the issue of taste 
remained unsettled since, as Ruskin continued, „it is easy to prove that such and such 
a critic is wrong; but not so, to prove that what everybody dislikes is right.‟395  
Later, Ruskin, as the most determined supporter of Turner, was actually trying to 
prove that what many people disliked was right; but this little irony did not invalidate 
his entire argument in this particular article. His criticism of Rippingille, at this point, 
gives us much to anticipate, for he presented a different view regarding aesthetic 
education and the role of the art critic. His view was more democratised than that of 
Rippingille, and he envisioned the critic not as one who congratulated himself on 
being one of „the initiated few,‟ but as one who mediated between artists and the 
audience, a role that he tried hard to fulfil in his Modern Painters series and other art 
criticisms. Now, due to a lack of materials, there is no way to know for sure how 
contemporaries responded to the debate between Ruskin and Rippingille, though 
obviously, the latter‟s professional bias did not win him much support. Perhaps this is 
why Rippingille, for all his effort in the „cultivation and refinement of the public 
taste,‟ was never formally acknowledged as an aesthetic educator, not even as an art 
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critic. If the remark of a reviewer in The Leader could be trusted, by the 1850s, he 
was still remembered as an artist, yet „better known a quarter of a century since than 
of late years.‟396 
  
A Devotion to Classics: Hazlitt as an Aesthetic Educator 
 Another problem with Rippingille‟s statement is relatively minor. It is likely to be 
rhetorical, but he certainly exaggerated when he claimed that there was to the public 
not a single source of information about art. The truth is, just as the previously 
mentioned Britannica reviewer had said, there was a „whole body‟ of people working 
in this area. In the early nineteenth century, English readers interested in this subject 
were usually quite familiar with the name of William Hazlitt. Like Rippingille, Hazlitt 
was also Ruskin‟s rival and target of criticism; only, he would be criticised for a very 
different reason.  
Though Hazlitt was also well-trained as a painter and knew much – to borrow 
Rippingille‟s words – about how to see and think and feel as an artist, he never 
highlighted his own skills in his art criticism. Instead, he always portrayed himself as 
an enthusiastic devotee. Nothing could be more illustrative of that identity than the 
first paragraph of his „Mr. Angerstein‟s Collection of Pictures,‟ an article published in 
The London Magazine in December 1822. There Hazlitt claimed, quoting 
Shakespeare 
 
Oh! Art, lovely Art! „Balm of hurt minds, chief nourisher in life‟s feast, great 
Nature‟s second course!‟ Time‟s treasurer, the unsullied mirror of the mind of 
man! Thee we invoke, and not in vain, for we find thee here retired in thy 
plentitude and thy power!
397
 
  
The ode-like quality and the generous use of exclamation marks characterised every 
essay within that collection. Short introductions to specific paintings were invariably 
followed by long paragraphs that celebrated the beauty of art. 
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 Rippingille, for sure, was also enthusiastic about art, but there is still a 
considerable difference in terms of the identity of these two people. While Rippingille 
held dialogues with his audience in order to emphasise his own authority, Hazlitt, by 
invoking the editorial plural „we,‟ constantly identified himself as part of the general 
audience. The pronoun was of course a formality, since most of his articles first 
appeared in newspapers; but it also helped his audience to visualise the speaking 
voice as one of „us.‟ It seemed as if he, like his readers, approached paintings with 
equal wonder and admiration: „for these alone we may count upon as friends for life 
[…] As long as we have a wish for pleasure, we may find it here; for it depends only 
on our love for them, and not on theirs for us.‟398 If Rippingille gave the impression 
of being an austere master, readers of Hazlitt, hearing the voice addressing them as 
„our,‟ „we‟ and „us‟ would easily think of him as an amiable fellow visitor, only 
perhaps more knowledgeable. Thus, Hazlitt‟s authority did not rest on any 
professional training, but simply on the fact that he, like his audience, loved art, 
respected artists, and was always amazed by beauty. 
 In his evaluation of paintings, Hazlitt was also reluctant to be seen as a 
professional. Unlike Rippingille, he refused to indoctrinate his readers with artistic 
skills, but tried to find a common language that focused on artistic sensibilities. Thus 
talking about specific artworks, Hazlitt‟s speaker invariably steered away from 
theoretical or technical aspects, concentrating chiefly instead on impressions received. 
Consequently, his accounts of paintings often serve as good illustrations of 
„synesthesia.‟ For example, one painting was described as having „drawing-room air,‟ 
another sent forth „delicious breath‟ comparable to violets, and yet another had the 
effect „like the down on an unripe nectarine.‟399 In 1845, Punch, ridiculing the trend 
in art criticism, gave the following instructions to art critics: 
 
Never use the word picture; say canvas; it looks technical. Never speak of a 
picture being painted, say rather studied or handled. The following terms are 
indispensable, and may be used pretty much at random; chiaroscuro, texture, 
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pearly greys, foxy browns, cool greens, breadth, handling, medium, 
vehicle.
400
 
 
These jargons hardly appeared in Hazlitt‟s discourse. His descriptions and criticisms 
of paintings only required that the audience made use their senses as best as they 
could. If he appeared as a knowledgeable „teacher,‟ he was surely a teacher who cared 
more for the cultivation of the love of art than the cultivation of technical skill. 
 Hazlitt had his own considerations when he adopted this style. One possible 
reason was the scarcity of public art galleries at the time. During the Napoleonic Wars, 
a French critic once observed that Britain as a nation had „no centralised, dominant 
collection, despite all the acquisitions made by its private citizens who [had] naturally 
retained them for their private enjoyment.‟401 In spite of its mocking tone, the 
comment contained much truth. Most of the galleries that Hazlitt and his 
contemporary art critics visited were private. As a standard practice, these galleries 
had very limited access; usually their possessors only distributed tickets among 
friends and acquaintances, creating therefore a „favourite lounge of the nobility and 
the gentry.‟402 The National Gallery, which materialised the nation‟s determination to 
promote artistic sensibility, did not come into being until 1824, exactly the same year 
when Hazlitt‟s Sketches came out. Thus it was only too natural that art critics like 
Hazlitt – or art lovers, as he called himself – would devote themselves to an 
educational cause by first of all cultivating a general interest in paintings. 
 Hazlitt‟s understanding of art also had a clear impact upon his writings. Curiously 
enough, his passion for art was actually based on his pessimistic view about its future. 
In an article published in The Morning Chronicle on January 11, 1814, Hazlitt asked 
„why the arts are not progressive,‟ and then provided an answer. According to him, art 
was not progressive because it was already so by nature. Unlike science, which 
always pressed forward, art could never keep pace with the advancement of 
civilisation. A specific art form reached its summit immediately after it was created 
and then, inevitably, suffered from stagnation and mediocrity. As a result, 
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The greatest poets, the ablest orators, the best painter, and the finest sculptors 
that the world ever saw, appeared soon after the birth of these arts […] These 
arts, which depend on individual genius and incommunicable power, have 
always leaped at once from infancy to manhood, from the first rude dawn of 
invention to their meridian height and dazzling lustre, and have in general 
declined ever after.
403
 
 
Hazlitt believed that nothing could alter this tendency. He remembered well how, as a 
young painter, he had closely examined great works, completely dazzled, „with 
wondering and with longing eyes,‟ feeling that „a new heaven and a new earth stood 
before me.‟404 His comments on contemporary painters reflected the same cult of 
genius. When praising Turner (though not without some reservations about his 
„morbid strength‟) in 1814, he expressed the wish that „this gentleman would always 
work in the trammels of Claude or N. Poussin.‟405 Later in his career, Hazlitt 
continued to appear dazzled; hence the style of his Sketches. In this sense, he appeared 
less as an art critic but more as a fellow visitor, because he wished to introduce to his 
audience that „meridian height,‟ and to convey the gratification he himself had 
received from those ingenious works. 
 The style of a fellow visitor, however, did not win universal approval. For one 
thing, the emphasis on emotional reactions prevented the author from developing a 
theoretical framework. As Claire Wildsmith has suggested in her recent study, this 
was a weakness that Hazlitt shared with many of his fellow art critics.
406
 But more 
serious charges came from Hazlitt‟s contemporaries, who, as early as the 1820s, had 
questioned his competency. A reviewer in the 1823 issue of The Gentleman’s 
Magazine believed that his Sketches did not meet the high expectation of the 
audience:  
 
On opening this volume we anticipated much information. But how great was 
our surprise on its perusal, to find that instead of containing some rich stores 
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of information, it abounded with reflections, the generality of which have not 
the least reference to the subject. We imagined that in this volume we should 
find a useful guide to the places noticed; but […] it furnishes but few 
descriptions; and even these are overloaded with the spirit of Essay 
writing.
407
 
 
Of course, it is not entirely fair to say that Hazlitt‟s Sketches had „not the least 
reference to the subject,‟ since he wrote extensively about some precious collections. 
Besides, when the reviewer asked for „a useful guide to the places noticed,‟ he seemed 
to have mistaken Hazlitt for a guide in the most literal sense of the word – a guide that 
knows every practical thing about places of interest, and never forgets to mention 
useful tips, such as the opening and closing times of galleries. In spite of all these 
possible misrepresentations, however, the reviewer did make his point when he 
complained about Hazlitt‟s „reflections,‟ „generality‟ and, above all, „the spirit of 
Essay writing‟ – a genre that had been noted for being personal and digressive ever 
since its creation by Montaigne. Too concentrated on impressions and enthusiasm, 
Hazlitt‟s writings did not attempt an objective description or assessment of artworks. 
Upon finishing his book, one would not know, for instance, what a painting looks like 
or even what it is about. Twenty years later, if we recall the quotation mentioned 
above, the same opinion of Hazlitt as an „essayist‟ would appear again in a review of 
Ruskin. Many modern critics also find it hard to dismiss this judgment. Hence 
Graham Hough‟s comment that „Hazlitt's art criticisms are genial and sympathetic, 
but generate more warmth than light; painting was to him a region of happy 
day-dreams, and his writing about it is an attempt to recreate this “sober certainty of 
waking bliss.”‟408 
 Apart from this, Hazlitt‟s accuracy was also called into question. In the first 
volume of Modern Painters, Ruskin criticised Hazlitt for making that comparison 
between skilfully painted trees to „the down on an unripe nectarine,‟ which, according 
to Ruskin, was a very careless observation. Concerning Hazlitt‟s reputation, an 
episode from George Eliot‟s Middlemarch might also be of some interest. The heroine 
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Dorothea Brooke is kind, graceful and knowledgeable. But the lack of aesthetic 
education in her upbringings prevents her from deciphering artworks properly: she 
regards great paintings with awe but finds them lifeless; when travelling alone in 
Rome, she even feels that the city of visible history oppresses her with „stupendous 
fragmentariness.‟409 The real fault, according to the narrator – who is to some extent 
identifiable with George Eliot herself - is not to be found with Dorothea, but with the 
entire cultural environment. Looking back to the 1830s, the narrator regrets the 
English public‟s general lack of knowledge in art. In order to demonstrate the 
seriousness of this ignorance, she singles out a „most brilliant English critic of the 
day,‟ who once „mistook the flower-flushed tomb of the ascended virgin for an 
ornamental vase.‟410 This critic, it turns out, is Hazlitt. A blunder like that, as Eliot 
suggests with this example from Christian art, not only contributes to the poor 
knowledge of art among the English public; worse still, it is also morally devastating 
since ignorance in art could make people superficial believers, who memorise 
doctrines but remain blind to the most obvious symbols. 
 
‘Authoritative and Inviolable’: Perception, Nature and Ruskin’s 
Aesthetic Education 
  From the very beginning of his career, Ruskin emerged as an aesthetic educator 
who would devote all his energy to the cause of „correction.‟ In the preface to the first 
edition of the first volume of Modern Painters, he asserted that „the work now laid 
before the public‟ shall function as a corrective power: 
 
When public taste seems plunging deeper and deeper into degradation day by 
day, and when the press universally exerts such power as it possesses to 
direct the feeling of the nation more completely to all that is theatrical, 
affected and false in art; […] it becomes the imperative duty of all who have 
any perception of knowledge in art, and any desire for its advancement in 
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England, to come fearlessly forward […] to declare and demonstrate, 
wherever they exist, the essence and the authority of the Beautiful and the 
True.
411
 
 
This is a very interesting assertion – in both what it expresses and the way it is 
expressed. To some extent, Ruskin saw himself as a comrade of Rippingille and 
Hazlitt, since they were all concerned with cultivating public taste. But he seemed to 
have more confidence with the task than either one of them. The opening summary of 
the present „universal degradation‟ and phrases such as „imperative duty‟ and „come 
fearlessly forward‟ closely imitated the tone of a declaration of war; and to declare a 
war was exactly what the author of Modern Painters intended to do. He was not a 
Hazlittian guide, who went around galleries and pointed out lovely things with much 
enthusiasm. The Ruskinian guide was, by contrast, a combatant repelled by the 
„degradation‟ of taste. With all sternness and courage, he approached the subject in 
order to instruct the public and to lead them, yet not necessarily to befriend them. 
When talking about particular paintings, the preface also tends to highlight the 
seriousness of intention and the endeavour at „consistency,‟ thus drawing a clear line 
between Modern Painters and Hazlitt‟s essayist style.412  
On the other hand, Ruskin also differed from the professional ideal of Rippingille. 
Putting himself against both the „public‟ and the „press,‟ Ruskin distanced himself 
from both the general audience and professional artists, who, like Rippingille, 
contributed articles to newspapers and journals in order to make their voices heard. 
The only quality the speaker possessed, then, was a „perception of knowledge in art,‟ 
a quality which, like the anonymous „Graduate of Oxford,‟ suggested the author‟s 
competency and, yet, was by no means exclusive to professionals. It is also worth 
noting that, although the speaker referred to himself as an anonymous combatant 
among all who had some knowledge in art, he did not regard himself as in any way 
inferior to the professionals who were then dominating the area. Conferring 
„authority‟ to abstract ideas of „beauty‟ and „truth‟ rather than to any individual, he in 
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effect showed himself to be on equal terms with anyone who claimed to work for the 
cause of aesthetic cultivation: nature and beauty became by themselves the lawgivers, 
and anyone who discussed art was simply explaining the law and testifying to its 
power. 
Out of a passion for his ideal beauty, Ruskin waged wars against the „theatrical, 
affected and false,‟ and many have surmised about the origin of this aesthetic 
preference. As some critics have pointed out, this had much to do with Turner.
413
 
Many people at the time disliked Turner‟s lack of form and finish. His Snow Storm, 
exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1842, for example, was once described as „a mass 
of soapsuds and whitewash.‟414  Later, Ruskin quoted this comment with much 
indignation, because he believed, as Turner himself believed, that the painting was a 
truthful record of nature. Here, in Modern Painters, which was formerly entitled 
Turner and the Ancients, Ruskin‟s disparagement of the theatrical, the affected and the 
false appeared very likely to be another gallant defence of his favourite painter. 
 Meanwhile, I would also like to suggest that a personal letter by Ruskin from 
1841 provides further insights into the origin of his aesthetic principles. Writing to his 
Oxford friend Edward Clayton, Ruskin described a revelation he had received during 
his drawing practice. When he first learnt to draw, he said,  
 
I used to think a picturesque or beautiful tree was hardly to be met with once 
a month; I cared for nothing but oaks a thousand years old, split by lightning 
or shattered by wind, or made up for my worship‟s edification in some 
particular and distinguished way.  
 
Now, however, that conviction was completely overturned. By contrast, 
 
there is not a twig in the closest-clipt hedge that grows, that I cannot admire, 
and wonder at, and take pleasure in, and learn from. I think one tree very 
nearly as good as another, and all a thousand times more beautiful than I once 
did my picked ones, but I admire those more than I could then, tenfold.
415
 
 
                                                        
413 Hewison 65. 
414 Ruskin Works, 13 162. 
415 Ruskin, „A Letter from Naples,‟ Works, 1 471. 
 169 
This is an ardent celebration of ordinary details of nature and the power of perception. 
Beauty, as Ruskin explained, was to be acquired neither through professional skills, as 
Rippingille argued, nor through studies of antiquity, as Hazlitt recommended. As a 
matter of fact, the above passage might even lead us to question the quite popular 
impression of a „Romantic Ruskin.‟ For instance, John D. Rosenberg once remarked 
that Ruskin in Modern Painters, writing of nature through imaginative interpretations, 
was „very much a Romantic.‟416 Here, however, the purposefully kept distance from 
„oaks a thousand years old,‟ the „lightning‟ and the „wind‟ serves as reminder that, 
even if Ruskin could be termed a „Romantic,‟ he was nonetheless a very different 
Romantic from, say, Hazlitt. While the latter spent pages and pages in describing the 
passions aroused by great art, Ruskin was deeply fascinated by realistic details of life. 
It is true that he also sang high praise of imagination (a point which I shall discuss 
later in this chapter), but imagination for him could never be detached from a close 
observation of objective reality. Thus in spite of its picturesqueness and beauty, a tree 
of a thousand years old was not in any way superior to an ordinary twig; and to strive 
after dramatic forms, in Ruskin‟s opinion, would not lead one towards a 
comprehensive understanding of genuine beauty. Only a clear perception of the most 
ordinary details of nature revealed the truly beautiful. Understood in this way, the 
letter offers some important hints about what Ruskin meant by the „theatrical, affected, 
and false‟ and, once again, it highlights the importance of perception in his aesthetic 
teachings. 
 Ruskin‟s emphasis on perception also registers his disagreement with another 
distinguished art critic, namely, Sir Joshua Reynolds. Though a man of the eighteenth 
century, Reynolds was still an object of reverence in the Victorian era. Not only did 
sales of his paintings cause sensations in newspapers; his ideas of beauty and art were 
also widely discussed and, for that matter, elicited much admiration. In 1843, the 
same year as Rippingille published his essays on beauty and Ruskin started his critical 
enterprise, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine published a series of articles 
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commemorating Reynolds‟ Discourses. In his conclusion, the author asked, 
rhetorically, what benefits Reynolds had given to the world with his works, and the 
answer was „great.‟ The most valuable part, according to the author, was his 
recognition of art as a source of intellectual pleasure, a habitat for „men of wit and 
wisdom.‟ Thus the essence of Reynolds‟ argument, as the author interpreted it, was the 
significance of art for the development of mental power.
417
 
 This intellectualistic view of art led Reynolds to prefer general ideas to details. In 
the Ninth Discourse, he argued that 
 
The art which we profess has beauty for its object; this it is our business to 
discover and to express; but the beauty of which we are in quest is general 
and intellectual: it is an idea that subsists only in the mind; the sight never 
beheld it, nor has the hand expressed it; it is an idea residing in the breast of 
the artists, which he is always labouring to impart […] which he is yet so far 
able to communicate, as to raise the thoughts, and to extend the view of the 
spectator.
418
 
 
The idea that art embodies beauty „general and intellectual‟ suggests Reynolds‟ 
indebtedness to Enlightenment thinkers, for whom rationality and the ideal form 
constituted the supreme laws not only of art but, more importantly, of human life. 
Reynolds then continued to bring forward his concept of „grand style.‟ „Grand style,‟ 
as he explained, referred to „ideal beauty […] superior to what [was] to be found in 
individual nature‟ and, thereby, stood in clear contrast to „minute neatness‟ of 
abundance and variety.
419
 
 Ruskin was quite familiar with the ideas of Reynolds, whom he always referred 
to as a great painter and leader in the School of Art in England.
420
 But his high regard 
did not prevent him from articulating his disagreement. In the first volume of Modern 
Painters, we find the following words: 
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[I]t is carelessly and falsely said that general ideas are more important than 
particular ones; carelessly and falsely, I say, because the so-called general 
idea is important, not because it is common to all the individuals of that 
species, but it separates that species from everything else. It is the 
distinctiveness, not the universality of the truth, which renders it 
important.
421
 
 
Concerning Ruskin‟s quarrel with Reynolds, critics have provided various 
interpretations. John D. Rosenberg, for instance, reads the conflict as one between the 
Classicists‟ celebration of ideal and the Romantics‟ submission to experience, and 
blames Ruskin for showing a bias against classicism.
422
 Claire Wildsmith, on the 
other hand, maintains that the quarrel reveals in fact how „the ideals of civic 
humanism‟ are challenged by the discourse of modern political economy that puts 
increasing emphasis on free trade and individuality.
423
 I interpret the conflict in a 
different way. Implicit in his audacious criticism of Reynolds is, I think, Ruskin‟s 
conviction about the importance of seeing. While Reynolds believed that a resourceful 
mind produced great art, Ruskin insisted that only those with quick perceptions could 
grasp beauty: it is the distinctiveness, not universality, that constitutes the most 
essential element of aesthetic quality. In other words, to have a genuine aesthetic 
experience was first of all to perceive the finest details in nature. Several years later, 
his belief in seeing would culminate in this memorable quotation: „The greatest thing 
a human soul ever does in this world,‟ Ruskin said in the third volume of Modern 
Painters, „is to see something and tell what it saw in a plain way. Hundreds of people 
can talk for one who can think, but thousands can think for one who can see. To see 
clearly is poetry, prophecy and religion, all in one.‟424 
 Nevertheless, it would be a complete misunderstanding if we thus conclude that 
Ruskin was simply a devotee to that realistic nature. Throughout the first volume of 
Modern Painters, he appeared as an individual that towered over everyone that 
surrounded him, amateurs and artists alike. Sometimes he even towered over nature 
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itself. Talking about paintings of foliage, Ruskin compared other painters with J. D. 
Harding, and found the latter much superior. But according to him, the superiority of 
Harding did not consist in his skilful representation. Instead of showing how 
wonderful Harding‟s artistic execution was, Ruskin introduced him with a command: 
„Let us refresh ourselves for a moment, by looking at the truth.‟425 Following a brief 
description of how a truthful representation of foliage looked like, the whole 
paragraph concluded: „this is nature, and beauty, too.‟426 A curious effect arose from 
this claim. Had Ruskin uttered the same words in a gallery in front of the actual 
painting, few people would fail to associate beauty and truth with the genius of the 
painter and the wonder of nature. But here, with only the book, the audience had 
neither the picture nor natural scenery to consult. Although they could always resort to 
their memory and imagination, it was still Ruskin‟s language that provided an 
immediate representation of beauty and truth – not the painter, and not even nature 
itself. When he asserted that „this is nature, and beauty, too,‟ he could have been 
referring to Harding‟s work or to the actual trees; but in effect, he was calling 
attention to his own descriptions. As a result, the verbal reproduction of painting and 
nature had the potential of becoming their substitute; and, thus, Ruskin the speaker 
rivalled both painter and nature as a conveyor of truth.  
 Elsewhere, after giving a detailed analysis of the „whole mass and multitude‟ of 
foliage, Ruskin also commanded his audience in a similar manner: „Now, with thus 
much of nature in your mind, go to Gaspar Poussin‟s view near Albano, in the 
National Gallery.‟427 Helsinger reads this as an expression of Ruskin‟s wish to have 
his paragraph hung up as a painting next to Poussin‟s in order to have a competition. 
But I think Ruskin was more ambitious than that. Once again, that „much of nature‟ 
did not come from nature itself but, more immediately, from his own words. Thus 
when he asserted that the „laws of the organisation of the earth are distinct and fixed 
as those of the animal frame, simpler and broader, but equally authoritative and 
inviolable,‟ he emphasised the inviolability of both natural principles and, perhaps 
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more so, his own authority as an aesthetic educator.
428
 Confident that he had the truth 
of nature in his hand, Ruskin asked the audience to remember his words as laws and, 
when they were standing in front the painting in the National Gallery, to compare it 
closely with his words in order to see which parts were duly observed and which, to 
the detriment of the painter, were ignored. While previously in the case of Harding, 
Ruskin the speaker appeared to be a potential conveyor of truth; here, he stood out 
more boldly as a formidable interpreter of the beauty of nature. This confidence 
reached its summit when Ruskin praised Turner:  
 
Turner – glorious in conception – unfathomable in knowledge – solitary in 
power – with the elements waiting upon his will, and the night and the 
morning obedient to his call, sent as a prophet of God to reveal to men the 
mysteries of His universe, standing, like the great angel of the Apocalypse, 
clothed with a cloud, and with a rainbow upon his head, and with the sun and 
stars given into this hand.
429
 
 
There is little surprise, indeed, that a description like this would be accused by John 
Eagles in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine as „blaspheming Divine attributes.‟430 
Upon a second glance, however, one cannot help but wonder whether or not the figure 
standing in the centre of this blasphemous canvas was actually Ruskin himself. After 
all, Turner was only an inspiration and he never actually spoke in Modern Painters. 
All along, it was Ruskin the aesthetic educator, who, talking passionately about the 
mysteries of universe and the laws of nature, impressed the audience with conceptions 
which were glorious and elevating, with knowledge which was wide and 
unfathomable, as well as a power which was astonishingly „authoritative and 
inviolable.‟ 
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Perceiving ‘with a Pure Heart’: Imagination and Morality in 
Ruskin’s Aesthetic Education 
 
Modern Painters II: From ‘Perception’ to ‘Imagination’ 
 According to many Ruskin scholars, the first volume of Modern Painters was a 
success upon its publication. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, the editors of the 
Library Edition of The Complete Works of Ruskin, quote extensively from 
publications such as The Weekly Chronicle, The Gentleman’s Magazine and even 
Rippingille‟s The Artist and Amateur’s Magazine, all of which lauded the efforts of 
the Oxford Graduate.
431
 Ruskin‟s biographer Tim Hilton also mentions favourable 
comments by literary celebrities, such as William Wordsworth, George Eliot, 
Elizabeth Browning and Charlotte Brontë.
432
 But I find the materials that Hilton 
quotes are somewhat dubious. Wordsworth asked a friend to borrow the book because 
he thought it too expensive and, therefore, not worthwhile to purchase a copy for 
himself. He never mentioned the book afterwards. Eliot and Brontë both spoke 
warmly of Modern Painters; however, their comments are dated 1858 and 1848 
respectively, by which time Ruskin had published other volumes. So it is very likely 
that Eliot and Brontë referred not specifically to the first volume of Modern Painters. 
Apart from this, Hilton is also seriously mistaken when he says that „[n]either the 
Athenaeum nor Blackwood’s seemed to be aware of its publication.‟433 Both, in fact, 
produced immediate responses. The review in the former was written by George 
Darley in January 1844, and the author of Blackwood’s review, which came out in 
October 1843, was John Eagles.
434
 Interestingly, both reviewers were highly critical. 
Eagles, whose quotation appears at the end of the previous chapter, absolutely 
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disliked Ruskin‟s praise of Turner, which he found „fulsome‟ and „nonsensical.‟435 
Darley ridiculed Ruskin‟s defence of Turner, too, but focused particularly on the 
author‟s youthful yet immature „mental power.‟ According to him, the author of the 
first volume of Modern Painters wrote with sensations only, demonstrating too little 
real power of logic and no „higher qualities of reasoning.‟436  
 Considering the prominence of these two publications, Ruskin could not have 
missed these comments. He probably did not enjoy them. But, as is always the case, 
criticism made a more significant impact than praise. In a letter from October 1844, 
Ruskin told his friend Henry Liddell about his own opinion of the first volume. His 
tone was exaggeratedly self-deprecating and, in some ways, echoed the criticism he 
had received: „There is a nasty, snappish, impatient, half-familiar, half-claptrap web of 
young-mannishness everywhere. This was, perhaps, to be expected from the haste in 
which I wrote.‟ From there he continued: „I‟m going to try for better things; for a 
serious, quiet, earnest and simple manner.‟437 Then, about one year later, he finished 
the second volume, which was clearly intended to be not only a sequel but also an 
improvement to the previous one. 
 The second volume distinguished itself from the first one in two aspects. First, it 
attempted at theorisation, and, secondly, it incorporated a stronger ethical undertone. 
While the first volume highlighted „perception,‟ especially the perception of natural 
objects, the second volume featured metaphysical thinking about perception, along 
with an emphasis on the moral consequences. In the first volume, Ruskin was mainly 
concerned with educating the senses. To have the organ of perception, he maintained, 
was not the same as to perceive things. Anyone who had eyes and ears could receive 
impressions from nature, but those without properly educated senses received nothing 
but forms and sounds. Only those who had properly cultivated senses could fully 
comprehend beauty. Thus Ruskin warned his audience: „[U]ntil the cultivation has 
been bestowed, and until the instrument thereby perfected has been employed in a 
consistent series of careful observations, it is as absurd as it is audacious to pretend to 
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form any judgment whatsoever respecting the truth of art.‟438  
 Later, Ruskin continued to regard sharp senses as a most important prerequisite in 
aesthetic experience, but his view about qualification underwent some significant 
changes. Over time, he would adopt the belief that competent judges of art were not 
only those who possessed highly developed senses; they must also have a sound 
metaphysical ground, a „principle‟ of their own. This conviction had already been 
expressed in the 1844 preface to the second edition of the first volume of Modern 
Painters. There Ruskin addressed a question partly to the audience and partly to 
himself: „[W]hat respect,‟ he asked, „could be due to a writer who pretended to 
criticise and classify the works of great painters of landscape, without developing, or 
even alluding to, one single principle of the beautiful or sublime?‟439 To develop a 
metaphysical principle of beauty was precisely what Ruskin intended to do in the 
second volume. In the same letter to Liddell, Ruskin earnestly sought advice after his 
self disparagement: 
 
can you tell me of any works which it is necessary I should read on a subject 
which has given me great trouble – the essence and operation of the 
imagination as it is concerned with art? Who is the best metaphysician who 
has treated the subject generally, and do you recollect any passages into Plato 
or other of the Greeks particularly bearing upon it?
440
 
 
So, Ruskin, at this stage, began to think about another type of perception: imagination. 
The result of his inquiry was to be found in the second volume, where he explained 
the truthfulness of art: 
 
It is the habit of most observers to regard art as representative of matter, and 
to look only for the entireness of representation; and it was to this view of art 
that I limited the arguments of the former sections of the present work, 
wherein, having to oppose the conclusions of a criticism entirely based upon 
the realistic system, I was compelled to meet that criticism on its own 
grounds. But the greater parts of works of art, more especially those devoted 
to the expression of ideas of beauty, are the results of the agency of the 
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imagination.
441
 
 
The criticism, „entirely based upon the realistic system,‟ was a clear reference to those 
unfavourable comments on Turner. Ruskin‟s single-minded defence of Turner as a 
painter of nature – his eagerness to „meet that criticism on its own grounds,‟ as he said 
– offered him little chance to address the issue in the first volume. Indeed, one who 
reads that volume on its own might gain the impression that Ruskin was only 
interested in seeing the world, literally, as it is. But here, as the letter and the second 
volume demonstrate, he also had in mind a different order of perception as well as a 
different order of truth. 
 But this should not lead to the assumption that imagination, for Ruskin, was 
completely separated from seeing. As a reply to the question in the letter, Liddell, 
being an expert on Greek, recommended Aristotle. The advice was brilliant, for 
Aristotle was among the first philosophers who drew connections between 
imagination and visual powers. According to Aristotle, the ancient Greek word 
„imagination‟ (phantasia) originally meant „light‟ (phaos), because „without light it is 
impossible to see.‟442 The etymological connection between imagining and seeing 
might explain why Ruskin could so readily embrace Aristotle‟s argument and 
incorporate the concept of imagination into his own theory of perception. Moreover, 
the emphasis on seeing is also inherent in Ruskin‟s theory of imagination. Instead of 
offering a rounded definition, Ruskin approached the concept of imagination by first 
of all classifying it into different orders. The imaginative faculty, as he explained, 
consisted of three orders: penetrative, associative and contemplative, each interacting 
with one another. Associative imagination combined materials in order to create new 
forms, the contemplative regarded and treated the newly created form in „peculiar 
ways,‟ while the penetrative helped to reveal truths which were otherwise invisible.443 
All of these functions, according to Ruskin, were meant to be an enhancement of 
visual perceptions. „The virtue of Imagination,‟ he concluded, „is its reaching, by 
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intuition and intensity of gaze (not by reasoning, but by its authoritative opening and 
revealing power), a more essential truth than is seen at the surface of things.‟444 Thus 
even for those who are less interested in the metaphysical aspect of Modern Painters, 
it is hard to ignore the author‟s attempt to elaborate the concept of „perception‟ and his 
striving after a theoretical framework that could compensate for the looseness of his 
previous treatment of art. 
 
‘The Pure in Heart’: Morality and Aesthetic Experience 
 With „imagination,‟ Ruskin did not only construct his own metaphysical 
principles of perception. The concept also embodied an ethical concern, which is 
another subject downplayed in the first volume of Modern Painters. „There is a 
reciprocal action between the intensity of moral feeling and the power of 
imagination,‟ Ruskin asserted in the second volume, for „those who have keenest 
sympathy are those who look closest and pierce deepest, and hold securest; and on the 
other, those who have so pierced and seen the melancholy deeps of things are filled 
with the most intense passion and gentleness of sympathy.‟445 The best illustration of 
this „reciprocal‟ relationship came from Ruskin himself, in fact three years before he 
wrote down the above words: The King and the Golden River, as we should remember, 
presented essentially the same argument. The youngest brother manages to save the 
village and the family, precisely because he possesses both the „gentleness of 
sympathy‟ and the ability to „look closest.‟ If the dictum that perception revealed truth 
still held ground, that truth, as Ruskin insisted, must be physical as well as moral. 
Likewise, to grasp truth meant more than an accurate observation of external reality; it 
also implied that people should cultivate a „keenest sympathy‟ in order to penetrate 
the truth of the inner world.  
In order to better describe the reciprocity between perception and morality, 
Ruskin in the second volume of Modern Painters introduced the word „theoria.‟ 
                                                        
444 Ruskin, Works, 4 228. 
445 Ruskin, Works, 4 257. 
 179 
Etymologically, the word means perception; and yet, more literally, it also means 
„looking at.‟ Ruskin put the word side by side with „aesthesis‟ and provided his own 
redefinition of the two. Both words, according to him, denoted sensual perceptions, 
but the perceptions they referred to were of different orders. Whereas theoria referred 
to sensual gratification offered by spiritual experience, aesthesis was the gratification 
of animal pleasure. 
 
For we do indeed see constantly that men having naturally acute perceptions 
of the beautiful, yet not receiving it with a pure heart, nor into their hearts at 
all, never comprehend, yet not receive good from it, but make it a mere 
minister to their desires, and accompaniment and seasoning of lower sensual 
pleasures, until all their emotions take the same earthly stamp, and the sense 
of beauty sinks into the servant of lust.
446
 
 
Here lies another major modification of Ruskin‟s previous argument. In the first 
volume, he was concerned only with emphasising the importance of „acuteness.‟ The 
sharper the senses were, the better people comprehend the beauty of nature and art. 
Here, however, acuteness was no longer the sole criteria. Rather than talking about the 
importance of senses in general, Ruskin now differentiated between various orders of 
sensual pleasures. While previously, there was only a contrast between bluntness and 
acuteness; now, as Ruskin emphasised, it was also important to aspire to higher 
sensual pleasures – in fact, it was more important, since acuteness did not guarantee 
higher sensual pleasure. If the senses were simply employed for the gratification of 
lower pleasures, aesthetic enjoyment, as Ruskin reminded his readers, was bound to 
turn into lust.  
In fact, as his argument continued, „the pure heart‟ overtook „acuteness‟ as the 
more crucial criterion. Immediately after the definition of „theoria,‟ Ruskin turned to 
contemporary life in order to show how horrible the world would become – to some 
extent, had already become – if a desire for beauty was not accompanied by a pure 
heart. A „heartless‟ civilisation, Ruskin alleged, gave rise to corruption only, where 
„„men build palaces, plant groves, and gather luxuries, that they and their devices may 
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hang in the corners of the world like fine-spun cobwebs, with greedy, puffed-up, 
spider-like lusts in the middle.‟447 At a later stage of his career, Ruskin frequently 
addressed the corruption of contemporary society, and this shall be the topic of the 
next section of this chapter. For now, it is my main intention to point out how 
intrinsically Ruskin‟s concern with morality was intermixed with his principles of 
beauty. The cultivation of taste, as he envisioned, involved both an aesthetic 
cultivation and a moral one; and, most importantly, these two goals were not 
separable.  
It is also necessary to add that the „heart‟ was deeply Christian. As George P. 
Landow has noted, the development of Ruskin‟s aesthetics was representative of the 
development of his thought and writings about religion.
448
 His Evangelical 
upbringing had a lifelong impact on his writings. According to many scholars, his 
faith dwindled as time moved on until finally, in 1858, the experience of 
„un-conversion‟ announced his loss of faith.449 Yet in the early 1840s, when Ruskin 
wrote the first two volumes of Modern Painters, his Evangelical faith was clearly still 
robust. In the first volume, we read the following words on the use of colour: „The 
hue,‟ Ruskin says, 
 
is a beautiful auxiliary in working out the great impression to be conveyed, 
but is not the source nor the essence of that impression; it is little more than a 
visible melody, given to raise and assist the mind in the reception of nobler 
ideas – as sacred passages of sweet sound, to prepare the feelings for the 
reading of the mysteries of God.
450
 
 
So, colours are no longer tools which assist individual painters to demonstrate their 
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ingenuity and communicate their personal impressions. They become, instead, an 
„auxiliary‟ for divine wisdom. A truly perceptive eye sees through different colours 
and shades a divine meaning; conversely, to perceive colours properly, one must also 
be ready for „the reception of nobler ideas‟ by elevating one‟s concern from visible 
facts to moral laws. 
 The same argument appeared again in the second volume. There, Ruskin 
identified the conflict between lower sensual pleasure and the pleasure of „theoria‟ as 
one between the Heathen and the Christian. The Heathen writers, in Ruskin‟s view, 
always leant towards a sensual pleasure in external nature. They loved the pleasant 
feel of „violet couch‟ and „ringing streamlet,‟ but could never comprehend the beauty 
of „bare mountains‟ and „ghostly glen.‟ The Christians, by contrast, derived aesthetic 
pleasure from all that was created by God; for them, to have aesthetic experience is 
„with clear and unoffended sight beholding Him for ever.‟451 The whole chapter 
ended with a quotation from the Gospel of Matthew: „Blessed are the pure in heart, 
for they shall see God‟ (Matthew 5:8). This biblical quotation appears to have been 
quite popular in nineteenth-century sermons. Indeed, if we read Ruskin‟s argument 
backwards, that is to say, start from the quotation and then proceed to the analysis of 
beauty, theoria and imagination, it is difficult to miss the sermon-like style.  
Nevertheless, Ruskin‟s interpretation of this quotation was somehow different 
from that of many other preachers. To take some examples: Purity of heart, as one 
preacher proclaimed, meant purity in conduct; it made people acceptable to God and, 
in that way, enabled them to see Him and to embrace His teachings.
452
 For another, 
pure heart, as an essential quality of Christians, denoted mercifulness, while to see 
God was the „blessed privilege‟ awarded to the true disciples.453 Ruskin, however, 
was concerned not only with morality but also with aesthetics. While the Evangelical 
part of him preached more or less the same doctrine as other preachers, the artistic 
part of him continued to be occupied not with good deeds but with the pleasures of 
seeing. Later, in Praeterita, he recalled how he began his early Bible reading under 
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his mother‟s supervision and, in particular, how the „evangelical faith […] placed me, 
as soon as I could conceive or think, in the presence of an unseen world.‟454 This 
comment, perhaps unintentionally, reflected Ruskin‟s twofold mentalities. For the rest 
of his career, Ruskin engaged himself with the job of making that „unseen‟ world 
visible to all, looking for divine wisdom in every detail in nature, in art as well as in 
the human heart. The reciprocity of Evangelical doctrines and aesthetic principles 
adds an aesthetic dimension to Ruskin‟s religious ideas; yet, in the present context of 
reading his Modern Painters as aesthetic education, it also sheds light on the ethical 
concerns in Ruskin‟s thinking about beauty. 
 
The Stones of Venice: Allegorical Readings and Morality 
 After the second volume of Modern Painters was published, Ruskin travelled to 
the Continent in 1845 and again in 1846. This was not the first time he had travelled 
abroad. His first extensive trip to the Continent dates back to 1833. As a boy of 
fourteen, he had travelled to France, Switzerland and Italy with his parents, following 
the route inspired by Samuel Prout‟s sketches. What the parents prepared for Ruskin 
was something close to the Grand Tour, a tradition that originated in the seventeenth 
century as a form of education, with much emphasis on the cultivation of not only the 
intellect but also aesthetic sensibilities. Thus young men from aristocratic families 
spent months, even years, on a preset itinerary across the Continent, roaming in 
galleries and museums, observing foreign cultures, and socialising with the learned 
and the noble. In the nineteenth century, as the middle classes prospered and the 
means of transportation improved, the Grand Tour became no longer the privilege of 
aristocrats. The trips of the Ruskins, in this sense, were much in accordance with the 
trend of the age.  
However, the fact that Samuel Prout inspired the trip reveals something peculiar 
about this family of tourists, especially the young Ruskin. Ruskin admired Prout, of 
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whom he said later: „of all our modern school of landscape painters, next to Turner, 
and before the rise of the Pre-Raphaelites, the man whose works are on the whole 
most valuable, and show the highest intellect, is Samuel Prout.‟455 But Prout was not 
just a landscape painter of foliage, clouds and water. He specialised in the so-called 
„manmade landscape,‟ that is paintings of architecture. This also happened to be of 
interest to Ruskin, one of whose earliest publications was a series of essays called The 
Poetry of Architecture. Hence there was little wonder that Prout‟s sketches, which 
consisted of drawings of market buildings and monuments, could ignite young 
Ruskin‟s desire to travel. When Ruskin visited the Continent again in 1845 and 1846, 
architecture continued to be the theme of his tour. His exploration crystallised into the 
three-volume The Stones of Venice, published during 1851 and 1853. The book is a 
brilliant account of Venetian architecture; yet, it is also, as I shall show in the 
following discussion, a fine specimen of Ruskin‟s moral-aesthetic teachings. 
Like Modern Painters, The Stones of Venice also highlighted the importance of 
accurate perception. To recognise that emphasis, one does not even have to delve into 
the main body of the book, for the chapter titles are already telling enough. A great 
part of the first volume is devoted to the study of „walls,‟ with each chapter focusing 
on a specific aspect of that subject. Thus Chapter Four, for instance, is about „the wall 
base,‟ which is then followed by chapters on „the wall veil,‟ „the wall cornice,‟ „the 
pier base,‟ „the shaft‟ and so on. So instead of talking about walls in general, Ruskin 
divided the subject as close as possible. His descriptions are to some extent 
comparable to a magnifying glass, which helps readers to see details with high 
precision. Although he alleged in the preface to the first edition of The Stones of 
Venice that „it is not easy to be accurate in account of anything,‟ accuracy was 
nevertheless the very quality he strived for – both for himself and for his readers.  
The stress on accuracy is also reflected in Ruskin‟s illustrations. The quantity 
alone is impressive enough. In 1846, when he was busy with the preparation of 
materials on Venetian architectures, his father wrote to W. H. Harrison, a family friend, 
that the son would not have time for poetry or painting because he spent all his time 
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on something else: 
 
He is cultivating Art at present searching for real knowledge but to you and 
me this knowledge is at present a Sealed Book. It will neither take the shape 
of picture or poetry. It is gathered in scraps hardly wrought for he is drawing 
perpetually but no drawing such as in former days you and I might 
compliment in the usual way by saying it deserved a frame – but fragments 
of everything from a Cupola to a Cartwheel but in such bits that it is to the 
common eye a mass of Hieroglyphics – all true – truth itself but Truth in 
mosaic.
456
 
 
The father, who had always enjoyed Ruskin‟s poetry and paintings and secretly 
wished that he would become a poet, was now perplexed by the son‟s new 
engagement. He knew Ruskin was gathering knowledge about art, but scraps of 
drawings of Cupola and Cartwheel certainly made no sense to him. Yet his letter 
serves as a witness to the progress of Ruskin‟s study of Venetian architecture. The 
huge amount of „hieroglyphics‟ would eventually become „six hundred quarto pages 
of notes.‟457 Many of them would find their way into the final publication. We see, 
for example, as many as 72 figures in the exposition on „the wall‟ alone. They are 
drawings of various subjects: some are lines and dots illustrating basic structures; 
some are shapes of architectural details; some are patterns of decorations, and others 
are full-scaled sketches of entire buildings. While Ruskin‟s description of cornices, 
shafts and bases provide readers with a magnifying glass, these drawings certainly 
offer more diverse views. But the emphasis on accuracy was sustained. In a way, the 
observation of Ruskin‟s father was prophetic: however „mosaic‟ they were, all 
illustrations were meant to provide the „Truth‟ which, in Ruskin‟s context, was only to 
be acquired through perception.  
 Also like Modern Painters, The Stones of Venice did not dwell on the perception 
of physical details only, for Ruskin continued to propound his doctrine of perceiving 
with a „pure heart.‟ This doctrine underlined, among others, the account of the tomb of 
the Doge Andrea Vendramin in Saints Giovanni and Paolo. The passage began with a 
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description of the sculpture on the tomb, which, according to Ruskin, was a failure. 
Apparently, the sculptor had been convinced that visitors would only see the work 
from below and, therefore, to perfect every single detail was not necessary. 
Consequently, he only finished those parts that the visitors would see and left all the 
„unnecessary‟ parts undone. The product was very odd indeed. A careful visitor would 
discover, as Ruskin described, that „the wretched effigy had only one hand, and was a 
mere block on the inner side. […] On one side the forehead is wrinkled elaborately, 
the other left smooth; one side only of the doge‟s cap is chased; one cheek only is 
finished, the other blocked out and distorted besides.‟458  
The unfinished sculpture infuriated Ruskin. However, he did not criticise the 
sculptor‟s laziness or carelessness, nor did he view the sculpture primarily as a 
violation of aesthetic principles. Instead, he saw the „wretched effigy‟ as a product of 
moral corruption, of „dishonesty‟ and „coldness of feeling.‟ He also believed that 
moral corruption was a crime committed against both the dead and the visitors, and 
was, for that matter, a violation of human laws. Hence Ruskin went out to address 
himself directly to the audience, with the manner of a lawyer who stood in front of a 
jury. While urging them to look more closely at the sculpture, he also pleaded with 
them to think about the heartlessness of the suspect: 
 
Who, with a heart in his breast, could have stayed his hand as he drew the 
dim lines of the old man‟s countenance – unmajestic once, indeed, but at 
least, sanctified by the solemnities of death – could have stayed his hand, as 
he reached the bend of the grey forehead, and measured out the last veins of 
it at so much the zecchin?
459
 
 
The distorted representation, as Ruskin maintained, revealed „moral degradation‟ on 
the part of the sculptor, for he failed to pay respect to the deceased, his work being a 
proof of his lack of fellow feeling. But more than that, the mention of „zecchin,‟ the 
coin of Venice, also reminded readers of another serious offence. Though he had been 
a commissioned artist, with an unfinished sculpture as that, he had certainly not 
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fulfilled the task. Thus he had ignored not only the moral obligation but also the laws 
that governed the exchange between labour and payment. The half-done sculpture, in 
this way, testified to the sculptor‟s two-fold crime against both the laws of humanity 
and the laws of economy.  
Ruskin‟s condemnation drew on further evidence when the account reached its 
climatic end: 
 
But now, readers, comes the very gist and point of the whole matter. This 
lying monument to a dishonoured doge, this culminating pride of the 
Renaissance art of Venice, is at least veracious, if in nothing else, in its 
testimony to the character of its sculptor. He was banished from Venice for 
forgery in 1487.
460
 
 
The lawyer had now become a judge. While formerly Ruskin had spoken as if he were 
waiting for the judgment of the jury, here he sounded more like the decision maker. 
The previous criticism of the sculptor, as he informed his readers, was not unfounded, 
for soon after the completion of the tomb, the sculptor was banished for forgery – a 
crime not at all unexpected, as Ruskin indicated, from someone who produced a 
half-done sculpture for the dead. At this stage, the „gist and point of the whole matter‟ 
became quite straightforward: violation against human laws could never escape 
punishment.  
Ruskin‟s account also contained a lesson about perception and morality. The 
sculptor dared to produce an artwork like this because he was confident that no one 
would view the sculpture from a position different than he was supposed to take. If no 
one bothered to study the sculpture closely and carefully, the moral offence would 
never be discovered. Ruskin, however, did not want his audience to be cheated. For 
this reason, he not only demanded that his readers should observe the physical quality 
closely, but also asked them to pay attention to its ethical indications. The logic was 
quite clear: careful observation enabled a visitor to discover the fault of the artwork; 
but to detect the moral corruption, a visitor must also see beyond the physical 
qualities, regarding the work as a „testimony to the character of its sculptor.‟ In other 
                                                        
460 Ruskin, The Stones of Venice. Works, 9 52. 
 187 
words, he should not just see but also see with his heart. Previously in Modern 
Painters, beauty symbolised the wisdom of the divine; and here, similarly, Ruskin 
regarded artistic flaws as a sign of weakness in human character. By thus holding 
aesthetic quality first as a sign of divinity and then as a testimony to morality, Ruskin 
further incorporated moral cultivation into his aesthetic teachings, reinforcing the 
message from The King and the Golden River: behold and be good.  
Ruskin‟s approach has elicited much critical interest since the nineteenth century. 
Most of his critics have recognised the combination of aesthetic and morality in his art 
criticism, but they assess this approach in different ways. In 1883, Vernon Lee 
characterised Ruskin‟s teaching as having a „conflicting ethical and aesthetical 
nature,‟ no matter how „highly-developed‟ this nature was.461 As she went on to 
explain, the conflict revealed that Ruskin had been unable to decide whether he 
should lean more towards moral teaching or aesthetic analysis. Today, more than a 
century later, there are still some echoes of Lee. Nicholas Shrimpton‟s recent study of 
Ruskin, for instance, draws a similar conclusion, though in a much more dramatic 
manner. Following the example of Browning‟s poem The Ring and the Book, 
Shrimpton tells the story of Ruskin and the aesthetes four times, each time offering a 
different portrait of Ruskin: either as a ferocious enemy fighting against aestheticism 
on moral grounds or as a sensualist that shares the views of those aesthetes. Since 
these differences could not be properly explained by timelines, Shrimpton suggests, 
the stories, combined, should better be read as an illustration of various facets of a 
„troubled‟ mind. 462  Other critics are more positive about Ruskin‟s approach. 
According to Landow, for example, Ruskin‟s integration of aesthetics and morality 
was a fine choice, for it enabled him to „place essentially equal emphasis upon both 
signifier and signified‟ by maintaining „a balance between the formal elements of a 
painting, its aesthetic surface, and its complex significances.‟ In other words, it 
enabled him to emphasise both the formal elements of the beautiful and the deeper 
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significance, be it theological or moral.
463
 
Seconding Landow, I believe that Ruskin‟s approach arose neither from a 
troubled mind nor from an unavoidable conflict, but is rather carefully chosen. The 
benefit of this approach is obvious. On the one hand, as Landow has pointed out, it 
helped Ruskin to maintain a balance between moral teaching and aesthetic cultivation. 
To some extent, morality serves as an end in Ruskin‟s art criticism, while sensual 
perception is a means. Both, as Ruskin‟s art criticism has shown, are indispensable. 
Without a moral anchorage, a discussion of beauty would have little sense of direction; 
without the aesthetic media, moral teaching would lose all its cognitive substance. 
Once again, Ruskin aimed to instruct his audience not only on how to see properly, 
but also on how to make sense of what they saw. On the other hand, this integration is 
as much to the benefit of Ruskin himself as a propagator. While those wondrous 
passages on leaves, rocks and clouds convinced Ruskin‟s audience that the person 
they were listening to was an expert with amazing capabilities of perception, his 
moral teachings also struck them with the fact that the speaker, despite his genius, was 
never quite outside their society. He shared the same ethical assumptions with his 
contemporaries, and he was to be admired for his quick perception not only of art but 
also of human character.  
Moreover, the approach of connecting art with moral discussion also renders 
Ruskin‟s words more accessible than other art criticism. For art lovers who receive 
little training in painting, his works are obviously easier to digest than an analysis of 
pure techniques; meanwhile, they are more „substantial‟ than impressionistic accounts 
– in which respect a comparison between Ruskin and Hazlitt is telling enough. 
Furthermore, a quick glance at contemporary comments also confirms the 
effectiveness of Ruskin‟s approach. A reviewer in The English Gentleman in 1846 
admired Ruskin‟s „high and lofty tone, the deep enthusiasm‟ and, in particular, „the 
association of religion with art on principles intelligible to this age,‟ which he 
believed, made Modern Painters „the most original and remarkable production of 
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what, till the author‟s views prevail, must still be called aesthetic criticism.‟464 A 
reviewer of The Stones of Venice also announced, with much gratification, that the 
book not only provided precious teaching on architectural beauty, but that it would 
also „elevate taste and intellect, raise the tone of moral feeling, kindle benevolence 
towards men, and increase the love and fear of God.‟465 
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Beauty and Industry: Woman and Aesthetics in ‘Of Queens’ 
Gardens’ 
 
‘The Stars Only May Be Over Her Head’: Woman as an Aesthetic 
Ideal 
In 1912, Austin Harrison, who edited The English Review from 1909 till 1923, 
recalled a childhood encounter with John Ruskin‟s Sesame and Lilies: 
 
When I was a small boy it was my good fortune to sit at the feet of a 
beautiful lady, gowned, festooned one ought perhaps to say, in a sumptuous 
Walter Crane design, the exact colour of the cushions and the wall-paper. She 
sat, like the pictures of Circe I always thought, and spun miracles; at any rate, 
for an hour every third day in the week after luncheon she read to me 
„Sesame and Lilies,‟ and descanted upon its teaching.466 
 
According to Harrison, Ruskin‟s words gave him an „aesthetic speculation.‟ I find this 
paragraph a perfect introduction to the present section on Ruskin‟s aesthetic education, 
and it is so for two reasons. The description testifies, first of all, to Ruskin‟s efforts at 
aesthetic cultivation in the post-Modern-Painters era. When Ruskin completed his 
Modern Painters series and the works on architecture, it seems that his mission as an 
aesthetic educator also came to a halt. By the mid 1860s, the art critic had become an 
active participant in various social activities and, consequently, turned more and more 
to the world of social criticism. At the surface level, Sesame and Lilies is such a 
product. It came out in book form in 1865, but actually consists of two separate 
lectures delivered in the city of Manchester in 1864. The first one, titled „Of Kings‟ 
Treasuries,‟ was about „what and how to read.‟ It was delivered with the express 
purpose of raising funds for a public library, as we can gather from a report from The 
Morning Post.
467
 The second one, „Of Queens‟ Gardens,‟ was about the education of 
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girls, and it was also delivered with the purpose of raising money for schools in slums. 
Because these works do not deal immediately with the concept of beauty, or rather, 
because they have more ostensible social commitments, it is not uncommon that 
critics often deem them as expressing an entirely different focus from Modern 
Painters.
468
 Harrison‟s comment, however, reminds us that in spite of all the social 
missions embodied, Sesame and Lilies is still aesthetically significant. 
 In fact, Harrison‟s judgment finds much textual support, for Sesame and Lilies 
contains plenty of messages that Ruskin had expounded in his previous works, such as 
Modern Painters and The Stones of Venice. Once again, there is, for example, the 
emphasis on feelings and „the fitness and fullness of sensation, beyond reason.‟ „The 
ennobling difference between one man and another,‟ Ruskin says, when talking about 
the proper education of boys, „is precisely in this, that one feels more than another‟ – 
just in the same way, we might add, as competent viewers of art differ from those 
whose hearts are as dead as stones.
469
 The recommendation of close reading in 
literature also echoes his previous insistence on close observation, the kernel of 
Ruskin‟s aesthetics. Hence in Sesame and Lilies, Ruskin confidently announces to his 
audience: „I tell you earnestly and authoritatively (I know I am right in this), you must 
get into the habit of looking intensely at words, and assuring yourself of their meaning, 
syllable by syllable – nay, letter by letter.‟470 Such an instruction would not have been 
unfamiliar to those who had read Modern Painters, where „looking intensely‟ at 
pictorial details is regarded as absolutely essential in the interpretation of any artwork. 
But the most telling evidence is found in the preface to the second edition of Sesame 
and Lilies. There Ruskin told readers of a „crime‟ that he had witnessed during his 
visit in the Alps: a group of „English and German lads,‟ in their excitement, destroyed 
a bed of budding Alpine roses. Horrified by the deeds of the youths, Ruskin 
contemplated – and urged his audience to join him in this contemplation – on the 
defects of the education of youths. This education, Ruskin lamented, failed to 
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cultivate „the deep and sacred sensations of natural scenery.‟471 Viewed in this way, 
Sesame and Lilies does not necessarily illustrate Ruskin‟s new focus; instead, the 
work is more like a record of his unabated passion for beauty as well as aesthetic 
cultivation. 
 Yet differently from his previous works, Sesame and Lilies did not instruct 
readers on how to see beauty in paintings or architecture. This time, Ruskin tried to 
make them see „beauty‟ itself. While in works such as Modern Painters and The 
Stones of Venice he had visualised paintings and morality respectively so as to teach 
his readers about the beauty of nature and the beauty of a pure heart; now, in the 
lectures, he visualised beauty itself, finding the best aesthetic example in human form, 
or to be more specific, a perfect female. Harrison‟s recollection of having an aesthetic 
speculation under the guidance of „a beautiful lady‟ might be a realistic depiction of 
the way that he read Ruskin; but it is also possible that he was reproducing the 
message from Sesame and Lilies. In the first part, „Of Kings‟ Treasuries,‟ a female 
ideal was already in formation. Here Ruskin described „the pure woman […] above all 
creatures‟ as an embodiment of feeling, compassion and beauty. In the second part, 
„Of Queens‟ Gardens,‟ which dealt specifically with the education of women, the ideal 
female received even more emphasis. Characterised by her emotional richness and the 
ability to „feel,‟ woman is identified as an aesthetic ideal, the natural source of 
sympathy, tenderness and beauty. What follows is how Ruskin visualised this ideal: 
 
The stars only may be over her head; the glowworm in the night-cold grass 
may be the only fire at her foot; but home is yet wherever she is; and for a 
noble woman it stretches far round her, better than ceiled with cedar, or 
painted with vermilion, shedding its quiet light far, for those who else were 
homeless.
472
 
 
The image might strike readers with its shining beauty, but its significance is far more 
than that. In the second volume of Modern Painters, Ruskin offers a complex theory 
about what beauty is. Among all attributes of beauty, Ruskin found the following 
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elements the most crucial. The beautiful, he said, must be orderly: „Orderly balance 
and arrangement are essential to the perfect operation of the more earnest and solemn 
qualities of the Beautiful, as being heavenly in their nature, and contrary to the 
violence and disorganisation of sin.‟473 For there to be an orderly arrangement, 
beauty must also demonstrate an element of „repose.‟ By „repose‟ Ruskin referred to 
the „simple appearance of permanence and quietness.‟ But he also added that this 
attribute should not be mistaken as lifeless, for a genuinely beautiful repose always 
contained „Divine vitality,‟ expressing „self-command and self-possession, the 
persistent dignity or the uncalculating love.‟474 In other words, true beauty did not 
only consist in beautiful forms but also in its vitality – the „felicitous fulfilment of 
function.‟475  
In Modern Painters, Ruskin, being an ardent traveller, illustrated this concept of 
beauty with mountainous scenes from the Alps. By the time he wrote the lectures, it 
seems that he had found yet another suitable embodiment. The female ideal, with her 
delicate form, her tranquillity and, above all, her ability to extend warm shelters for 
the homeless, stood exactly for Ruskin‟s idea of beauty. This feminine guardian is also 
in every way a clear contrast to the „blasphemous‟ image of the masculine Turner in 
Modern Painters, even though both figures serve ideals in Ruskin‟s aesthetic 
cultivation. The masculine Turner appears as a prophet of God that is „clothed with a 
cloud, and with rainbow upon his head, and with the sun and stars given into his 
hand.‟ He creates beauty by acting as a dauntless messenger, much in the same way as 
Ruskin himself, who always entreated the audience to make the best of their 
perception in order to discover what beauty was.
476
 The goddess-like image here, on 
the other hand, distinguishes herself for her feminine virtues. Thus considered, 
Harrison‟s recollection of his reading experience was indeed a very sympathetic 
response to Ruskin‟s aesthetic teachings. Had Ruskin known about this account, he 
would probably have congratulated himself on having such a perceptive reader. 
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The Identity of the Queen: a Paradoxical Female Ideal 
Yet it is sometime quite hard to tell what Ruskin intended to convey with such an 
ideal, and the fault, I think, is not always on the readers‟ part. According to Robert 
Hewison, who is also interested in Ruskin‟s use of visual imagery, „a visual reading is 
the only way we can trace the line of argument‟ in Sesame and Lilies.477 My reading, 
however, will lead to a slightly different conclusion. In fact, I find that a visual 
reading does not offer much help in „tracing the line of argument‟ but actually reveals 
Ruskin‟s self-contradiction, and this is exactly what happens in that beautiful ideal 
female in „Of Queens‟ Gardens.‟ There has been much speculation about why Ruskin 
chose this female ideal. The image is obviously based on cultural tradition, where the 
association between woman and beauty can be traced as far back as ancient religion 
and mythologies, in figures such as Saint Mary and Aphrodite. It is also based on the 
purpose of the second lecture, which, as Ruskin himself made it explicit, was to 
address the issue of the education of girls.
478
 Indeed, the fact that Sesame and Lilies 
became a bestseller, a common gift for girls and even a fixture in middle-class homes, 
all confirmed the soundness of Ruskin‟s choice. 479  Meanwhile, those who are 
interested in Ruskin‟s private life could also identify in this image the impact of his 
romantic relationship with Rose La Touche, who was for him an angelic presence and, 
for that matter, could be reasonably inferred as the most important reader he intended 
to communicate to through these lectures.
480
 
But I would add that the image of the ideal woman has also a typical Victorian 
context. As Linda Colley has noted in her study of British culture in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, since the eighteenth century, there had been a 
„remarkable prominence of the female component of the British Royal family.‟ 
Queens and princesses elicited unprecedented attention and admiration. According to 
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Colley, this phenomenon could be attributed to the fact that the Royal family had 
produced several female personalities; yet, more significantly, it also reflects a 
psychological demand of the British public. The prominence, as Colley argues, which 
„coincided with a gradual decline in church attendance, can be seen in part as a kind 
of substitute religion, a strictly Protestant version of the cult of the Virgin.‟481 
Throughout the Victorian era, when the centre of the Royal family was actually a 
woman, it was only too natural that this „substitute religion‟ would find its way to the 
wider public. Colley also quotes a poem written by an anonymous woman in 1817, 
which, I think, is helpful to be repeated here: 
 
  T‟was hers with calm and condescending grace, 
  To rule in woman‟s chiefest empire, Home; -- 
  T‟was hers to keep the sabbath in its place, 
  Mid the meek worship of the village dome.
482
 
 
The image of the calm, graceful, home-bound female well anticipated that in „Of 
Queens‟ Gardens.‟ It is likely, therefore, that Ruskin reproduced this image because 
the ideal female was by then a widely recognised idol; for this reason, it provided the 
most convenient personification for beauty, which, in his view, was also to be 
worshipped.  
Just as Colley has noted, the cult of female royals produced consequences at once 
„limiting and liberating‟: liberating, because it called attention to the importance of 
the role of the female in social life; limiting, because that role of the female was very 
often confined to domesticity.
483
 Likewise, Ruskin‟s argument in „Of Queens‟ 
Gardens‟ also contains a paradox – a paradox, I would argue, that first makes his 
female ideal confusing and then obfuscates the ultimate end of his aesthetic education. 
This complication consists first of all in the identity of the feminine symbol of beauty 
that Ruskin had created. The lecture, as Ruskin himself made clear at the beginning, 
was a sequel to „Of Kings‟ Treasuries.‟ Its chief topic, he explained, is the order and 
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beauty of „queenly power,‟ as opposed to the „kingly power‟ of the previous one; or, in 
other words, „the „mission‟ and „rights‟ of Woman‟ as opposed to „the mission and 
rights of Man.‟484 Because of the binary opposition of „queen‟ and „king,‟ the female 
image in the first part of the lecture is especially distinguished by its „wifely quality.‟ 
In order to buttress this point, Ruskin quoted extensively from literature. Romeo and 
Juliet, for instance, was interpreted as a story of how „the wise and brave stratagem of 
the wife was brought to ruinous issue by the reckless impatience of her husband.‟485 
Dante‟s Divine Comedy, too, demonstrated to Ruskin women‟s heavenly assistance to 
men in the midst of crisis. Ruskin also drew on Greek poems, which, as he 
paraphrased, shared the same theme: the „wife‟s heart of Andromache,‟ „the 
housewifely calm of that of Penelope‟ and, above all, the good Alcetis who 
volunteered to save the life of her husband through the sacrifice of her own. From all 
these literary concepts of pure women, Ruskin constructed his own ideal female. She 
was, again, defined in relation to the characteristics of the male. 
 
The man‟s power is active, progressive, defensive. He is eminently the doer, 
the creator, the discoverer, the defender. His intellect is for speculation and 
invention; his energy for adventure, for war, and for conquest, wherever war 
is just, wherever conquest necessary. But the women‟s power is for rule, not 
for battle, – and her intellect is not for invention or creation, but for sweet 
ordering, arrangement, and decision.
486
 
 
Despite this elaborate comparison, the idea that Ruskin expressed was actually 
quite simple: men maintained a family through working and conquest; and their wives, 
as „pure angels,‟ made sure that this tiny piece of land was beautified into a cosy 
home. Her reign was within the threshold, while the rest of the world was ready for 
further adventures and discoveries by men. It is also with this assumption that Ruskin 
presented his proposal for the education of girls. To make their girls the ideal women, 
Ruskin advised his readers that they should not only provide their daughters with the 
same education as the boys, so that the future woman could „sympathise in her 
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husband‟s pleasures and in those of his best friends.‟487 In terms of subjects to be 
studied, they should also pay particular attention to literature, art, and fair nature, 
since all of them were indispensable in the cultivation of the sense of beauty. 
However, as the praise of the ideal woman went on, Ruskin seemed more and 
more unable to contain his passion to relocate the ideal image from private houses to 
the public arena. The idea of „ruling‟ and „decision making‟ gained gradual 
ascendance, the sphere for women was broadened, and the way he visualised the ideal 
woman also underwent an enormous change. When Ruskin finally addressed „ye 
women of England‟ directly, it became apparent that females had come to bear the 
chief responsibility for the proper maintenance of the whole world, much like Queen 
Victoria herself:  
 
There is no suffering, no injustice, no misery, in the earth, but the guilt of it 
lies with you. Men can bear the sight of it, but you should not be able to bear 
it. Men may tread it down without sympathy in their own struggle; but men 
are feeble in sympathy, and contracted in hope; it is you only who can feel 
the depths of pain, and conceive the way of its healing. Instead of trying to 
do this, you turn away from it; you shut yourselves within your park walls 
and garden gates; and you are content to know that there is beyond them a 
whole world of wilderness – a world of secrets which you dare not penetrate; 
and of suffering which you dare not conceive.
488
 
 
Compare the passage above with the previous one, and the duty of women becomes a 
complicated issue. The contrast between man and woman was preserved: one was still 
characterised by an active, belligerent nature, while the other was still distinguished 
for her feeling, sympathy and tenderness. But the relationship between them was 
somehow altered. Instead of cooperating with their husbands by taking care of the 
private sphere, now women‟s task was to supervise and to redress as rulers of the 
public world. They were now held as culprits for the degradation outside, and that was 
only because Ruskin regarded them as the primary power to change the world. While 
previously, the two sexes, with different natures, were presented as complimentary, 
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here Ruskin‟s emphasis leant so much to the power of „ordering,‟ „comforting‟ and 
„the beautiful adornment‟ that the nature of men appeared indeed feeble, if not 
defective. In this way, the wifely figure evolved into a motherly one, who, with all her 
affections and love for beauty, single-handedly guarded the world; the „queen,‟ in 
consequence, became more like the supreme monarch than the spouse of the king. 
 Moreover, this dual identity of the ideal female image gave rise to paradoxical 
interpretations of women‟s social roles. In 1983, an anthology on Victorian „woman 
questions‟ republished Ruskin‟s „Of Queens‟ Gardens.‟ In the complementary note, 
the editor explained that the argument for the extension of women‟s sphere „was 
neither new nor controversial by the 1860s,‟ and therefore indicated that Ruskin‟s 
views in the lectures were readily accepted by the public.
489
 The first part of this 
comment is perhaps true, but the latter part is decidedly not. Responses from 
contemporaries well reflected the inherent paradox in the female image that Ruskin 
created: readers were far from unanimous concerning Ruskin‟s position. Supporters of 
women‟s rights claimed that they drew inspiration from „Of Queens‟ Gardens‟; many 
were determined to spread the Ruskinian teaching to fellow women throughout 
society. For instance, Flora Lucy Freeman, a Victorian activist who committed herself 
to the improvement of the condition of working-class girls, once gave an account of 
how she recommended the lecture to girls around her and, as she believed, to their 
benefit.
490
 But George Gissing‟s The Odd Women showed a different understanding. 
In his story, a husband explains to his wife that 
 
[w]omen‟s sphere is the home […] Unfortunately, girls are often obliged 
to go out the earn their living, but this is unnatural, a necessity which 
advanced civilisation will altogether abolish. You shall read John Ruskin; 
every word he says about women is good and precious.‟491  
 
The husband is referring to „Of Queens‟ Gardens,‟ but for him those words bore a 
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totally different indication from what Miss Freeman believed. In his view, an ideal 
woman should be in the first category as Ruskin had described her: one who 
maintained order, created beauty and, in this way, assisted men in their adventure of 
modern enterprises. Both understandings are to some extent true to Ruskin‟s argument, 
for the paradox rises inevitably from his two different ways of visualising the ideal 
female and, for that matter, the role of beauty. In fact, one might even doubt whether 
that was part of the reason why, upon its publication, the lecture „Of Queens‟ Gardens‟ 
sold so well: the dubiousness of the image was so open to different explanations that 
every reader, whatever their position, could always find what he or she wished to find. 
 
Beauty in the Age of Industrialisation: The Dilemma of Aesthetic 
Education  
Since the ideal female also symbolises ideal beauty, which is the grand object of 
Ruskin‟s aesthetic education, the inherent paradox in that image – the tension between 
wife and mother, between partner and ruler – also reveals the dilemma of aesthetic 
education within an increasingly industrialised Victorian society. In the previously 
mentioned report from The Morning Post about Ruskin‟s lectures, it was recorded that 
Ruskin said at the beginning that „he always came to Manchester somewhat nervously, 
feeling that he came to address an audience in the most powerful city on earth in its 
probable future and influence on the destiny of mankind.‟492 The reporter put down 
these words with a touch of pride, but he might not have fully grasped Ruskin‟s 
insinuation. When Ruskin courteously referred to Manchester as the „most powerful 
city‟ that influenced „the destiny of mankind,‟ he did not specify whether the influence 
would be auspicious or not. What made him nervous could have been the grandness 
of the city, but it could also have been the ominous power of industry. The latter 
seems more probable if we also recall how Elizabeth Gaskell, a novelist based in 
Manchester, felt compelled to portray the city‟s „unhappy state of things‟ in her works, 
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such as Mary Barton.
493
  
Ruskin‟s attitude towards industrialisation also made the latter choice more likely. 
He had always been quite outspoken about the evil of the modern industrial world. 
The preface to the second edition of Sesame of Lilies is full of protest against „the 
modern lust of wealth‟ and „its practical intelligence.‟ Because of the rapid 
development of industry, Ruskin mourned, 
 
Of the ancient architecture and most expressive beauty of their country there 
is now little vestige left; and it is one of the few reasons which console me 
for the advance of life, that I am old enough to remember the time when the 
sweet waves of the Reuss and Limmat (now foul with refuse of manufacture) 
were as crystalline as the heaven above them; when her pictured bridges and 
embattled towers ran unbroken round Lucerne; when the Rhone flowed in 
deep-green, softly dividing currents round the wooden ramparts of Geneva; 
and when from the marble roof of the western vault of Milan, I could watch 
the Rose of Italy flush in the first morning light, before a human foot had 
sullied its summit, or the reddening dawn on its rocks taken shadow of 
sadness from the crimson which, long ago, stained the ripples of Otterburn.
494
 
 
Nevertheless, this lovely landscape of the „good old days‟ was rapidly changing, and 
these changes were inevitable. The flourishing manufacturing industry altered the 
country permanently, rural and urban alike. In some respects, the changes were not 
very favourable. Old buildings were ruthlessly torn down, while chimneys were 
erected, producing large puffs of sooty smoke and that famous London fog, which 
found expression in a variety of Victorian literary works. The fast growth of the urban 
population made the countryside desolate, while, on the other hand, it also gave rise to 
numerous unhealthy lodgings and slums. Thus as Charles Kingsley‟s novel Alton 
Locke depicts, instead of those „sweet waves of the Reuss and Limmat,‟ streets in the 
poor area were surrounded by „[b]lood and sewer water,‟ which „crawled from under 
doors and out of spouts, and reeked down gutters among offal, animal and vegetable, 
in every stage of putrefaction.‟495 The living conditions in some parts of the industrial 
cities had become so appalling that scenes from there struck many as „the most 
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deplorable manifestations of human wretchedness and depravity.‟496 This was the fate 
of London and Manchester; yet other European cities such as Milan and Venice also 
suffered the same: hence Ruskin‟s lament over the „pain from the sight of restorations 
or ruins‟ when he worked in Venice in 1849.497 So it requires little difficulty to 
imagine how the travels in the 1840s and 1850s had brought home to him the dark 
side of material progress. In „Of Queens‟ Gardens,‟ Ruskin also expressed his anxiety 
over the industrialised landscape and challenged his audience in an almost blunt 
manner: 
 
Yet this is what you are doing with all England. The whole country is but a 
little garden, not more than enough for your children to run the lawns of, if 
you would let them all run there. And this garden you will turn into furnace 
ground, and fill with heaps of cinders, if you can, and those children of yours, 
not you, will suffer for it.
498
 
 
In his view, the blind expansion of modern industry destroyed the beauty of the 
British landscape and, for that matter, jeopardised the living condition of British 
people. The reconstruction of the landscape was therefore an aesthetic project. In 
order to undo all the wrongs, „furnace‟ and „heaps of cinders‟ must be removed, so 
that the country would become once again a queen‟s garden, modelled after the 
symbol of beauty that Ruskin ascribed to the ideal womanhood.  
To be sure, Ruskin was not alone in his call for beauty. Beauty cures the ugliness 
of modern cities, and this was a conviction shared by many. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, many Victorian urban dwellers had found the advancement of industry and 
the corruption of the landscape utterly horrendous. Talk about aesthetic cultivation, at 
this point, appeared frequently in daily newspapers. When the English translation of 
The History of Ancient Art was published in 1850, a reviewer from The Morning 
Chronicle praised ardently the achievement of Winckelmann the author, as well as the 
„genial climate of Greece,‟ which, in his view, facilitated an „aesthetic love of art and 
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beauty.‟ After that, however, readers‟ attention was reverted from ancient Greece to 
contemporary England, and eulogy was turned into disparagement:  
 
In England, from the brutalising influences of gin, and dirt, and filthy living, 
our want of a good public school of art, and the utter absence of all 
encourage to excel, it were vain to hope for any enduring monument of 
beauty, for neither its spirit, nor any encouragement to create that spirit, 
exists among us.
499
 
 
The contemporary world was far behind ancient Greece in its aesthetic sensitivity. But 
this was not the fault of artists. Rather, according to the judgment of the writer, it was 
symptomatic of a degenerated social life. A passage from the 1869 issue of The Pall 
Mall Gazette expressed a similar judgment, though from a different perspective. There 
was a critical need for the cultivation of aesthetic principles, according to the writer, 
because even if people had the financial means to maintain a decent household, they 
had no idea how to decorate the place properly in order to avoid vulgarity. As a result, 
 
in what an atmosphere of ugliness do we live and move and have our own 
being! Take, by way of example, the so-called well-appointed house of an 
English family in comfortable circumstances. The drawing room will differ 
in no essential degree from thousands of drawing-rooms; the upholstery will 
be unexceptionable as far as costliness goes, the decorations will be of a 
piece with all the other houses in the same street.
500
 
 
Attributing „ugliness‟ as a feature to the general „atmosphere‟ and ordinary English 
families, this passage also identified the lack of aesthetic sensibility as a social 
phenomenon and, for that matter, the cause of a corrupted modern taste. But neither 
commentator discussed how the aspiration towards beauty shall alter the landscape, or 
how cities would look like once the aesthetic cultivation of its dwellers had been 
accomplished. If people could get rid of „filthy living,‟ would they also dispose of 
chimneys and factories altogether? If everyone were to choose handmade decorations 
according to their cultivated taste, would it still be necessary to maintain mass 
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production and manufacturing industries?  
In this respect, Ruskin, too, remained highly ambivalent. When he warned his 
audience against the danger caused by rising industry, he told them, as we read from 
the previous quotes, that it was the queenly power of „ordering‟ and adornment alone 
that could save the landscape from being destroyed by the power of the male, that is, 
„the Power to destroy.‟501 Meanwhile, he also acknowledged that the destructive 
power which made men „prone to fight‟ and which threatened the wellbeing of the 
modern landscape was also the progressive power that fuelled „invention‟ and 
„adventure.‟ Their power paralleled closely the power of industrialisation: it produced 
hideous cities yet, at the same time, produced huge amounts of goods, capitals and, 
above all, a powerful country.
502
 In this sense, the nature and duty of men and women 
became – perhaps even unintentionally for Ruskin – allegorical; the gender 
relationship reflected in fact the relationship between aesthetic culture and the power 
of industry. How, therefore, should feeling, imagination and sensibility for beauty 
work against such a trend of progress, which both benefited and damaged society and 
which was absolutely irreversible? Should it complement industrialisation with 
patch-ups here and there, or should it overtake the trend? When Ruskin portrayed his 
heroine as an „angel at home,‟ he seemed to anticipate a happy cooperation. But when 
the bleakness of the modern land compelled him to demand that females ought not to 
shut themselves within „park walls and garden gates,‟ he certainly expressed a much 
radical view concerning the aesthetic ideal – that beauty must become the supreme 
power in order to eliminate the wrongs of industry.
503
 
 Because of his indecisiveness about where beauty stood against social reality, 
Ruskin did not pin down a practical solution. Thus the final picture he offered to his 
audience was intensely poetic. In the concluding part of the lecture, aesthetic power 
once again took the shape of an ideal woman, and the problem of the world, as he 
described, was to be solved in a most airy manner: „The path of good woman is 
indeed strewn with flowers; but they rise behind her steps, not before them.‟ He cited 
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here from the lines of Tennyson: „Her feet have touched the meadows, and left the 
daisies rosy.‟504 We do not know how the piles of cinder is to be removed, or how the 
furnace ground will be turned back into gardens; all we know is that the cultivation of 
beauty would finally lead to a garden of meadows and blossoms, a Neverland of 
eternal spring. 
 Ruskin was aware of the impracticality of his project. In fact, he was haunted by 
this awareness. Hence, when the aesthetic educator rose to defend himself, he could 
not help but become slightly hysterical. After the poetical description of the triumph 
of beauty, Ruskin addressed his audience directly: 
 
You think that only a lover‟s fancy; – false and vain! How if it could be true? 
[…] it is little to say of a woman, that she only does not destroy where she 
passes. She should revive; the harebells should bloom, not stoop, as she 
passes. You think I am rushing into wide hyperbole! Pardon me, not a whit – 
I mean what I say in calm English, spoken in resolute truth.
505
 
 
But he did not sound calm at all, and the tone he used for self-justification disturbed 
many readers. In spite of the popularity of the book, reviewers were not always kind. 
One reviewer from The Contemporary Review, for example, described Sesame and 
Lilies as lectures „written in scream‟ and concluded with a warning that „to lose 
temper or betray over-excitement is of all things the most fatal to him who would 
influence Englishmen.‟ 506  Even in the early twentieth century, Mrs. Amabel 
Williams-Ellis, who had not been among Ruskin‟s Victorian audience, still felt that 
the lectures must have been composed with a „shriek,‟ and were therefore „unreadable 
in their entirety.‟ In them, Mrs. Ellis complained, „we are being “spoken to” in the 
most odious sense of that idiom.‟507 
 Some critics regard this hysteria as an early sign of Ruskin‟s mental instability.508 
Yet I would argue that this was a normal reaction from a desperate public speaker. In a 
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private letter to his friend Coventry Patmore, dated June 1865, Ruskin mentioned his 
new lectures, which he described as „pearly,‟ but also added that they were „written 
for a couple of schoolgirls in reality and were only delivered to amuse them, not in the 
least expecting them to be of any use to the public.‟509 The somewhat paradoxical 
description of the lecture – that it was both „pearly‟ and „useless‟ – is a possible 
explanation of Ruskin‟s „screaming‟ and „shrieking.‟ While he was convinced of the 
soundness of his „pearly‟ „resolute truth,‟ he did not know for sure if the ideal he 
visualised could be effectively conveyed to the public. Would the public „see‟ the idea 
of „beauty‟ with the same ease as they saw the beauty of Claude and the moral 
indications of Venetian sculpture? Ruskin surely did not have enough confidence in 
the effectiveness of his aesthetic ideal and the audience‟s power of perception.  
This is a problem that Ruskin did not encounter in his art criticism. As an art 
critic, he was for the most part a conveyor of truth. He acted as the eye of his audience, 
helping them to perceive the minutest detail and, in this way, to appreciate the wisdom 
of God, the talent of Turner and the moral significance of architectures. His authority, 
then, was primarily the authority of an interpreter. As John D. Rosenberg has pointed 
out, Modern Painters and The Stones of Venice impress readers not just with „their 
word-painting,‟ but, more importantly, with their „sustained energy of elaboration.‟510 
Ruskin‟s lectures about beauty, however, continued to do word painting but did not 
retain the same energy of elaboration. Determined to hammer that ultimate end into 
the head of his audience, he no longer acted as a conveyor or an interpreter. As a 
result, the lecture was filled up with visual symbols: both the ideal female and the 
beautiful garden, for instance, appear many times throughout the lecture. But such 
repetitiveness did not help to clarify his point. On the contrary, as we can see in the 
conflicting interpretations of women‟s roles and the complaints about his tone, the 
visual signs ground on the nerves of some of his readers. At this point, it seems that 
Ruskin the aesthetic educator had evolved into an impatient headmaster, who dictated 
and tyrannised with that vision of ideal beauty, but had somehow forgotten that his 
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most primary task as an aesthetic educator – a task that he had in fact performed quite 
well – was to educate the eyes so that they could perceive beauty and truth in the most 
ordinary details of the world.   
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Conclusion 
Ruskin‟s aesthetic education could be properly summarised as an education of 
„eyes.‟ The emphasis on seeing continued from his early fairy tale well into his art and 
social criticism. Gluck wins a happy life, according to Ruskin, not only because he 
has a kind heart but, more importantly, because of his quick perception, which makes 
him sensitive to both human sufferings and heavenly signs. The moral of the fairy tale 
was repeated again and again in Ruskin‟s later career. From Modern Painters and The 
Stones of Venice to „Of Queens‟ Gardens,‟ he made it crystal clear to his audience that 
he wanted them to become neither professional artists nor disciples of great masters; 
he wanted them, instead, to make the best use of their eyes in order to discover more 
about the beauty of nature and the human heart and, in that way, to rebuild their own 
world according to the ideal of beauty.  
In his art criticism, the emphasis on artistic details which were otherwise 
neglected by common viewers convinced many people of his authority; the 
exploration of moral significance, of „seeing with a pure heart,‟ also translated 
Ruskin‟s art criticism into a meaningful criticism of life. As an art critic, he offered 
professional instructions in various artistic subjects; yet, he also transcended the 
limitation of professionalism by infusing art talks with ethics. His audience was quick 
to understand this message, and was in general very sympathetic to his effort. In a 
letter from July 31, 1848, Brontë described how exhilarated she was while reading 
Ruskin‟s Modern Painters. „Hitherto,‟ said Brontë, „I have only had instinct to guide 
me in judging of art; I feel more as if I had been walking blindfold – this book seems 
to give me eyes. I do wish I had pictures within reach by which to test my new 
sense.‟511 In the obituary of Ruskin, published in The Times, the commentator also 
stated, with even more admiration that „Artistic criticism was unknown in England 
[…] Ruskin created it.‟512 This well-expressed enthusiasm tells us how readily his 
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audience embraced Ruskin‟s aesthetic teachings in the realm of art. 
In his direct engagement with various social issues, however, Ruskin fared less 
well. He was still quite popular, to be sure, but his teachings and manners were both 
found to be controversial. Speaking with the desire to improve the country both 
morally and aesthetically, he continued to make high demands on his readers‟ 
capability of perceiving. This practice, as was seen in the previous section, gave birth 
to some complex – and even paradoxical – imagery in his writings. Because of his 
obsession with images, his neglecting of explanation and, ultimately, the lack of 
confidence in his audience‟s capability to „see,‟ Ruskin‟s endeavour to restore beauty 
to an increasingly industrialised society became more like an illusion based on a 
personal whim. Not every one could appreciate the visual effects in the same manner 
as Ruskin expected. As a result, people did not only criticise this overexcited aesthetic 
educator for screaming and shrieking; they were also disappointed of how empty 
Ruskin‟s teachings were. Anthony Trollope, for instance, deeply regretted the fact that 
Ruskin had given up his old trade of art criticism: 
 
But the fiddler was thus powerful because he understood the art of fiddling. 
Had he dropped his bow, and got into a pulpit that he might preach, we may 
doubt whether by his preaching he would have held the crowds whom his 
music had collected. […] Mr Ruskin […] will leave talking to us of the 
beauties of art and nature, of the stones of Venice and the wild flowers of 
Switzerland, and will preach to us out of a high pulpit on political economy 
and the degradation of men and the duties of women!
513
 
 
In spite of those beautiful words and images, Trollope concluded in another review of 
Ruskin, that readers of his social criticism were bound to realise that „no human being 
can learn anything from such teaching, indeed that there is no lesson taught 
whatsoever, that the words are words and words only.‟514 Trollope‟s judgment that 
„there is no lesson taught whatsoever‟ could be an exaggeration; nonetheless, their 
impressions were quite to the point, especially when we recall how repeatedly the 
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icon of ideal beauty appeared in Ruskin‟s „Of Queens‟ Gardens‟ yet how confusing 
and elusive it had become towards the end. 
At some point, Ruskin himself also realised that the beautiful forms which he 
recommended did not improve Victorian landscapes aesthetically but, instead, 
aggravated their condition. Thus in a letter to The Pall Mall Gazette from 1872, he 
observed, with a tone of self-mockery, that his endeavour to make the audience 
perceive the beauty of Venetian architecture brought some hideous consequences: 
 
I have had indirect influence on nearly every cheap villa-builder between this 
[Denmark Hill] and Bromley; and there is scarcely a public house near the 
Crystal Palace but sells its gins and bitters under pseudo-Venetian capitals 
copied from the Church of the Madonna of Health or of Miracles. And one of 
my principal notions for leaving my present home is that it is surrounded 
everywhere by the accursed Frankenstein monster of, indirectly, my own 
making.
515
 
 
Some of the originators of those „pseudo-Venetian‟ buildings had perhaps read Ruskin, 
but it is likely that many more simply picked the style out of manuals as an icon of 
fashion. At any rate, they followed the instruction of the master – either closely or 
erroneously – to such an extent that they disgusted the master himself, driving him 
away from his home. Ruskin, on his part, had every reason to complain. To find that 
his aesthetic ideals had now deteriorated into a disfigured product was certainly no 
pleasant news for such a devoted aesthetic educator; and it was almost a deadly blow 
to find that he was unable to benefit the „actual and insistent‟ and that he himself was 
even culpable for the destructive effect on the very landscape that he desired to make 
beautiful.  
The stark contrast between his success as an art critics and his failure as a social 
critic, however, should not lead us to assume that Ruskin‟s social criticism was 
different from his criticism of art. As I have been trying to show in this chapter, as far 
as the „education of eyes‟ is concerned, his social criticism, no matter how impractical 
it might appear, is built on essentially the same principle as his art criticism, and both 
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convey the same message. In fact, there is not even much difference, I argue, between 
Ruskin the social critic and Ruskin the art critic. Throughout his life he was devoted, 
as he had promised in the first volume of Modern Painters, to revealing to the public 
the „degradation‟ of the world and disseminating „the essence and the authority of the 
Beautiful and the True.‟516 This was what he did when he guided his audience from 
one painting to another, showing them the splendour of nature and criticising the 
popular taste which preferred the affected and false in art. With the same aim, he 
directed his readers‟ attention to Venetian architectures and sculptures, reminding 
them of the beauty of a pure heart and condemning the conduct of dishonesty. When 
he finally came to address his audience on issues in everyday life, he was still 
fulfilling the same task: he constructed an ideal of beauty for his audience so that they 
would be alerted to the negative impacts of industrialisation. The thorough devotion 
to the education of eyes was the cause of his success as well as his failure: it animated 
his analysis of paintings and architectures, yet, being too preoccupied with the „vision‟ 
of the beautiful, his disparagement of modern society disturbed some readers with an 
anxious tone but did not demonstrate attention to practical solutions: hence the 
criticism about its „shrieking‟ and „emptiness.‟ Thus Ruskin was, from beginning to 
end, an avid aesthetic educator; he once spoke of laws of the organisation of the earth‟ 
as being „authoritative and inviolable,‟ yet what was the truly „authoritative and 
inviolable‟ for him was nothing but the need to perceive „the Beautiful and the True.‟ 
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Conclusion 
News for the Present: Aesthetic Education as a Critique of Social 
Order 
 
So much for the group portrayal of three Victorian aesthetic educators – John 
Stuart Mill, Matthew Arnold and John Ruskin. Once again, my work does not aim to 
provide a full view of everything related to the cultivation of the beautiful. Rather, it 
highlights some crucial elements in their idea of aesthetic education and focuses 
particularly on how these ideas were formed, modified and communicated. While for 
all of them, the faith in beauty continued unabated throughout their life, the three 
educators had nevertheless very different understandings of what beauty was and how 
it should serve society. This difference was partly based on their individual genius, 
and partly on their diverse experience within that era. In this way, I hope that my work 
– paying particular attention to personal and social factors – has provided some 
insight into the „intellectual history‟ of the idea of aesthetic education in the Victorian 
age. Before my thesis comes to an end, however, I would like to quote another 
comment about „portrait,‟ that is, George Bernard Shaw‟s description of several 
portraits of Ruskin which, quite curiously, seems very compatible with my argument. 
George Bernard Shaw introduced these portraits in his study of Ruskin‟s politics. 
He had noticed four portraits of Ruskin in an exhibition. The first one was a bronze 
dish featuring his youthful profile, the second one was done by Herkomer in 1879, the 
third one was a photograph taken in the Lake District in Ruskin‟s later years, and the 
fourth one was a portrait made by Arthur Severn in 1897, just three years before 
Ruskin‟s death. The four images, Shaw observed, were not just illustrations of the 
different phrases of a famous individual; they also depicted the progress of Ruskin‟s 
career. The first one, according to Shaw, showed an interesting resemblance to the 
profile of Mozart, demonstrating the same „vivacity‟ peculiar to great artists. In the 
second and the third ones, respectively, Shaw found the same seriousness as people 
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studying economics, sociology and science and, therefore, noted a likeness to John 
Stuart Mill and Grant Allen, a determined supporter of Darwin‟s theory of evolution. 
The last one was done when Ruskin was old and weak and, as is generally believed, 
mentally ill. But this was not the message that Shaw grasped. In his view, Ruskin in 
this picture was „hardly a human being‟, but more like a „God as depicted in Blake‟s 
Book of Job.‟ Thus, altogether, the four portraits completed the „evolution‟ of Ruskin; 
and here is Shaw‟s conclusion: 
 
He begins as a painter, a lover of music, a poet and rhetorician, and presently 
becomes an economist and sociologist, finally developing sociology and 
economics into a religion, as all economics and sociology that are worth 
anything do finally develop. You follow him from Mozart to Mill, picking up 
on the way the man of science, Grant Allen, also a little in the sociological 
line, but very much interested in science and material things, and material 
forms and shapes, just as Ruskin is in Modern Painters.
517
 
 
This path of „evolution‟ is in my view also true for Ruskin the aesthetic educator. 
Ruskin initially developed his idea of beauty as an expert on art. When he told his 
audience that a close observation of nature was the only way to understand what 
beauty was, he was actually making a case for „modern painters‟ such as Turner. It is 
in the first volume of Modern Painters, which is generally regarded as a fine work on 
art criticism, that Ruskin launched his project of aesthetic education. His indictment 
of Victorian taste, at this stage, contained the best illustration of what he believed to 
be the „truth‟ of aesthetic pursuits: one of the greatest of all human actions, he said, 
was „to see.‟  
However, although Ruskin established the principle of „seeing‟ as a cornerstone 
of his aesthetic education first as an art critic, he never regarded aesthetic education as 
merely an artistic issue. It is important to observe closely, as we can learn from 
Ruskin‟s study of Venetian architecture, because clear vision helps one to make 
proper moral decisions and to better appreciate (or condemn) the character of the 
artist and, for that matter, the moral implication of an artwork. It is also important to 
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see with imagination, as he tried to tell his audience in his later lectures, because the 
vision of beauty is to be the only thing we can rely on in order to save ourselves from 
the pollutions – both literally and figuratively – of modern industrial civilisation. Thus, 
step by step, Ruskin introduced his principle of „seeing‟ to a much wider audience 
than gallery visitors. Meanwhile, the „aesthetic education‟ that he intended for the 
Victorian public also became more and more complex: this education was not just 
about how to decide which painting looked better; it was the cultivation of moral 
character and, even more importantly, it was concerned with the welfare of the entire 
human society. In this way, Ruskin‟s aesthetic education covers a whole range of 
topics in its evolutionary process. It joins his personal taste with his social concerns 
and because of this, we should always keep in mind how multifaceted his idea of 
„aesthetic education‟ was.  
 An evolution of this kind, according to Shaw, was unique. „There have been very 
few men,‟ he said, „in whom our manifold nature has been more marked than in 
Ruskin.‟518 I agree that Ruskin‟s nature was remarkably „manifold,‟ but I doubt if that 
„manifold‟ nature was truly idiosyncratic. John Stuart Mill, whom Shaw flatly 
classified as an „economist and sociologist,‟ also exhibited the same interest in art and 
beauty. As the present thesis has been trying to show, there is a similar „evolution‟ in 
Mill‟s idea of aesthetic education, which, just like that of Ruskin, originated from the 
study of literature and then found its way into the realm of sociology and politics. 
While Mill remained consistent in his emphasis that the cultivation of „feeling‟ was 
the most essential component of aesthetic education, his definition of feeling had 
undergone enormous changes; and it was through those changes in ideas that we 
perceive significant changes in Mill himself. When Mill corrected his former 
statement that feeling was the intense emotion acquired from solitude, he rejected the 
position of a radical Romantic. Later, when his definition of feeling shifted from 
sentiments aroused by literature to „pleasures in cooperation,‟ the change marked in 
fact the beginning of his contemplation on the social consequence of beauty. Thus, 
with each turn of mind, Mill adopted a different image, until that passionate lover of 
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art grew into a conscientious philosopher. As an aesthetic educator, he had a nature as 
manifold as that of Ruskin. 
 It is the same with Matthew Arnold. When Ian Hamilton wrote about Arnold‟s 
„poetic life‟ in 1999, he, quite characteristically, stopped at the year 1869, the year 
when Arnold‟s two-volume Poems came out. According to Hamilton, Arnold‟s 
post-1869 career was a „poetryless‟ stage and therefore a „second life.‟519 For my part, 
I am not entirely sure of the validity of such a label as „second life.‟ Somehow, it 
indicates that the life of Arnold followed two completely different directions; and this, 
in my view, is an exaggeration. Nevertheless, Arnold did experience several changes 
of mind, even though the inherent direction remained largely unchanged. This is 
particularly true regarding his idea of aesthetic education. As an aesthetic educator, 
Arnold was surprisingly tenacious with his emphasis on the importance of the 
aesthetic „unity‟ of life; but, meanwhile, his understanding of that unity also 
demonstrated a surprising variety. He found this unity first of all in an idealised 
Scholar-Gipsy, who warded off the multitudinousness of daily life by focusing only 
on that „one aim, one business, one desire‟ (l. 152). As a poet, Arnold also identified 
unity as a desirable quality in poetry: only through the description of actions that were 
unified and essential, as he once said, could poetic works capture the essence of 
human life. Ultimately, he wanted unity to be the characteristic not only of individuals 
but also of the „state.‟ This, according to works such as Culture and Anarchy, was to 
be the most effective cure for Victorian sectarianism. The faith in aesthetic unity or, 
rather, the conviction that such a unity must be cultivated for the present age, thus 
became for Arnold an „idea of the world,‟ which prompted him to join debates on a 
whole range of subjects, undergoing the same evolution as Mill and Ruskin. 
Such an evolution from artist to economist and even politician, I argue, is 
inevitable. Initially, the three aesthetic educators were all drawn to art and literature in 
order to search for the ideal beauty. But at some point in their life, they all realised 
that artworks could not illustrate beauty if the people that produced them were 
spiritually or morally deformed. The revelation was well articulated by Ruskin in his 
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study of Gothic architecture. According to him, Gothic stones were able to express 
true beauty because their creator worked both manually and intellectually. His hands 
followed his own heart. Only by doing so did he manage to turn those stones into 
subjects „of the most noble human intelligence.‟ 520  Modern craftsmanship, by 
contrast, separated the intellectual from the manual. Thus a common workman no 
longer followed his heart; he followed principles that were established by others. In 
order to produce a „perfect‟ artwork, all he needed to do was to obey the rules and to 
make „right‟ shapes. As a result, the work produced, however refined it appeared, was 
„„the slave‟s work‟ which, according to Ruskin, was merely a mindless copy that 
contained neither thought nor beauty. Thus, the problem of modern art turned out to 
be a symptom of modern society, in which the division of labour and gross inequality 
stifled the spirit of invention and, consequently, the spirit of beauty.
521
 This was one 
of the primary drives that led Ruskin from art to political economy: in order to restore 
that noble beauty to art, one must think of a solution to the condition of modern 
workmen. 
 In his 1853 Preface, Arnold expressed a similar conviction. He insisted that in the 
present age, poets should return to the past – ancient Greece, for example – for 
materials, because the present age could not nourish great poetry. When asked to write 
poetry by drawing subjects from the present age, poets (with whom Arnold identified 
himself) would reply  
 
that with all this they can do nothing; that the elements they need for the 
exercise of their art are great actions, calculated powerfully and delightfully 
to affect what is permanent in the human soul; that so far as the present age 
can supply such actions, they will gladly make use of them; but that an age 
wanting in moral grandeur can with difficulty supply such, and an age of 
spiritual discomfort with difficulty be powerfully and delightfully affected by 
them.
522
 
 
This, Arnold added, was not just the best way to produce great poetry in the present 
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age; it was also the best way for contemporary poets to serve their own age, which, 
because of „industrial development‟ and „spiritual discomfort,‟ had become very 
„unpoetic.‟523 Eventually, in „The Study of Poetry‟ (1888), Arnold would equal poetry 
to criticism: poetry, he said, was in essence „a criticism of life.‟524 Many critics read 
this remark as a declaration on the importance of poetry; yet, in my view, it also gives 
us a good clue as to why Arnold felt so compelled to have a „second life‟ as a social 
and cultural critic. Once again, I would like to quote Shaw, who, on another occasion, 
made an equally perceptive – though slightly sarcastic – comment on Ruskin. People 
like him, Shaw said, had „enormous social appetites and very fastidious personal 
ones‟: 
 
They are not content with handsome houses: they want handsome cities. 
They are not content with bediamonded wives and blooming daughters: they 
complain because the charwoman is badly dressed, because the laundress 
smells of gin, because the sempstress is anemic […]. They turn up their noses 
at their neighbour's drains, and are made ill by the architecture of their 
neighbor's houses. Trade patterns made to suit vulgar people do not please 
them (and they can get nothing else): they cannot sleep nor sit at ease upon 
„slaughtered‟ cabinet makers' furniture. The very air is not good enough for 
them: there is too much factory smoke in it. They even demand abstract 
conditions: justice, honor, a noble moral atmosphere, a mystic nexus to 
replace the cash nexus.
525
 
 
This comment applies to all the aesthetic educators mentioned in the present thesis. 
All of them, through a life-long search for ideal beauty, developed the conviction that 
beauty could not exist where the cultural milieu remained sick, and if one wanted to 
have a genuine aesthetic experience, one must always set off to fix society first. 
 In this sense, Victorian aesthetic educators were invariably social critics. Indeed, 
it has been my purpose in this thesis to highlight the social concerns behind their 
inquiries into beauty and art. And I emphasise in particular their role as „critics,‟ so 
that my portraits would set a clear contrast against those of Bourdieu (whose ideas 
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have been briefly discussed in the introduction), who regards these people as „agents‟ 
that carry out social amelioration. Contrary to Bourdieu‟s argument, I argue that the 
primary task of those social critics was not to disseminate middle-class ideologies but, 
quite the contrary, to challenge them. Bourdieu‟s theory identifies aesthetic choices as 
a demonstration of class conflict. He does so, I think, because he looks at the 
bourgeoisie exclusively as the disseminator of „cultural capital,‟ and regards the lower 
class exclusively as the receiver of that capital. As he said himself: 
 
Lacking the internalized cultural capital which is the pre-condition for correct 
appropriation (according to the legitimate definition) of the cultural capital 
objectified in technical objects, ordinary workers are dominated by the 
machines and instruments which they serve rather than use, and by those 
possess the legitimate, i.e. theoretical, means of dominating them.
526
 
 
Hence, in the realm of education, „which teaches respect for useless, disinterested 
knowledge‟ such as what beauty is, „workers encounter legitimate culture as a 
principle of order which does not need to demonstrate its practical utility in order to 
be justified.‟ 527 So, in Bourdieu‟s understanding, the middle class transmits to the 
lower class the knowledge of aesthetics, which, being an abstract embodiment of „a 
principle of order,‟ is by itself a cultural classifier and a tool of domination. In the 
examples that I cited in the introduction, scholars, such as Morris, clearly adopt 
Bourdieu‟s critique when they sneer at Victorian aesthetic education as something 
„stylized as disinterestedness‟ and informed by „cultural capitalism.‟ Varnelis‟ 
criticism of Ruskin suggests a similar mentality when it introduces his teaching as the 
teaching of „an eternal truth outside of context or history‟ and argues that, far from 
contextless or ahistorical, it is actually „founded on class distinction.‟528 
However, if we take more seriously the intention of the Victorian aesthetic 
educators, it becomes evident that the most urgent task as they perceived it was not 
the domination of the lower class but the education of the people who were socially 
and economically influential in their society. First of all, it was precisely the so-called 
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„middle classes‟ that constituted the main body of the intended audience of many of 
their works. This has already been pointed out by T. W. Heyck in his study of 
intellectuals in the Victorian period. The published writings of those men of letters, as 
Heyck observes, exercised great influence upon the governing body of society, 
because the population of the electorate, similar to that of the reading public, had an 
„essentially middle-class composition.‟529 In fact, to focus on the middle class as the 
target audience helped the speakers to ensure the effectiveness of their writings; thus, 
„through their newspapers, periodicals and books, the men of letters wrote directly for 
all the people who counted in decision-making.‟530 Heyck‟s judgment is testified by 
many Victorians and their works. One could immediately think of, for example, 
Ruskin and his 1864 lectures (later published under the title of Sesame and Lilies) 
which were meant to be a treaty on aesthetic education but which also had the more 
practical purpose of raising funds from the audience for the foundation of a library. 
 On the other hand, the middle classes also attracted special attention because of 
their unsatisfactory performance. While it is true that Matthew Arnold‟s Culture and 
Anarchy, which propounded the aesthetic unity of human nature against chaos and 
sectarianism, was written after he witnessed the mob riot in Hyde Park in 1866, the 
voice in the book never sets out to teach the working class on the issue of beauty; 
rather, it was the middle class philistines that received the most severe attack. As he 
had stated elsewhere: „The great work to be done in this country and at this hour, is 
not with the lower class, but with the middle; the work of raising its whole level of 
civilisation,‟ and aesthetic cultivation, one could add, is exactly a vital part in Arnold‟s 
civilisation-raising plan for the middle classes.
531
 Yet again, this decision was based 
on the consideration that the middle class had „risen into such preponderating 
importance of late years, and now returns to the House of Commons, dictates the 
policy of Ministers, makes the newspapers speak with its voice, and in short governs 
the country.‟532 Poorly educated yet immensely influential in social values, the 
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middle classes were identified by Arnold to be the chief target of aesthetic education, 
because to educate them was to bring refinement to a great part of society. 
Thus viewed, the aesthetic education proposed by Victorians aimed not to 
disseminate cultural capital but to modify it. If the relationship between the middle 
classes and the lower classes should still be described as one between teacher and 
student, then Mill, Arnold and Ruskin‟s indoctrination of that disinterested knowledge 
of beauty is in fact an education of the educators or, to be more precise, a kind of 
self-education, since they themselves were middle-class Victorians. In this sense, the 
aesthetic education that they envisaged is in essence a self-reflection and self-critique. 
The ideal beauty that they aspired to is the very thing that they found themselves – 
collectively – having failed to produce. 
This recognition, I think, also explains the idealistic tendency in their argument. 
Commenting on the appeal of idealism in the nineteenth century, Ben Knights has 
provided an interesting account from the perspective of collective psychology. 
Idealism, he argues, embodying a tendency towards „monism‟ and „nostalgia for 
system,‟ „has been likely to find adherence in periods of rapid and perplexing 
symbolic change.‟533 Here, Knights is talking about a general intellectual tendency in 
the Victorian period; yet, I think his conclusion is equally true for Victorian aesthetic 
educators, who sought to impose form over chaos, to use culture to combat anarchy, 
to regain beauty and harmony in a fast-changing society and, in sum, to recover what 
the Victorian society seemed to be losing hold of. This was well suggested in Arnold‟s 
superlative statement that an ideal „state‟ would provide aesthetic education that 
brought out „the best self‟ as well as „the most completest and most harmonious 
development‟ in human nature. It was also illustrated by Mill‟s characterisation of art 
as „the endeavour after perfection,‟ his own unremitting effort at achieving the perfect 
equipoise by reconciling two extremes – romantic and utilitarian, aesthetic and 
intellectual – and, above all, his controversial model of „elitist‟ civilisation in which 
the love of beauty is spread to all.
534
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In the case of Ruskin, who had a more artistic temperament than the other two, 
this idealism informs not only his romantic description of the imagery of an aesthetic 
garden, a Neverland where the path was „strewn with flowers‟;535 it also consists in 
his memorable description of a „perfect country‟. „That country is the richest,‟ said 
Ruskin in 1860, 
 
which nourishes the greatest numbers of noble and happy human beings; that 
man is richest, who, having perfected the functions of his own life to the 
utmost, has also the widest helpful influence, both personal, and by means of 
his possessions, over the lives of others.
536
 
 
This idea partly materialised when Ruskin founded the Guild of St. George, a 
charitable fund, in 1870. The fund was, as many critics have noted, a utopian project. 
For this reason, its political and economic arrangements have attracted much interest. 
But I want to point out that Ruskin‟s utopia is also highly aesthetic. While defining 
the guild‟s general layout, he took extra care to specify principles in dress, 
architecture and all types of decorations. For instance, workers in the guild must be 
dressed in a plain manner, according to Ruskin, but it was also necessary to maintain 
„various splendour.‟ As for the adornment of women, they should be „golden 
ornaments of the finest workmanship‟ and „jewellery of uncut gems‟ such as 
„agates.‟537 So Ruskin was, by all means, „obsessed‟ with aesthetic details, and this 
would appear to many politicians or economists as curiously irrelevant: what is the 
connection, one might ask, between an agate and a perfect community? However, 
when we read Ruskin from the perspective of aesthetic education – in fact, if we have 
been tracing those three people‟s turns of mind regarding the cultivation of the 
beautiful – this „obsession‟ becomes perfectly reasonable. The Utopia was based on 
the aesthetic education that Ruskin had devised; yet, more significantly, it was the 
product of frustration that Ruskin and many other aesthetic educators had experienced 
within their own middle-class community. Being disappointed with what they had 
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encountered in daily life, where violations of aesthetic principles seemed everywhere, 
they were compelled to build a place in which ideal beauty and ideal society merged 
together, a place nowhere to be found in the Victorian world. In this sense, I think 
Terry Eagleton‟s understanding of „aesthetics‟ is more appropriate in the Victorian 
context than the theory of Bourdieu. „Aesthetics,‟ Eagleton maintains, 
 
are not only incipiently materialist; they also provide, at the very heart of the 
Enlightenment, the most powerful available critique of bourgeois possessive 
individualism and appetitive egoism. […] The aesthetic may be the language 
of political hegemony and an imaginary consolation for a bourgeois bereft of 
a home but it is also, in however idealist a vein, the discourse of utopian 
critique of the bourgeois social order.
538
 
 
A „utopian critique‟ of social order, in my view, is exactly what the Victorian 
aesthetic educators provided. Thus, despite their disagreements and even occasional 
animosity against each other, Mill, Arnold and Ruskin were all working on the same 
project. And this project was to be carried on. In 1891, William Morris, an aesthete 
who also had a typical middle-class background, published a utopian fiction, titled 
News from Nowhere. In the story, the Victorian protagonist awakes to find himself 
transported to a future England. The new society strikes him with its amazing social 
structures and perfection everywhere. But, first of all, it dazzles him with its exquisite 
beauty: the Thames is still there, but instead of the foul black water that has disturbed 
the Victorians for many years, the protagonist, under the guidance of a „manly refined 
young gentleman,‟ sees a river from which  
 
[t]he soap-works with their smoke-vomiting chimneys were gone; the 
engineer‟s works gone; the lead-works gone; and no sound of riveting and 
hammering came down the west wind from Thorneycroft‟s. Then the bridge! 
I had perhaps dreamed of such a bridge, but never seen such an one out of an 
illuminated manuscript; for not even the Ponte Vecchio at Florence came 
anywhere near it. It was of stone arches, splendidly solid, and as graceful as 
they were strong; high enough also to let ordinary river traffic through easily. 
Over the parapet showed quaint and fanciful little buildings, which I 
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supposed to be booths or shops, beset with painted and gilded vanes and 
spirelets. The stone was a little weathered, but showed no marks of the grimy 
sootiness which I was used to on every London building more than a year old. 
In short, to me a wonder of a bridge.
539
 
 
So it is a river from which all traces of acquisitive industrialism have been removed, a 
bridge where beauty is fully restored and, above all, a society in which aesthetic 
cultivation has been successfully implemented. Once again, it is interesting to note 
how the author depicted the beauty of the river and the bridge by emphasising what 
they were not. This was a riverbank with no „chimneys,‟ no „engineer‟s work,‟ no 
„lead-works‟ and „no sound of riveting and hammering.‟ And the bridge was made of 
stones that showed „no marks of the grimy sootiness‟ on every London building. The 
passage offers the reader a charming picture of an aesthetic Utopia; but, meanwhile, 
the narratives and descriptions also keep reminding them that this „picture‟ was 
painted by a Victorian who was familiar with and detested the chimneys, the 
lead-works and the sootiness everywhere.  
Here we might compare Morris‟ picture of river in future England with the report 
of another riverside scene in 1884 from In the Slums by D. Rice-Jones, a clergyman 
who once worked and lived in Central London. On a cold rainy winter morning, the 
author happens to be walking over Vauxhall Bridge and sees from there „a huge 
unsightly pile of buildings used as a coal depot in connection with the adjoining 
gasworks‟ and around it numerous „black barges‟ and „iron buckets.‟540 Yet there is 
something more disturbing than the coal-heaving; for there the author also notices that 
 
the shore was swarming with children, -- boys and girls of all ages from six 
or seven up to fourteen or fifteen, some of them knee-deep in the water, and 
others knee-deep in the mud. There were from fifty to a hundred of them 
there in all, and most of them were busily engaged as if in search of 
something. Most of them also had a basket, although in some cases there 
were two children to one basket, or small hamper.
541
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Later he realises that the children are in fact working with several adults, similarly 
poor, to search for „a bit of fuel to warm their desolate hearths.‟542 And this, we 
should add, is what a riverside scene truly was when Morris painted his Utopia. In this 
sense, Morris‟ future England is a parable; it is an aesthetic ideal that aims to explore 
all kinds of inadequacy within the nineteenth-century society. As an imagined world, 
it is indeed „news from nowhere,‟ but as a utopian critique of the existent social reality, 
the future England – just as Mill‟s „civilisation,‟ Arnold‟s „state‟ and Ruskin‟s „guild‟ – 
is, in fact, an importance piece of news for the present. 
 It is news for the „present‟ also in the sense that the utopian picture provides 
insight into „our‟ present. Perhaps few people could deny that the world we are 
currently living in is a place where economic interests play a significant – if not 
paramount – part in virtually every aspect of daily life. Bourdieu‟s theory is but one 
example of how that reality affects our understanding of the value of art and beauty. 
Later scholars could be even more explicit about the so-called „aesthetic economy.‟ In 
1995 Marc Shell, professor of comparative literature at Harvard University, published 
a book entitled „Art and Money.‟ The opening sentence of its introduction is as 
straightforward as its title: „In recent years, the price of artworks has skyrocketed.‟543 
Shell then proceeds to specify his intentions and, in doing so, he mentions the 
traditional study of the „external political economy of art.‟ According to Shell, this is 
the tradition established by John Ruskin and his Political Economy of Art (1857), a 
tradition where critics 
 
study such problems as the place of art as commodity in national economy, 
the general disappearance from public sphere of costly artworks, the business 
of investing in painting, the role of patrons and dealers, the motives for 
private collecting, the politics of mass distribution, the commercial effects of 
museums, the influence of advertisement, and the scholarly appeal of artists‟ 
account books.
544
  
 
One could not be entirely sure if this is a proper summary of Ruskin‟s idea of art. For 
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my part, I would say it is not, since Ruskin had been such a devoted champion of 
moral-aesthetic education, as we witness from his works previously discussed. 
Nevertheless, Art and Money won many positive reviews upon its publication. In Art 
Journal, for instance, the reviewer Hannah Feldman puts this book side by side with 
Martha Woodmansee‟s The Author, Art and the Market, a work that also argues about 
the „professional and economic interests‟ of artists and, for that matter, the „dark‟ truth 
of aesthetic.
545
 Moreover, Feldman also identifies these works as a powerful response 
against the supposition „born first in Kant's writings on aesthetics and later revitalized 
through the doctrine of high modernism – that true artistic practice remains immune 
to economic concerns‟ and praises in particular Shell‟s insight that „art, as a 
representational practice, is always already like money.‟546  
There is indeed nothing wrong in exposing the economic concerns within the 
issue of aesthetic, but in doing so, it is important to remember that the story always 
has the other side. Thus, while asserting that art resembles money, one must also be 
aware that art, beauty and aesthetic has many more facets than the „external political 
economic‟ one. When agreeing with Feldman‟s argument that true artistic practice is 
never immune to economic concerns, it is also necessary to add that economic 
concerns do not therefore become primary in artistic practice or, for that matter, in the 
way we look at art and beauty.
547
 After all, we should recall that art and beauty, even 
in the „tradition‟ that Shell describes, are not merely entities of political economic 
significance but have strong moral implications. Beauty, in Mill‟s idea, consists partly 
in the cordial fellow feelings and therefore functions as the key ingredient for modern 
community and cooperation. For Arnold, beauty is in essence a harmonious 
development of human nature, the ideal that human development seeks after. In the 
views of Ruskin, the author of Political Economy of Art, the beauty of artworks could 
only be fully appreciated by a nature morally upright. In this way, the utopian vision 
that their works provide reminds us – people in the twenty-first-century context – that 
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aesthetic cultivation is meant to be a cultivation of ideal humanity and that art, in spite 
of its skyrocketing price, has yet an educational role to play: this particular type of 
culture assists human beings to explore their intellectual and moral potentials, to 
benefit their community, and not to lose themselves in investing, collecting and price 
tagging. So long as it stands as the ideal of human development, aesthetic cultivation 
as discussed by those Victorian minds does not conceal any truth; rather, with its 
emphasis on the cultivation of humanity, the message that they passed on illuminates 
our understanding of the function of art and beauty in our own time.  
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